Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner prevailed in a workers’ compensation claim before the Supreme Court in which she sought medical benefits. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking attorney fees and costs. At issue before the Supreme Court was the application of W. Va. Code 23-5-16(c), which provides a financial incentive for lawyers to represent workers’ compensation claimants seeking medical benefits. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) section 23-5-16(c) does not apply retroactively; but (2) the application of section 23-5-16(c) to Petitioner’s request for attorney fees and costs is not a retroactive application of the statute. Remanded. View "Cassella v. Mylan Pharms." on Justia Law

The underlying case involved oil and gas wells owned and operated by four separate partnerships. The partnerships owned mineral interests in the form of leases to extract oil and gas from real estate. The partners themselves, however, owned no part of the mineral interests. Plaintiff alleged that he owned an interest in the partnerships. A federal district court determined that Plaintiff’s assertion of an interest in the four “mining partnerships” failed because he could not produce a written instrument in conformance with the Statute of Frauds showing his ownership interest in the partnerships. Plaintiff appealed. Because of the vagaries of West Virginia law on this issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Court answered that (1) the Statute of Frauds requires the partners of a “mining partnership” to show their membership through a deed, will, or other written instrument establishing they are co-owners of the mineral interest being mined; but (2) because the real property of a general partnership belongs to the partnership entity and not to the individual partners, no written instrument is required to establish a partnership interest in a general partnership. View "Valentine v. Sugar Rock, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the West Virginia Investment Management Board (IMB) and the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (Board), instituted a declaratory judgment action against the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) requesting judicial resolution of Petitioners’ entitlement to a full surrender of two annuity contracts without delays in payment or surrender charges. The trial court granted VALIC’s motion for summary judgment, resolving Petitioners’ claims on grounds of standing, the absence of a justiciable controversy, and the lack of ambiguity concerning the language of a policy endorsement in dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that no justiciable controversy existed between the parties and that Petitioners lacked standing in relation to the contracts; and (2) the policy endorsement language under review was of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree as to its meaning. View "W. Va. Inv. Mgmt. Bd. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Huntington, arguing that the City was negligent in its maintenance of a “trash rack” within a stormwater management project in the City, which negligence proximately caused flooding in Petitioners’ Spring Valley neighborhood. A jury found the City negligent and awarded damages for both the cost to raise the foundations of Plaintiffs’ homes to prevent additional flooding as well as the diminished value of the homes. The circuit court granted the City’s motion for remittitur, concluding that West Virginia law permits only recovery for the lesser of the diminution of value of the homes or the cost of the foundation repair. Accordingly, the court remitted the verdict to provide recovery for only the lost value of the homes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in remitting the verdict because, where the owner of residential real property which is damaged can establish that the pre-damage fair market value of the real property cannot be fully restored by repairs, then the owner may recover both the cost of repair and for such remaining residual diminution in value. View "Brooks v. City of Huntington" on Justia Law

Carol Kinsinger and Todd Pethel were divorced by a final order entered in 2006. The final order incorporated by reference a settlement agreement stating that Kinsinger was entitled to fifty percent of the martial portion of Pethel’s thrift savings plan (TSP). In 2012, Kinsinger prepared and filed a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), and the family court ordered the Kinsinger be paid one-half of the marital portion of the TSP that was contributed while the parties were married and living together. However, in 2009, Pethel had withdrawn all funds from the TSP. Petitioner filed a petition for contempt of the retirement benefits order. The family court declined to find Pethel in contempt, concluding that Kinsinger failed to timely file her QDRO and therefore forfeited her share of the TSP. The circuit court affirmed, interpreting the family court ruling as an application of the doctrine of laches. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s finding that Pethel was not in contempt of the QDRO; but (2) reversed the circuit court’s finding that Kinsinger forfeited her share of the TSP under the doctrine of laches. Remanded for entry of a judgment order awarding Kinsinger the amount to which she was entitled. View "Kinsinger v. Pethel" on Justia Law

Defendants defaulted on their obligation to Plaintiff, who had loaned them $200,000 secured by a first deed of trust on real property they owned. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the subject property at a trustee’s sale and then filed the instant lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance of Defendants’ promissory note. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and awarded Plaintiff post-judgment interest on this award. Defendants appealed, arguing that the deficiency judgment was too high and should have been adjusted to reflect the fair market value of their property when it was sold at the trust deed sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trust deed grantor may assert, as a defense in a lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment, that the property was sold for less than its fair market value at the trust deed foreclosure sale. Remanded. View "Sostaric v. Marshall" on Justia Law

An Employee filed a class action complaint against her Employer alleging that the Employer violated the state’s Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards (MWMHS) by failing to pay her for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week at a rate of one and one-half times her regular rate. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Employer, determining that the MWMHS only applies to “employees” and “employers” as defined under the MWMHS and that the Employer in this case did not meet the statutory definition of “employer.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Employer was regulated by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and therefore, the Employer did not meet the definition of an “employer” under the state’s MWMHS for purposes of the Employee’s overtime compensation claim. View "King v. West Virginia's Choice, Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of felony murder. The circuit court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her the possibility of parole for the duration of her life imprisonment. Specifically, Defendant argued that the circuit court did not adequately justify its decision to depart from the prosecutor’s recommendation, in accordance with the plea agreement, that Defendant be granted eligibility for eventual parole from the required life sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court’s rejection of the State’s recommendation was an appropriate exercise of its legitimate discretion. View "State v. Allman" on Justia Law

In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the recommendation of mercy. In 1995, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. In 2012, Petitioner filed a second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 2013, Petitioner was paroled. The circuit court dismissed the habeas petition as moot because Petitioner no longer satisfied the statutory requirement of being incarcerated and because Petitioner received the relief he sought - release from custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as a parolee, Petitioner was no longer incarcerated, and therefore, he was no entitled to seek post-conviction habeas relief. View "Cline v. Mirandy" on Justia Law

Petitioners were seven electricians who were employed by Eastern Electric, LLC, an electrical contractor, on several public works projects. Petitioners filed this civil action to recover statutory wages and liquidated damages under the Prevailing Wage Act and Wage Payment and Collection Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Eastern Electric. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioners’ Prevailing Wage Act claims as untimely, and disputed issues of material fact existed with regard to Eastern Electric’s “honest mistake or error” affirmative defense; and (2) the circuit court correctly dismissed Petitioners’ Wage Payment and Collection Act claims. View "Grim v. Eastern Electric, LLC" on Justia Law