Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of attempted murder in the first degree, three counts of malicious assault, and other offenses arising from Defendant’s acts of deliberately shooting a man twice in the back and, in the process, accidentally shooting an eight-year-old girl. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, primarily, that the circuit court erred in allowing a witness to make a blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment without requiring the witness invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury, thus violating Defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Herbert" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of felony murder. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her the possibility of parole for the duration of her life imprisonment. Specifically, Defendant argued that the circuit court did not adequately justify its decision to depart from the prosecutor’s recommendation, in accordance with the plea agreement, that Defendant be granted eligibility for eventual parole from the required life sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court’s rejection of the State’s recommendation was an appropriate exercise of its legitimate discretion. View "State v. Allman" on Justia Law

In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the recommendation of mercy. In 1995, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. In 2012, Petitioner filed a second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 2013, Petitioner was paroled. The circuit court dismissed the habeas petition as moot because Petitioner no longer satisfied the statutory requirement of being incarcerated and because Petitioner received the relief he sought - release from custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as a parolee, Petitioner was no longer incarcerated, and therefore, he was no entitled to seek post-conviction habeas relief. View "Cline v. Mirandy" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a written plea agreement Petitioner entered a no contest plea to one count of sexual abuse in the first degree. The circuit court later rescinded Petitioner’s probationary period “due to [Petitioner’s] non-compliance of conditions of his probation,” and sentenced Petitioner to a term of one to five years incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and ordered Petitioner released from incarceration, holding that the circuit court erred in rescinding Petitioner’s probationary period based upon its determination that Petitioner violated the conditions of his probation, as Petitioner fulfilled all the conditions of the plea agreement at issue in this case. View "State v. Shrader" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of forty years in prison. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in the manner in which it conducted a suppression hearing concerning his videotaped statement and erred in finding that a statement he made was voluntarily given to the police. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s challenges to the suppression hearing failed; and (2) under the circumstances, the circuit court correctly determined that Petitioner’s statement was voluntary and in admitting the statement into evidence. View "State v. Marcum" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to nighttime burglary by way of entering without breaking and grand larceny. As part of his sentence, Petitioner was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $50,013 to the victim of his crimes. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reconsideration of sentence requesting a reduction in the amount of restitution he was ordered to pay, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in determining the amount of restitution without the presentation of evidence of the victim’s loss at the sentencing hearing and without determining Petitioner’s ability to pay restitution. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on the issue of restitution, holding that the circuit court did not consider all of the pertinent circumstances in determining the practicality of an award of full restitution. View "State v. Atwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with first degree murder and found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner subsequently requested a bench trial to give him the opportunity to establish defenses to the charged offense. At the conclusion of a hearing held pursuant to W. Va. Code 27-6A-6, the trial court ruled that the evidence adduced, were it to go to trial, could result in a verdict of second degree murder. The court determined that it retained jurisdiction over Petitioner for forty years based on the maximum sentence specified for a conviction of second degree murder and remanded him to the custody of William R. Sharpe Hospital for the duration of that period of time. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding (1) Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied his right to a jury trial because the right to a jury trial does not attach to a hearing requested pursuant to section 27-6A-6; and (2) the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient for the trial court to rule that the State had demonstrated Petitioner committed second degree murder for commitment purposes. View "State v. Gum" on Justia Law

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board (collectively, the ODC) issued an informal advisory opinion that determined (1) the Attorney General did not have authority to prosecute criminal cases outside of the limited prosecutorial authority granted by W. Va. Code 5-3-2, and (2) the Rules of Professional Conduct would be violated if the Attorney General prosecuted assisted county prosecutors in certain criminal prosecutions. The Attorney General subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent ODC from enforcing the informal advisory opinion, contending that county prosecutors have authority to request the Attorney General to assist with criminal prosecutions and that the office of the Attorney General has independent common law authority to prosecute criminal cases. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) county prosecutors do not have statutory authority to appoint the Attorney General as a special prosecutor; and (2) under the state Constitution and statutory law, the common law criminal prosecutorial authority of the Attorney General was abolished. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. W. Va. Office of Disciplinary Counsel" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting a system of precedent intended to clarify the weight of opinions issued by the Court, holding that the trial court (1) did not improperly admit prior bad act evidence at trial; (2) abused its discretion in admitting certain lay opinion testimony, but the error was harmless; (3) did not abuse its discretion in precluding testimony by a psychiatrist; (4) did not err in rejecting a plea agreement; and (5) did not err in admitting opinion testimony by a fact witness. In addition, Petitioner waived his allegation that the trial court erred in its ruling concerning Facebook evidence. View "State v. McKinley" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to two charges under an indictment - obtaining money by false pretenses and fraudulent scheme - and six counts in an information. Defendant later filed a motion to correct his sentence under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(a), contending that his two felony convictions under the indictment violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy principles do not preclude a conviction for a fraudulent scheme offense in addition to a conviction for any other offense arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. View "State v. Coles" on Justia Law