Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

M.D., a high school soccer player, sought a waiver from the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (WVSSAC) to play for both her high school and club soccer teams during the same season. The WVSSAC denied her request, leading M.D. and her parents to file a lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the WVSSAC's Non-school Participation Rule, which prohibited participation in non-school teams during the school season for team sports but not for individual sports.The Circuit Court of Ohio County granted M.D. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to play for both teams. Subsequently, the court granted her summary judgment and a permanent injunction, ruling that the Non-school Participation Rule was arbitrary and capricious because it unfairly differentiated between team and individual sports without a rational basis.The WVSSAC appealed the circuit court's decision. While the appeal was pending, the WVSSAC's Board of Control amended the Non-school Participation Rule to eliminate the distinction between team and individual sports, applying the same restrictions to all student athletes regardless of the type of sport.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and determined that the amendments to the Non-school Participation Rule rendered the appeal moot. The court found that the substantive changes to the rule addressed the issues raised by M.D., and there were no sufficient collateral consequences or issues of great public interest that warranted further review. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission v. David D. and Elizabeth D., Parents and Legal Guardians of M.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final order of the circuit court reversing a decision of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board and finding that Respondents, educational sign language interpreters who worked with students in high school classrooms, qualified for the pay increase provided by W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e) as full-time special education teachers, holding that the circuit court erred.In reversing, the circuit court concluded that the Grievance Board's decision was clearly erroneous and that Respondents qualified as full-time special education teachers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Legislature intended the 2021 amendment of W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e) to have retroactive effect; and (2) even in the absence of the 2021 amendment, Respondents were not "classroom teachers" under any version of W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e), and therefore, they did not qualify for the salary increase provided therein. View "Kanawha County Bd. of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal of the circuit court's orders, the latter of which denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment, in this action alleging that Petitioners acted negligently in their handling of an incident where S.D. was inappropriately touched by a fellow student in the hallway of a high school, holding that the orders appealed from did not present an appealable ruling.In their notice of appeal, Petitioners asserted that the individual defendants were entitled to dismissal pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-12A-5(b)(2) because the order at issue found that the individual defendants did not act maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Petitioners further contend that the board of education was immune from liability pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-12A-5(a)(4). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the orders presented in this appeal were interlocutory, did not fall within the collateral order doctrine, and did not otherwise present an appealable ruling. View "Kanawha County Board of Education v. S.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting Respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction in the circuit court seeking to enjoin Petitioners from creating "any West Virginia Professional Charter School Board-authorized charter schools absent a voter of country residents," holding that Respondents lacked standing to seek the preliminary injunction.House Bill 2012, passed in 2021, created the West Virginia Professional Charter School Board (PCSB) tasked with authorizing and approving public charter schools. Respondents brought this action seeking to prevent the creation of public charter schools without a majority vote of the citizens of the county in which the charter schools would be located. Respondents were granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Governor James Justice and related persons from enforcing HB 2012 in the creation of PCSB-authorized charter schools. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondents lacked standing to seeking the injunction because Governor Justice lacked the ability to authorize public charter schools and because granting injunctive relief does not prevent the PCSB from authorizing public charter schools. View "Blair v. Brunett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court permanently enjoining the State from implementing the Hope Scholarship Act, W. Va. Code 18-31-1 to -13, after declaring the Act to be unconstitutional, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion.The Act established the Hope Scholarship Program to create education-savings accounts that may only be used for specific educational purposes. Via statute, the Hope Scholarship's funding was "in addition to all other amounts required" to fund public education. Plaintiffs brought this complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and arguing that the Act was unconstitutional. The circuit court ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act does not facially violate the "free schools" clause contained in W. Va. Const. art. XII, 1; (2) the Act does not impinge on a child's fundamental right to an education; (3) the Act does not violate W. Va. Const. art. XII, 4-5 or art. X, 5; and (4) the Act does not violate article XII, 2. View "State v. Beaver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition prohibiting enforcement of a preliminary injunction against the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (WVSSAC) in favor of Heather B. as legal guardian of A.B., holding that WVSSAC showed that it was entitled to the writ.In issuing the preliminary injunction the circuit court concluded that the WVSSAC applied its "waiver rule," W. Va. C.S.R. 127-2-2, in an arbitrary and capricious manner and that its "residence-transfer rule," W. Va. C.S.R. 127-2-7.2a, was facially unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted a writ prohibiting enforcement of the injunction, holding (1) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review A.B.'s as-applied challenge to the WVSSAC's waiver rule; and (2) the circuit court clearly erred in finding the residence-transfer rule to be facially unconstitutional. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Secondary School Activities Comm'n v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the ordered entered by the circuit court granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant, the Harrison County Board of Education, and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint seeking damages for their student's injuries caused by an Assistant Principal's actions and the Board's response thereto, holding that the circuit court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for negligent hiring and negligent supervision; (2) the circuit court did not err by dismissing a portion Plaintiffs' claim for negligence per se, but the allegations of negligence per se that Petitioners set forth in their third iteration of the claim sufficiently stated a caused of action for negligence to defeat the Board's motion to dismiss; and (3) the circuit court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for negligent retention because Plaintiffs stated a claim for negligent retention sufficient to survive the Board's motion to dismiss this claim. View "C.C. v. Harrison County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the state agency that oversees law-enforcement training refusing a state university's application seeking authorization to establish and operate a new law enforcement training academy for senior university students majoring in criminal justice studies, holding that the circuit court did not err.In denying the university's application to create a new law enforcement training academy the state agency concluded that the university's proposed academy was not necessary. The circuit court reversed the state agency's decision and ordered that the agency approve the university's application, finding that the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agency's decision to deny the university's application to establish and operate an entry-level law enforcement training academy was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by any statutory authority. View "Division of Justice & Community Service v. Fairmont State University" on Justia Law

The circuit court violated the requirements of W.Va. Code 62-12-11 by imposing a second five-year probationary period upon Petitioner.Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny and received a five-year probationary period. The initial probation period commenced on March 24, 2011. On February 10, 2016, approximately one month before Petitioner’s five-year probation period was set to expire, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, contending that Petitioner had failed to make his required restitution payments. Petitioner admitted to the violation. The circuit court subsequently revoked Petitioner’s probation by order dated March 16, 2016 and imposed a second five-year probation period. Petitioner argued that the circuit court had violated section 62-12-11 by extending his probation beyond the original five-year period. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the restrictions of section 62-12-11 prohibited the circuit court from imposing a second five-year probationary period. View "State v. Cookman" on Justia Law

The circuit court violated the requirements of W.Va. Code 62-12-11 by imposing a second five-year probationary period upon Petitioner.Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny and received a five-year probationary period. The initial probation period commenced on March 24, 2011. On February 10, 2016, approximately one month before Petitioner’s five-year probation period was set to expire, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, contending that Petitioner had failed to make his required restitution payments. Petitioner admitted to the violation. The circuit court subsequently revoked Petitioner’s probation by order dated March 16, 2016 and imposed a second five-year probation period. Petitioner argued that the circuit court had violated section 62-12-11 by extending his probation beyond the original five-year period. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the restrictions of section 62-12-11 prohibited the circuit court from imposing a second five-year probationary period. View "State v. Cookman" on Justia Law