Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of second degree sexual assault, incest, detaining with intent to defile, and conspiracy. Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court (1) erred by allowing the State to admit in its case in chief eight pornographic file names obtained during a search of his personal laptop computer, (2) erroneously applied the Rape Shield statute in refusing to allow him to admit into evidence a notebook maintained by the victim, and (3) erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of his illegal drug and alcohol use. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial, holding (1) the court committed reversible error by failing to fully evaluate the admissibility of pornographic file names pursuant to a McGinnis hearing; and (2) the court erroneously applied the Rape Shield statute in refusing to allow Petitioner to admit the victim's notebook into evidence. Remanded. View "State v. Jonathan B." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of his former girlfriend. Defendant appealed, submitting several assignments of error. The State conceded error with regard to two of those assignments but argued that the errors were harmless. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) it was constitutional error under the Confrontation Clause for the trial court to admit into evidence the autopsy report and to permit the chief medical examiner for the State to testify as a surrogate witness in place of the deputy assistant medical examiner, who conducted the forensic investigation into the circumstances of the victim's death; and (2) the error was not harmless, as the State failed to demonstrate that the autopsy finding and conclusions did not contribute to the verdict. View "State v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the circuit court's order granting permanent guardianship of her two children to Respondent, their paternal grandmother. Petitioner asserted that the circuit court erred in exercising jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and by transferring custody from a biological mother without a finding of unfitness. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order awarding guardianship to Respondent, restored Petitioner's custodial rights, and remanded the matter, holding (1) it was error for the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the UCCJEA; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to consider the evidence of abuse and neglect underlying this guardianship proceeding and in transferring custody of the minor children from a natural parent without a finding of unfitness. View "In re K.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against a hospital, several doctors, and others. Two of the doctors were employed by a corporate entity and treated patients exclusively at the hospital in accordance with a contractual relationship between the hospital and the entity. The third doctor provided surgical services at the hospital in accordance with a contract he executed with a corporation that contracted with hospital to provide a "surgicalist" program, an arrangement that provided the hospital with surgeons. Plaintiffs sought to hold the hospital vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of the doctors on the theory that the doctors were employees or actual agents of the hospital, or that the doctors and corporate defendants were engaged in a joint venture with the hospital. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, holding (1) the doctors were not actual agents or employees of the hospital at the time of the alleged negligence, and (2) there was no joint venture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Cunningham v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem'l Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Ida Trayter. Trayter's insurer tendered its liability limits, after which Plaintiffs sought underinsured motorist coverage from their insurer, State Farm. State Farm advised Plaintiffs that its settlement offer would be based on the "net" value of the claim after reduction of the liability limits and medical payments already received by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed suit against State Farm seeking a declaratory judgment that a non-duplication provision and reimbursement provision in State Farm's underinsured motorist policy violated W. Va. Code 33-6-31(b). The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs, finding both provisions at issue violated the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a non-duplication of benefits provision in an underinsured motorist policy, which permits an insurer to reduce an insured's damages by amounts received under medical payments coverage, does not violate the "no sums payable" language of section 33-6-31(b), and the circuit court erred in holding otherwise; and (2) the circuit court's consideration of and entry of summary judgment on the reimbursement provision was erroneous because the provision was not ripe for adjudication in this matter. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schatken" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to the offense of escape from custody. Thereafter, Petitioner appealed his conviction pursuant to the sentencing order of the circuit court, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea to this offense because his act of leaving home confinement only amounted to a violation of pre-trial bail condition rather than an escape from custody or confinement. Petitioner further argued that the lower court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to the State for costs associated with apprehending him following his unauthorized departure from home confinement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Petitioner's conviction, holding that Petitioner effectively waived or forfeited his right to appeal his conviction by failing to enter a conditional guilty plea or otherwise preserve the matter for review; and (2) reversed the imposition of restitution, holding that the restitution provisions of the Victim Protection Act do not extend to recovery of costs or expenses incurred by governmental agencies in apprehending perpetrators of criminal acts. View "State v. McGill" on Justia Law

In the instant case, the Supreme Court was once again asked to consider whether medical protective orders are valid and enforceable to limit the dissemination and retention of medical records obtained through discovery. Such orders had been entered in lawsuits filed by plaintiffs seeking compensation for the injuries they sustained in motor vehicle accidents caused by other motorists. Repeatedly, the insurers from whom such compensation had been sought requested the West Virginia Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, and a federal district court to invalidate these protective orders as burdensome, restrictive, and/or unconstitutional. Each time the reviewing Court examined these medical protective orders, it upheld the order as substantively valid and enforceable as a proper exercise of the issuing court's supervisory authority over discovery. In the instant case, the Court again declined insurance companies' invitation to invalidate the subject medical protective orders, finding that the insurance companies' arguments were insufficient to overturn precedent. View "State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff learned his confidential medical and psychological information at St. Mary's Medical Center had been improperly accessed, Plaintiff filed several state-law claims against St. Mary's. The circuit court granted St. Mary's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state-law claims based upon its conclusion that the claims were preempted by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). In addition, St. Mary's asserted a cross assignment of error arguing that the circuit court erred by finding that Plaintiff's claims did not fall under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) and concluding, therefore, that Plaintiff was not required to file a notice of claim and screening certificate of merit. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it granted St. Mary's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based upon its conclusion that Plaintiff's state-law claims were preempted by HIPAA, holding that Plaintiff's state-law claims for the wrongful disclosure of his medical and personal health information were not preempted by HIPAA; and (2) affirmed the order to the extent it found Plaintiff's claims did not fall under the MPLA. Remanded. View "R.K. v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved an automobile accident which resulted in the death of fourteen-year-old Samantha Staubs and serious injury to her sister, thirteen-year-old Jessica Staubs. Both were passengers in a vehicle stolen and driven by fourteen-year-old Misty Johnson, who was intoxicated. Respondent Lori Ann Staubs, the mother of Samantha and Jessica, filed suit against Petitioner Jonathan Marcus and others, alleging that Petitioner negligently provided alcohol to the minors. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent on the issue of liability and concluded that Petitioner was at least one percent negligent and Jessica was less than fifty percent negligent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment because disputed issues of material fact pervaded the matter. Remanded. View "Marcus v. Staubs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with Stephen Stanton. At the time, Plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his employer, Bambardier Aerospace Corporation, and Stanton was driving a vehicle owned by his employer, the City of Elkins. Plaintiff and his wife filed an action against the City and Stanton to recover for injuries. Plaintiffs' personal automobile insurer, Westfield Insurance, filed a crossclaim against the City and Stanton and a third party claim against Bombardier and National Union Fire Insurance. The trial court entered an order finding (1) the City, Stanton, and National were immune from liability; (2) Bombardier and Westfield were subject to a payment of damages of not more than $20,000 each; and (3) Plaintiffs were not entitled to auto medical coverage under the policy covering Bombardier and the policy issued by Westfield. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order to the extent it held the uninsured motorist policies for Bombardier and Westfield were not enforceable above the mandatory limits of uninsured motorist coverage required by W. Va. Code 33-6-31; (2) reversed the court's order to the extent it denied Plaintiffs auto medical payment benefits under Bombardier's policy; and (3) affirmed the remainder of the court's judgment. View "Jenkins v. City of Elkins" on Justia Law