Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Kristen Nicole Wetzel, was convicted of unlawful taking of a vehicle, also known as "joyriding," under West Virginia Code § 17-8-4(a). As part of a plea agreement, she was sentenced to six months of incarceration, with only ten days of actual confinement and the remainder of the sentence suspended in favor of probation. The court later amended the confinement period to 240 hours of actual incarceration. Wetzel filed a motion to correct her sentence, arguing that the language of the sentencing order was denying her "good time" credit, a reduction of sentence for good conduct.The Circuit Court of Barbour County denied Wetzel's motion. The court found that the issue of good time credit was within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the court. The court also noted that its sentencing order did not prohibit Wetzel from receiving good time credit. If Wetzel believed she should be receiving credit for good time, the court suggested she should file a civil action against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Wetzel's sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on any impermissible factor. The court agreed with the lower court that the issue of good time credit fell within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Therefore, the court found no basis to grant Wetzel any relief under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. View "State of West Virginia v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Kyle Slaughter, who was arrested and charged in two separate counties in West Virginia. In Fayette County, he was arrested after leading police on a high-speed chase and subsequently charged with bribery and other offenses. While incarcerated for these charges, his bond was revoked for separate charges pending in Raleigh County. At sentencing in Fayette County, the court credited Slaughter with thirty days for time served—the time between when he was first incarcerated and when his Raleigh County bond was revoked. Slaughter appealed, arguing that he should have been credited for the entire 263-day period that he was incarcerated.The Circuit Court of Fayette County determined that any credit for time served after Slaughter's bond had been revoked in Raleigh County should be applied to the charges in Raleigh County, not Fayette County. Slaughter appealed this decision, arguing that he should receive credit for the entire period he was incarcerated on the Fayette County charges.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the Circuit Court of Fayette County erred in failing to credit Slaughter for the full 263 days he spent incarcerated on Fayette County charges and awaiting sentencing in Fayette County. The court stated that criminal defendants are entitled to credit for time served awaiting trial and sentencing while incarcerated on the underlying offense if the offense is bailable. However, the court deemed the error harmless and affirmed the lower court's decision because Slaughter was ultimately credited his full time served in the Raleigh County sentencing order. View "State v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

Hagerman used a shotgun to kill his former brother-in-law, while drinking with friends at Hagerman’s home. Charged with first-degree murder, he argued self-defense. After his conviction for second-degree murder, a lesser included offense, Hagerman discovered that six individuals who reside in or near the community of Bradshaw, where the shooting occurred, had been selected for the jury panel but the circuit court had directed the circuit clerk not to call them. The trial court denied Hagerman a new trial, stating: No juror was excluded from the case on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status or being a qualified individual with a disability. The six jurors were from a “tight-knit community” of approximately 259 people, would generally know each other, and would be aware of the local knowledge or gossip. The court reasoned that the jurors would have likely been removed from the jury panel based on their relationships with people involved in the case.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the circuit court violated his right to a randomly selected jury representing a fair cross-section of the community and committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. View "State of West Virginia v. Hagerman" on Justia Law

Ward, charged with felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, moved to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that Raleigh County Sheriff’s Officers arrived at his mother’s residence, questioned him regarding a dispute, and asked him for identification. Ward stated he could retrieve it from “downstairs in [his] mother’s house in the [t]-shirt shop.” Both officers and Ward walked around to the door. Ward opened the door. The officers grabbed the door and followed him in. Ward then walked through another door that led into a separate room used for his t-shirt printing shop. While Ward retrieved his identification, an officer observed a firearm. Ward testified that a person standing at the entryway to the basement door would not have been able to see the firearm because it would have been obscured by two doors and a curtain. The basement was not his residence and there was a lock on the front door. Detective Queen stated that he watched Ward retrieve his identification “[f]or officer safety” although he did not have a specific reason to fear for his safety.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Officers conducted the search and seized the firearm without a warrant; the plain view and officer safety exceptions do not apply. View "State of West Virginia v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the sentencing order of the circuit court and remanded this case with instructions to dismiss Petitioner's conviction for malicious assault and resentence him on the remaining charges, holding that the indictment was insufficient because it did not include an essential element of the offense of malicious assault.Before trial, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the malicious assault count of the indictment because it did not reference the intent to "maim, disfigure, disable or kill." The circuit court denied the motion, finding that a person may commit malicious assault (1) by maliciously shooting, stabbing, cutting, or wounding any person; or (2) by any means causing a person bodily injury with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentencing order, holding (1) the intent to main, disfigure, disable, or kill is an essential element of the offenses of malicious assault and unlawful assault pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-29; and (2) therefore, the indictment in this case was insufficient. View "State v. Maichle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction of sexual assault in the first degree following a jury trial, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree; (2) did not err when it denied Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial regarding a photographic identification; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it denied an in camera hearing on the suggestibility of the pretrial photographic identification; and (4) did not err when it denied Petitioner's motions for a mistrial due to vouching. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court finding that Petitioner violated the conditions of his supervised release and revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to a two-year term in prison, holding that United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. __ (2019), does not apply to a supervised release revocation pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-12-26 because section 61-12-26 does not require a mandatory minimum sentence upon revocation.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the revocation of Petitioner's supervised release pursuant to W. Va. Code 62-12-26 did not violate Petitioner's constitutional rights; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition or by sentencing Petitioner to a term of imprisonment without holding a jury trial when revoking his supervised release; and (3) the circuit court did not clearly err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner conspired to deliver crack cocaine, in violation of conditions of his supervised release. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's appeal from his plea of no contest to obstructing an officer on the basis that Petitioner's no-contest plea in magistrate court resolved the case and barred Petitioner from pursuing appellate review in circuit court, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the appeal.Petitioner pled no contest in magistrate court to obstructing an officer and attempted to appeal the conviction to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that Petitioner's no-contest plea in magistrate court barred him from pursuing appellate review in circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under W.Va. Code 50-5-13(a) a defendant such as Petitioner may timely appeal a conviction in magistrate court to circuit court; and (2) section 50-5-13(a) and (b) afforded Petitioner a trial de novo, to the circuit court, without a jury. View "State v. Folse" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court reversing the final order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding Respondent's administrative driver's license revocation for a period of five years for driving under the influence, holding that the circuit court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the OAH and in using its determination as a basis for overturning the OAH's decision.After a hearing, the circuit court concluded that the OAH improperly weighed results of field sobriety tests against the negative findings of secondary chemical tests and that Respondent's expert's "unrebutted" testimony supported the negative findings of the secondary chemical test. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the OAH's factual determination that Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent had ingested controlled substances impairing his ability to operate a motor vehicle was entitled to substantial deference; and (2) the evidence in this case supported that factual determination. View "Frazier v. Ramadan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the amended sentencing order and the denial of Petitioner's motion for a judgment of acquittal, holding that there was no error in Petitioner's convictions or sentences.Petitioner was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in a position of trust (counts one through four) and four counts of sexual abuse in the first degree (counts five through eight). Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The circuit court corrected Petitioner's sentence as to count four. In these consolidated appeals, Petition raised an ex post facto violation relative to the jury's instruction and, alternatively, sought a reduction in his sentence based on ex post facto principles baed on the fact that his criminal conduct that led to his conviction on count three occurred before the statute was amended to increase the penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence of sexual abuse after the statutory amendments to subject him to the harsher penalty; and (2) did not err in denying Petitioner's motion for a judgment of acquittal. View "State v. Todd C." on Justia Law