Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The West Virginia Board of Education and the State Superintendent sought extraordinary relief after a legislative dispute over the Board’s rulemaking authority. The Board had historically promulgated rules for state schools without legislative pre-approval, but in 2025, the Legislature enacted House Bill 2755, requiring Board rules to be submitted for legislative approval before becoming effective. The Board opposed this, citing the West Virginia Constitution’s grant of “general supervision” of public schools to the Board, and asserting that HB 2755 was unconstitutional. When the Board submitted Policy 4334 directly to the Secretary of State for publication, the Secretary refused to accept it, citing the new statutory requirements.Previously, similar statutory provisions were challenged in 1988, leading to the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia Board of Education v. Hechler, which held that legislative review requirements constituted unconstitutional interference with the Board’s rulemaking power. The Board’s current action was a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that Hechler controlled and rendered HB 2755 unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case under its original jurisdiction. The Court determined that the practical effect of HB 2755 was the same as the statutes struck down in Hechler, requiring legislative approval of Board rules and thus interfering with the Board’s constitutional authority. The Court reaffirmed Hechler and held that rulemaking by the State Board of Education is part of its “general supervision” under Article XII, Section 2 of the West Virginia Constitution, and any statutory provision interfering with such rulemaking is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court granted the writ of mandamus, declared HB 2755 unconstitutional, and ordered the Secretary of State to accept and publish Policy 4334. View "State ex rel. Board of Education v. Warner" on Justia Law

After winning both the Republican primary and the general election for the 91st Delegate District in West Virginia in 2024, Joseph A. de Soto was unable to take the oath of office due to his arrest for alleged threats against other delegates. He entered a bail agreement that restricted his contact with other legislators and put him on home confinement. Subsequently, the West Virginia House of Delegates adopted a resolution declaring his seat vacant, citing his failure to appear to take the oath and referencing his alleged misconduct. Both the Republican and Democratic Executive Committees submitted nominees to fill the vacancy, and the Governor appointed a Republican nominee, Ian Masters, who was seated as delegate.Several procedural missteps ensued, with the petitioners—Mike Pushkin, Stephen Willingham, and the West Virginia Democratic Party—filing multiple petitions for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. These petitions sought to compel the House Speaker to seat Mr. de Soto or, alternatively, to select a replacement from the Democratic nominees. Each petition encountered procedural hurdles, including the failure to provide timely pre-suit notice and to file a timely motion for expedited relief, resulting in dismissals or denials. The petitioners ultimately filed a third petition after attempting to correct notice issues.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the latest petition and denied the request for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that the petitioners lacked standing because their alleged injuries were not redressable by the Court. Specifically, the relief sought depended on actions beyond the respondents’ authority, and there was no vacancy to fill after the Governor’s appointment. Because the Court could not grant the relief requested, it found the petitioners failed to satisfy the redressability prong required for standing and denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Pushkin v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

In 2011, a fourteen-year-old named R.C. reported to her school counselor that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive uncle and biological brother, the respondent in this case. Following the report, a civil abuse and neglect petition was filed, but no criminal charges were brought at that time. In 2023, the respondent’s biological daughter made similar allegations of sexual abuse spanning 2018 to 2023. In 2024, a grand jury indicted the respondent on thirty-one counts, with the first sixteen counts concerning R.C. Thirteen years had elapsed between R.C.’s initial report and the indictment. During that time, R.C.’s grandparents (the respondent’s adoptive parents and her custodians during the relevant period) both died. Before her death, the grandmother gave a video deposition in which she had significant memory problems.The respondent moved to dismiss the counts related to R.C., arguing that the lengthy preindictment delay caused actual prejudice because critical witnesses—his parents—were now unavailable. The State conceded it could not explain the delay but argued that the loss of these witnesses did not constitute substantial prejudice. The Circuit Court of Fayette County held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately granted the motion, dismissing the first sixteen counts. The circuit court found that the unavailability and questionable reliability of the grandparents’ testimony caused actual, non-speculative, substantial prejudice that impaired the respondent’s defense.On the State’s petition for extraordinary relief, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers. The court found that the respondent failed to show actual prejudice as required under the standard set forth in State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire. The court concluded that the mere loss of witnesses who might have provided exculpatory testimony was insufficient and that the potential testimony was not shown to be material or unavailable from other sources. The Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition, vacating the circuit court’s dismissal of the counts related to R.C. View "State ex rel. State v. Fast" on Justia Law

Following the divorce of a mother and father in West Virginia in 2019, their agreed parenting plan allowed the father regular visitation with their young child, B.L. In July 2021, the mother sought a domestic violence protection order after B.L., then three years old, disclosed sexual abuse by the father both to her and in a Child Advocacy Center interview. The mother subsequently petitioned for modification of parenting time, alleging further disclosures and physical injuries upon B.L.’s return from the father's care. Investigations by Virginia’s child protective agencies determined the allegations were “unfounded,” but the mother and B.L.’s therapist continued to report concerns, leading to additional forensic interviews and referrals.The Family Court of Wayne County initially suspended the father’s visitation and appointed a guardian ad litem for B.L. After hearings in 2024, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the father sexually abused B.L., citing consistent disclosures in interviews and therapy, and awarded sole custody and exclusive decision-making authority to the mother, denying the father any parenting time. The father appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient and highlighting the “unfounded” findings by Virginia agencies.The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the family court’s decision, determining there was substantial evidence supporting the finding of abuse and that the family court did not err or abuse its discretion.Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the Intermediate Court's ruling, holding that the family court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and its application of law was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court also remanded the case in part, instructing the family court to comply with Rule 48, which requires mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse to Child Protective Services and the circuit court, regardless of prior investigations or jurisdiction. View "S.L. v. A.C." on Justia Law

On September 12, 2019, the defendant drove his truck across the center line on a Logan County road, colliding head-on with another vehicle driven by Brittany Duty. The crash resulted in both vehicles catching fire, causing severe injuries to Brittany Duty and the death of her passenger, Beverly Duty. First responders noted the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, combative behavior, and the smell of alcohol. Blood samples were taken at two hospitals: one within two hours of the collision, showing a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .263 percent, and another six to seven hours later, showing a BAC of .131 percent. The defendant was indicted for causing death and serious bodily injury while driving in an impaired state.The Circuit Court of Logan County denied the defendant’s pre-trial motions to exclude the BAC test results, finding the first sample was drawn within two hours of the collision and would be admissible if analyzed according to state health standards. The court also ruled the second sample, taken pursuant to a warrant and outside the statutory two-hour window, would be admissible, with its timing affecting its weight, not its admissibility. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal these evidentiary rulings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s decisions de novo for legal conclusions and under a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings. The Court held that the blood test taken within two hours of the collision was admissible as presumptive evidence of impairment, and the second test, though not qualifying for statutory presumptions, was admissible under the Rules of Evidence. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions in limine and upheld the defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Conley" on Justia Law

Sierra Mattson was a front-seat passenger in her own vehicle, which was driven by Caleb Ratcliffe with her permission. Ratcliffe, driving the wrong way, caused a fatal head-on collision that resulted in the deaths of both Mattson and Ratcliffe, among others. Mattson’s vehicle was insured by Milbank Insurance Company, while Ratcliffe owned another vehicle insured by Erie Insurance, which was not involved in the accident. The Estate received liability proceeds from both insurers, but claimed these were insufficient and sought underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage under Mattson’s Milbank policy, treating Ratcliffe’s Erie-insured (uninvolved) vehicle as the “underinsured motor vehicle.” Milbank denied the claim, leading to a declaratory judgment action.The Circuit Court of Ohio County granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate, finding UIM coverage was available under the Milbank policy, as Ratcliffe’s Erie-insured vehicle qualified as an “underinsured motor vehicle” under West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b). The circuit court determined that the policy did not require the underinsured vehicle to be involved in the accident. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed, holding that the Milbank policy’s UIM endorsement required the underinsured owner or operator’s liability to “arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use” of the underinsured vehicle, and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Milbank.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo. It held that UIM coverage is available because Ratcliffe’s vehicle meets the statutory definition of “underinsured motor vehicle.” The Court concluded that Milbank’s UIM endorsement, to the extent it imposes more restrictive requirements than West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b), is void as against public policy and unenforceable. The Court reversed the ICA’s decision and remanded to reinstate summary judgment for the Estate on UIM coverage. View "Showalter v. Milbank Insurance Co." on Justia Law

HD Media Company, operating as a local newspaper, filed suit against the West Virginia University Board of Governors, alleging violations of the West Virginia Open Governmental Proceedings Act (WVOGPA). The complaint arose from several Board meetings held in summer 2020, during which the Board entered executive sessions to discuss topics including the university’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, budget matters, social justice issues, athletics, business college affairs, emergency pay policy, Title IX regulations, tuition and fees, and capital projects. HD Media claimed that these closed sessions did not fall within the Act’s limited exceptions and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County granted summary judgment in favor of the Board on all nine topics, finding that most discussions fell within the “commercial competition” and “confidential matters” exceptions of the WVOGPA. The court also found a technical violation in the Board’s meeting agenda notice but denied attorney fees, concluding the Board’s position was substantially justified. HD Media appealed, first to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which declined direct review, then to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s rulings, including the application of exceptions and the denial of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. It held that most topics discussed in executive session fit the “commercial competition” exception, but reversed as to the social justice issues discussion, concluding that it did not meet any statutory exception. The court affirmed the ICA in part, reversed in part, and remanded for consideration of attorney fees related to the improper closure regarding social justice issues. View "HD Media Company, LLC v. West Virginia University Board of Governors" on Justia Law

Several residents of the Town of Harpers Ferry challenged the constitutionality of a state statute known as the Tourism Development District Act. The Act allows the creation of tourism development districts in municipalities with a population of 2,000 or less, for projects with projected costs of at least $25 million, and limits the number of districts to five statewide. Within these districts, qualifying tourism projects are exempt from most local regulations, including zoning, land use, licensing, and building codes, and are instead regulated by state agencies. The only tourism development district approved since the Act’s adoption was for a luxury hotel redevelopment in Harpers Ferry, which prompted the lawsuit by local residents.After the complaint was filed, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the Act had a rational basis for its classifications and was reasonably related to legislative policy goals, so it did not violate equal protection principles or the constitutional prohibition on special laws. The court also found no constitutional right to “self-rule” and ruled that there was no violation of the right to vote, as municipalities possess only powers granted by the legislature. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal, concluding that the Act was a general law, rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and did not infringe upon municipal regulatory rights or voting rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The Court held that the Act does not violate the constitutional prohibitions on special laws or equal protection, and does not infringe upon any inherent right to self-rule or the right to vote. The classifications in the Act were found to be reasonable and uniformly applicable to all qualifying municipalities and projects. The Court affirmed the decisions of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. View "Fleming v. Herridge" on Justia Law

Following the fatal shooting of her husband, Carli R. Reed was indicted for first-degree murder in West Virginia. At trial, the prosecution argued Reed acted intentionally, while Reed claimed the shooting was accidental, asserting she was suicidal and the gun discharged unintentionally. The circuit court refused to instruct the jury on accident, and Reed was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to forty years. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded, finding the failure to instruct on accident was reversible error.Upon release pending retrial, Reed was placed on strict home confinement as a condition of bond. Venue was transferred to Taylor County. Eventually, Reed entered an Alford/Kennedy plea to voluntary manslaughter, agreed to a firearm sentencing enhancement, and accepted a condition regarding parole eligibility. The Circuit Court of Taylor County sentenced her to fifteen years, denied credit for both pre-trial and post-conviction home confinement, and denied an alternative sentence. Reed appealed, arguing the denial of credit for home confinement violated constitutional protections and that the court relied on an impermissible factor in sentencing.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the sentencing order under an abuse of discretion standard. The court held that when a defendant is placed on post-conviction home confinement under terms meeting statutory requirements and fully complies, credit for time served must be applied to the sentence. It found the statutory grant of discretion to deny such credit unconstitutional as applied. However, the court affirmed the denial of credit for pre-trial home confinement, maintaining it is not penal. It also found no impermissible factor in sentencing, concluding the prior conviction reference did not render the sentence illegal. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to credit Reed’s post-conviction home confinement. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

The case centers on criminal charges against an adult, Mr. B-Smith, who was accused of committing multiple sex offenses against a minor, R.C., in Berkeley County, West Virginia. The allegations included two counts of first-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree sexual abuse, and three counts of sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, with the events occurring in November 2021. R.C.’s mother had employed Mr. B-Smith as a babysitter, and disclosures by R.C. and his younger brother led to the investigation. The State sought to allow R.C., who was ten years old and reportedly fearful of Mr. B-Smith, to testify outside the defendant’s presence, citing emotional harm. A court-appointed expert supported this request.The Circuit Court of Berkeley County held a pretrial hearing and ultimately ordered that R.C. would testify in the courtroom, but both the defendant and the jury would be absent during his testimony. The defendant’s attorney objected generally to the use of closed-circuit television, citing confrontation clause concerns, but did not specifically object to the jury’s absence. After trial, the jury convicted Mr. B-Smith on all counts. The circuit court denied his post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial, sentencing him to consecutive prison terms totaling between eighty-five and two hundred eighty-five years, followed by supervised release.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The Court found that the circuit court plainly erred in removing the jury from the courtroom during the child’s testimony, violating statutory procedures. However, because the defendant failed to show that this error substantially prejudiced his rights or affected the outcome, the error did not warrant reversal. The Court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and sentence. View "State v. B-Smith" on Justia Law