Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two separate cases were filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by administrators of the estates of deceased individuals who died while incarcerated in West Virginia regional jails. The plaintiffs alleged that jail staff and medical providers failed to respond to the decedents’ serious medical needs, resulting in death or injury. Both complaints included claims against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) for negligence, negligent training, and “deliberate indifference in violation of clearly established West Virginia law,” but explicitly disclaimed reliance on federal law or constitutional claims, instead seeking damages under state common law.DCR moved to dismiss the deliberate indifference counts, arguing that West Virginia common law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law.” The Circuit Court denied the motions, concluding that such a claim was recognized by prior West Virginia Supreme Court decisions and supported by decisions from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). DCR then filed petitions in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia seeking writs of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court orders denying dismissal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter and granted the writs of prohibition. The Court held that a claim for damages for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law” is not cognizable under the common law of West Virginia. The Court determined that prior decisions, including Nobles v. Duncil, did not establish such a cause of action, but rather recognized deliberate indifference as a legal standard in constitutional claims, most often under federal law. The orders by the Circuit Court were found to be clearly erroneous as a matter of law and thus were prohibited from enforcement. View "State ex rel. Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Salango" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old, K.B., was the subject of a juvenile delinquency proceeding for possession of a controlled substance. During the hearing, K.B. alleged that she was subjected to physical and emotional abuse by her mother and grandmother. The circuit court judge, upon hearing these allegations, initiated a separate administrative proceeding and ordered the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) to investigate and report on the allegations, particularly because five other children resided in the home. Despite DHS finding the allegations unsubstantiated after multiple investigations and interviews, the court continued to direct further investigation and ultimately ordered DHS to “open a case” for services following a separate disclosure of alleged sexual abuse by one sibling against another. The administrative proceeding was repeatedly reopened and extended, with the circuit court directing specific actions, such as ordering a psychosexual evaluation of the alleged perpetrator, even when law enforcement had not filed any charges.Over several months, status hearings were held jointly with the ongoing juvenile delinquency case. The circuit court’s involvement extended to specifying interventions and requiring further DHS actions, despite the lack of substantiated abuse findings and objections from DHS and the prosecutor about the court’s authority. Eventually, the circuit court entered an order directing DHS to file a formal child abuse and neglect petition within fourteen days or face contempt, prompting DHS to seek relief from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate judicial authority and violated the separation of powers by ordering DHS to file an abuse and neglect petition. The court found that statutory authority to investigate and initiate such petitions resides solely with the executive branch, and the judiciary cannot compel the executive to file a petition in the absence of statutory prerequisites. The June 4, 2026, order was found clearly erroneous and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Cohee" on Justia Law

The case involves two parents whose children were removed from their home after allegations of truancy, poor living conditions, physical abuse, and felony child abuse charges. After an unsuccessful improvement period, the parents stipulated to certain allegations and were adjudicated as abusive and neglectful. The circuit court initially granted them post-adjudicatory improvement periods, but they failed to comply with requirements, tested positive for cocaine, and missed a status hearing. Their improvement periods were terminated, and at the dispositional hearing, although there were motions to terminate parental rights, the court decided it was not in the children's best interests to do so. Instead, the children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS), with limited visitation granted to the parents.Subsequently, the parents and their counsel did not participate in several permanency review hearings due to confusion about their roles and responsibilities after the initial disposition. Notices were inconsistently sent, and the parents were functionally excluded from key proceedings, including multi-disciplinary team meetings and decisions about visitation, which was eventually discontinued. The guardian ad litem later moved to modify disposition and terminate parental rights. The circuit court "reappointed" counsel and held a contested hearing where the parents argued they had not received proper notice. The court found a material change in circumstances and terminated parental rights, reasoning that the children no longer wished to be reunified and had bonded with their foster family.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court substantially disregarded statutory and procedural requirements by functionally excluding the parents and failing to make the statutory findings necessary for termination of parental rights under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). The court vacated the order terminating parental rights and remanded for further proceedings consistent with statutory and procedural requirements. View "In re A.S." on Justia Law

After being injured in a motorcycle accident, the plaintiff was transported to a designated trauma center and diagnosed with a thoracic vertebra fracture. Initially, a non-surgical treatment was recommended, but the defendant physician offered surgery as an alternative, which the plaintiff chose. Following surgery, the plaintiff suffered permanent paraplegia. He later experienced a stroke, and his life care plan was updated to reflect increased needs after this event. The plaintiff sued the physician for medical negligence, alleging failures in preoperative and intraoperative care, and sought compensatory damages. At trial, issues arose regarding the timeliness and scope of expert witness disclosures, as well as the connection between the surgery and later stroke.In the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, a jury found for the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages and finding the physician not only negligent but reckless. The court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law, including arguments that West Virginia’s Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) “Trauma Cap” should limit damages. The defendant appealed, challenging the court’s rulings on the Trauma Cap and procedural matters. The West Virginia Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in part, but reversed on one issue: it found the trial court abused its discretion by striking a late-disclosed expert opinion on life expectancy, and remanded for a new trial solely on damages.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the physician bore the burden to invoke and prove the factual predicates for the Trauma Cap’s application, which he failed to do. The court affirmed that the MPLA Trauma Cap did not apply and upheld most trial court rulings. However, it reversed the appellate court’s order for a new trial on damages, finding no abuse of discretion in striking the late life expectancy expert opinion. The September 12, 2022, judgment was reinstated. View "Orphanos v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

A state agency and two of its Child Protective Services (CPS) workers were sued by parents whose child was allegedly assaulted by another child at a youth baseball game. The CPS workers were present to supervise a visitation between a child in state custody and her family, following prior allegations of sexual assault by her brother, who had since been returned to his family. The plaintiffs alleged that the CPS workers knew of the brother’s history, observed him with their child, and failed to intervene, resulting in the assault.After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, arguing both qualified and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied summary judgment, focusing on whether the CPS workers were grossly negligent under a statutory exception to personal liability. The court concluded there was enough evidence for a jury to decide if gross negligence occurred, without conducting a qualified immunity analysis.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the appeal. It conducted a de novo analysis and determined that the CPS workers’ supervision of the family visitation constituted discretionary governmental functions, entitling them and the agency to qualified immunity unless the plaintiffs could show a violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct. The court found the plaintiffs’ cited statutes and policy manual provisions were too general or insufficiently specific to defeat qualified immunity and that no evidence of malicious or oppressive conduct was presented.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the defendants and dismiss them from the lawsuit, holding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from these claims. View "Department of Human Services v. A.Z." on Justia Law

A dispute arose following a 2016 chlorine gas leak at a chemical plant in West Virginia, where IPI, Inc. employees, including its president, Matthew Joseph Taylor, were injured and IPI’s equipment was damaged while performing power washing and industrial painting services for Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corporation and Westlake Natrium LLC (collectively Westlake). The parties operated under two interrelated service agreements containing indemnity provisions. After the incident, IPI and Taylor sued Westlake for personal injury and property damage. Westlake counterclaimed, arguing that IPI breached the indemnity agreements by bringing suit and owed Westlake indemnification for Taylor’s claims.The Circuit Court of Marshall County applied Pennsylvania law, granted summary judgment to Westlake, and found the indemnity agreements clearly required IPI to indemnify Westlake, even for claims arising from Westlake’s own negligence, except in cases of Westlake’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. The court ruled that IPI’s claims fell within the scope of the agreements, including damages from the chlorine gas release, and certified its order as final under Rule 54(b). On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the application of Pennsylvania law but concluded that the circuit court erred by not analyzing the possible conflict between the two indemnity provisions and by insufficiently explaining why the claims fell within their scope. The ICA remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo, holding that the two indemnity provisions should be read together, not in conflict, and that both unequivocally require IPI to indemnify Westlake for its own negligence. However, the court found ambiguities regarding the scope of indemnity and the application of exceptions, necessitating factual development through parol evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to the circuit court. View "Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corp. v. IPI, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1902, F.W. Severin conveyed 117.55 acres of land in Doddridge County, West Virginia, to L.D. Nicholson, reserving “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” for himself. Over time, Nicholson’s successors leased their oil and gas interests, and, in 2017, production began, resulting in royalty payments. Disputes arose regarding the respective interests of Severin’s and Nicholson’s successors in the oil and gas estate, leading to litigation. The central issue was whether Severin’s reservation in the deed constituted a one-sixteenth or a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate.The Circuit Court of Doddridge County, in a declaratory judgment order dated September 28, 2022, concluded that the deed was unambiguous and that Severin had reserved a one-half interest in the oil and gas mineral estate. The court reasoned that, in the context of 1902 West Virginia oil and gas law, a reservation of one-sixteenth operated as a reservation of one-half of the mineral estate. The Nicholsons appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s judgment on November 13, 2023. The ICA found the deed unambiguous and determined that Severin reserved only a one-sixteenth interest in the oil and gas minerals under the land.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. The Court held that the 1902 deed was unambiguous and that Severin’s reservation of “the one sixteenth of all the oil and gas in and under said land” meant exactly one-sixteenth of the oil and gas mineral estate. The Court rejected arguments for construing the deed in light of historical industry practice or adopting the “estate misconception theory” used in Texas. The ICA’s decision was affirmed. View "Severin POA Group, LLC v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Two affiliated companies operating as a public utility entered into a revenue-based factoring agreement with a financial entity. In exchange for $130,000, the companies agreed to pay future receipts totaling $169,000, granting the financier a security interest in their property. Payments were made for a short period before ceasing. The utility was placed in receivership due to mismanagement and subsequently filed for bankruptcy. The financier filed a claim in bankruptcy, which the bankruptcy court upheld, finding the contract enforceable and not against the public interest, despite arguments about the lack of regulatory approval.Following the bankruptcy, the financier sued the utility and its receiver for breach of contract and other claims in the Circuit Court of Tucker County, and the case was assigned to the Business Division. Meanwhile, the Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated an investigation. The PSC found the contract void as contrary to the public interest, citing improper enrichment of affiliates and harm to utility assets. The Business Court dismissed the breach of contract claim, relying on the PSC’s finding that the contract was void. The financier appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the bankruptcy court’s prior determination was res judicata and bound both the Business Court and the PSC.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. It held that the ICA erred in reversing the Business Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court found that the PSC’s statutory authority to void utility contracts for public interest reasons superseded prior bankruptcy court findings regarding the contract’s enforceability. Because the PSC declared the contract void, there was no contract to breach, and the financier’s claim failed to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court reversed the ICA and remanded the case for dismissal of the breach of contract claim. View "Timberline Four Seasons Utilities, Inc. v. Kapitus Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

During the early morning of February 11, 2018, a shooting occurred at Rehm’s Bar in Huntington, West Virginia, resulting in the death of Brent Jackson from multiple gunshot wounds. Law enforcement responded to the scene and observed two men fleeing: the petitioner, who exchanged gunfire with the bar’s bouncer, and Jordan Jeter, who was seen discarding a firearm and was apprehended. Although Mr. Jeter tested positive for gunshot residue, the police determined that his firearm could not have been the murder weapon and eliminated him as a suspect, focusing their investigation on the petitioner.The petitioner was tried for first-degree murder in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. The State introduced surveillance footage, eyewitness testimony, and statements allegedly made by the petitioner while incarcerated. The defense argued that Mr. Jeter was the shooter, highlighting flaws in the investigation and witness reliability. During trial, a dispute arose regarding whether Mr. Jeter’s plea agreement in federal court would have provided him immunity if he confessed to the murder. The trial judge made a brief comment during this exchange, which the petitioner argues implied judicial endorsement of Mr. Jeter’s innocence. The jury convicted the petitioner of first-degree murder and did not recommend mercy.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case under the plain error doctrine, given the petitioner’s failure to object contemporaneously or request a mistrial. The Court assumed arguendo that the judge’s comment constituted error but found it was not prejudicial. The Court determined the fleeting comment did not affect the outcome, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence and the judge’s instruction that he had no opinion about the facts. The Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "State v. Battle" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted in Jackson County, West Virginia, for multiple offenses, including grand larceny, alleged to have occurred in January 2020. In June 2021, a jury convicted him on all counts. Shortly after conviction, the State filed a recidivist information, asserting that the defendant had prior felony convictions qualifying him for enhanced sentencing under West Virginia’s habitual criminal statutes. The defendant was arraigned on the recidivist information on June 22, 2021, which was the first day of a new term of court, not during the same term in which he was convicted.The Circuit Court of Jackson County denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the recidivist information, reasoning that the term of court had not officially ended until the grand jury was impaneled later on June 22. After a jury determined that the defendant was the person previously convicted of felonies, the court imposed consecutive sentences for the underlying offenses and a life sentence enhancement for grand larceny pursuant to the recidivist statute. The defendant was resentenced for purposes of appeal, and he challenged the timeliness of his arraignment on appeal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s denial de novo and found that, under West Virginia law and court rules, the new term of court began on the fourth Tuesday in June—June 22, 2021—and not when the grand jury was impaneled. The Court held that the statutory requirement for arraignment on a recidivist information during the same term of conviction is mandatory and jurisdictional. Because the defendant was arraigned in the next term, the recidivist enhancement was void. The Court reversed the circuit court’s order imposing a recidivist life sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "State v. Swindler" on Justia Law