Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court determining that Bank breached its contract with Respondent by refusing to tender payment upon Respondent's presentation of an an original unendorsed money market certificate of deposit (CD), holding that Bank was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.Respondent presented to Bank and demanded payment of the CD issued in 1980 by Bank and payable either to Respondent or her father. Bank denied payment, determining that there was no existing account associated with the CD. Respondent brought this action alleging breach of contract. The jury found for Respondent and awarded her damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Bank's motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) the circuit court did not err in refusing two proffered jury instructions; and (3) the filing of this matter was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "Wesbanco Bank, Inc. v. Ellifritz" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals arising from breach of contract litigation between Thomas and Jamie Miller and WesBanco Bank, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of prejudgment interest to the Millers and reversed the jury's damages award, holding that the Millers' evidence failed to support this verdict.On appeal, the Millers, who prevailed below, challenged the denial of their request for prejudgment interest, which was based upon their failure to request prejudgment interest from the jury. In its separate appeal, WesBanco raised four assignments of error. The Supreme Court remanded in part for further proceedings, holding (1) there was no error in the circuit court's denial of prejudgment interest; (2) there was no error in the admission of parol evidence; (3) the duty of good faith and fair dealing was properly applied to modify WesBanco's contractual obligations; (4) the circuit court did not err in denying judgment as a matter of law to WesBanco; and (5) the jury's damages award of $404,500 was against the clear weight of the evidence. View "Miller v. Wesbanco Bank, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue was whether the City of Fairmont, which entered into a lease purchase agreement for equipment with Comvest, Ltd., may assert claims and defenses against Blue Ridge Bank - to whom Comvest assigned its interest in the lease purchase agreement, including its right to the City’s monthly payments - based on Comvest’s conversion of funds designated for the purchase of the equipment. The Supreme Court held (1) the Bank took its assignment subject to the City’s claims and defenses arising from Comvest’s breach of the lease purchase agreement; and (2) therefore, the City may assert claims and defenses against the Bank based on Comvest’s conversion. View "Blue Ridge Bank, Inc. v. City of Fairmont" on Justia Law

Sue Walters filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc., alleging that Quicken Loans violated the “illegal loan” provision of the West Virginia Residential Mortgage Lender, Broker and Servicer Act, W. Va. Code 31-17-8(m)(8), in originating a primary mortgage loan for her. A jury found in favor of Walters and awarded her damages in the amount of $27,000. Walters sued additional defendants - an appraiser and the entity that serviced the loan - with whom she settled. In total, the court offset $59,500 of the $98,000 paid by the settling defendants against the total damages, costs and fees awarded against Quicken Loans. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in allowing the illegal loan claim to go to the jury, as section 31-17-8(m)(8) applies to a single primary mortgage loan; (2) did not err in ruling that Walters was a prevailing party and thus entitled to an award of fees and costs; (3) erred in offsetting only a portion of the settlement monies received from the settling defendants against the total compensatory damages received by Walters. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Walters" on Justia Law

Robert Perry was issued a Citibank MasterCard account in 1998. The terms and conditions of the Citibank Card Agreement governing Perry’s account included an arbitration agreement. In 2010, Citibank filed a debt collection action against Perry seek to recover the balance owed on Perry’s account. In 2015, Perry filed an answer to Citibank’s complaint and a class counterclaim alleging that Citibank had violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Thereafter, Citibank filed a motion asking the court to compel arbitration of the parties’ claims. The circuit court concluded that Citibank had implicitly waived its right to arbitration by filing suit in circuit court and waiting nearly five years before seeking to invoke its contractual right to arbitrate. Citibank appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Citibank did not waive its right to compel arbitration in this matter. Remanded. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Perry" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a bank, filed suit against Respondent seeking the outstanding balance remaining on a loan it made to him in 2012. Rather than litigate the matter, Respondent entered into an “Agreed Order Confessing Judgment” with the Bank for the full amount. The circuit court entered the order and dismissed the matter. Thereafter, the Bank’s vice president, who also arranged Respondent’s loan, pleaded guilty to bank fraud. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for relief from the confessed judgment pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming that after he learned of the vice president’s conviction, he suspected there were improprieties regarding his loan. The circuit court concluded that relief from judgment was justified, finding that the circumstances surrounding the loan made the loan questionable and that a decision on the merits was favored. Petitioner subsequently filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order granting Respondent’s motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Respondent’s motion to vacate the judgment. View "State ex rel. First State Bank v. Hon. F. Jane Hustead" on Justia Law

Respondent obtained a home mortgage loan from Lender. Lender obtained a mortgage lender bond from Petitioner and later filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Code. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint naming Petitioner as defendant solely as surety for Lender. At the time this suit was filed, Lender was bankrupt and judgment proof. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the bond conditions had not been satisfied because Respondent had not obtained a judgment against the bond principal, Lender. The circuit court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that the bond at issue was a judgment bond and that the unambiguous bond language requires an aggrieved party to obtain a judgment against the principal before maintaining an action against the surety of the bond. View "Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. James" on Justia Law

Edwin Miller Investments, LLC ("EMI") owned twelve acres of real estate used to secure a loan from BCBank, which assigned the note and deed of trust to CGP Development Co. ("CGP"). The State became the legal owner of eight acres of EMI's property after it paid $241,000 into court following a condemnation action. EMI defaulted on its loan, and CGP purchased the remaining four acres at a foreclosure sale. The circuit court ordered release of the $241,000 paid into court to CGP in partial satisfaction of CGP's lien. EMI and CGP disagreed as to which party was entitled to additional proceeds paid as damages to the four-acre residue as well as additional sums resulting from the condemnation of the eight acres. The circuit court concluded that CGP was entitled to all of the condemnation proceeds and dismissed EMI from the condemnation proceeding. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that CGP was entitled to all sums awarded for damage to the four-acre residue purchase by CGP; but (2) reversed the circuit court's finding that CPG was entitled to any additional sums resulting from the condemnation of the eight-acre tract and the court's dismissal of EMI from the condemnation proceedings. Remanded.View "Edwin Miller Invs. v. CGP Dev. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent refinanced the mortgage on his home with a loan he obtained from Petitioner. Because Respondent failed to make his monthly loan payments in accordance with the parties' agreement, Petitioner invoked its right to initiate a foreclosure sale of the house. After the foreclosure sale, the property was sold to Petitioner. Because Respondent refused to vacate the house, Petitioner filed an unlawful detainer action. In response, Respondent asserted various counterclaims against Petitioner alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The circuit court conditionally granted Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's counterclaims and additionally certified two questions for the Supreme Court's consideration regarding whether Respondent timely asserted his counterclaims. The Supreme Court concluded that the counterclaims were not timely. View "Tribeca Lending Corp. v. McCormick" on Justia Law

These two consolidated cases involved a bond for which Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) was the surety. Each bond principal was sued, and both cases resulted in the entry of default judgments. Hartford was not given notice of either lawsuit against its principals or notice that default judgments were being sought. Hartford learned of the default judgments only after the plaintiffs in those cases sought payment on the bonds. In each case, Hartford ultimately was found liable on the bond. Hartford appealed, asserting that the circuit courts erred in finding the bonds to be judgment bonds and in holding Hartford liable on the bonds under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two bonds at issue were judgment bonds, and therefore, the circuit courts correctly found that default judgments entered against the bond principals were conclusive and binding against Hartford. View "Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtis" on Justia Law