Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Lewis County Board of Education (Board) terminated Michael Holden’s employment as a school bus driver due to his physical inability to safely perform his job duties. Holden filed a grievance with the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board, alleging, among other things, that the Board’s denial of his request for a leave of absence was improper. The grievance board upheld the Board’s decision on all issues, determining that Holden was properly terminated and that his grievance on the leave of absence issue was not timely filed. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the Board improperly terminated Holden and that Holden timely filed his grievance of the Board’s denial of his request for a leave of absence. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and reinstated the grievance board’s decision, holding that the circuit court erred in (1) setting aside the grievance board’s decision, as the Board did not err in terminating Holden based on physical incompetency; and (2) finding that Holden did not timely file his grievance as to the leave of absence issue. View "Lewis County Bd. of Educ. v. Holden" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a claim for workers’ compensation for her peripheral neuropathy that she developed due to toxic exposure to heavy metals at the workplace. The claim was ruled compensable. Petitioner subsequently began intravenous chelation therapy at her physician’s office, a treatment that was medically necessary to treat Petitioner’s compensable condition. Petitioner sought reimbursement for those medical expenses. An administrative law judge with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges concluded that reimbursement was appropriate. The Workers' Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that reimbursement for these medical expenses was precluded pursuant to West Virginia Code of State Rules 85-20-62.2, under which a claimant will be denied reimbursement for intravenous chelation therapy performed in an office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 85-20-62.2 unreasonably denies reimbursement when such treatment is medically necessary, in contravention of W. Va. Code 23-4-3, and it is therefore invalid. Remanded for entry of an order directing that Petitioner’s reasonable expenses for medically necessary chelation therapy be reimbursed. View "Moore v. K-Mart Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of attempted murder in the first degree, three counts of malicious assault, and other offenses arising from Defendant’s acts of deliberately shooting a man twice in the back and, in the process, accidentally shooting an eight-year-old girl. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, primarily, that the circuit court erred in allowing a witness to make a blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment without requiring the witness invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury, thus violating Defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Herbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc., alleging that Quicken committed common law fraud and violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a loan agreement between Plaintiff and Quicken. The circuit court found in favor of Plaintiff on all but one of her claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that the circuit court improperly cancelled Plaintiff’s obligation to repay the loan principal, failed to support its punitive damages award with the correct analysis, and failed to offset the compensatory damages award against Plaintiff’s pretrial settlement with defendants who did not proceed to trial. After remand, the circuit court entered an opinion and order. The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) improperly created a lien on Plaintiff’s property; (2) erred in increasing the compensatory damages award to Plaintiff; (3) erred in awarding attorney fees and costs for both the first appellate proceeding and the post-appellate proceedings; (4) improperly increased the punitive damages award; and (5) erred in refusing to offset Plaintiff’s award of attorney fees and costs by a pretrial settlement between Plaintiff and the codefendants. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner prevailed in a workers’ compensation claim before the Supreme Court in which she sought medical benefits. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking attorney fees and costs. At issue before the Supreme Court was the application of W. Va. Code 23-5-16(c), which provides a financial incentive for lawyers to represent workers’ compensation claimants seeking medical benefits. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) section 23-5-16(c) does not apply retroactively; but (2) the application of section 23-5-16(c) to Petitioner’s request for attorney fees and costs is not a retroactive application of the statute. Remanded. View "Cassella v. Mylan Pharms." on Justia Law

The underlying case involved oil and gas wells owned and operated by four separate partnerships. The partnerships owned mineral interests in the form of leases to extract oil and gas from real estate. The partners themselves, however, owned no part of the mineral interests. Plaintiff alleged that he owned an interest in the partnerships. A federal district court determined that Plaintiff’s assertion of an interest in the four “mining partnerships” failed because he could not produce a written instrument in conformance with the Statute of Frauds showing his ownership interest in the partnerships. Plaintiff appealed. Because of the vagaries of West Virginia law on this issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Court answered that (1) the Statute of Frauds requires the partners of a “mining partnership” to show their membership through a deed, will, or other written instrument establishing they are co-owners of the mineral interest being mined; but (2) because the real property of a general partnership belongs to the partnership entity and not to the individual partners, no written instrument is required to establish a partnership interest in a general partnership. View "Valentine v. Sugar Rock, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the West Virginia Investment Management Board (IMB) and the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (Board), instituted a declaratory judgment action against the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC) requesting judicial resolution of Petitioners’ entitlement to a full surrender of two annuity contracts without delays in payment or surrender charges. The trial court granted VALIC’s motion for summary judgment, resolving Petitioners’ claims on grounds of standing, the absence of a justiciable controversy, and the lack of ambiguity concerning the language of a policy endorsement in dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that no justiciable controversy existed between the parties and that Petitioners lacked standing in relation to the contracts; and (2) the policy endorsement language under review was of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree as to its meaning. View "W. Va. Inv. Mgmt. Bd. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Huntington, arguing that the City was negligent in its maintenance of a “trash rack” within a stormwater management project in the City, which negligence proximately caused flooding in Petitioners’ Spring Valley neighborhood. A jury found the City negligent and awarded damages for both the cost to raise the foundations of Plaintiffs’ homes to prevent additional flooding as well as the diminished value of the homes. The circuit court granted the City’s motion for remittitur, concluding that West Virginia law permits only recovery for the lesser of the diminution of value of the homes or the cost of the foundation repair. Accordingly, the court remitted the verdict to provide recovery for only the lost value of the homes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in remitting the verdict because, where the owner of residential real property which is damaged can establish that the pre-damage fair market value of the real property cannot be fully restored by repairs, then the owner may recover both the cost of repair and for such remaining residual diminution in value. View "Brooks v. City of Huntington" on Justia Law

Carol Kinsinger and Todd Pethel were divorced by a final order entered in 2006. The final order incorporated by reference a settlement agreement stating that Kinsinger was entitled to fifty percent of the martial portion of Pethel’s thrift savings plan (TSP). In 2012, Kinsinger prepared and filed a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), and the family court ordered the Kinsinger be paid one-half of the marital portion of the TSP that was contributed while the parties were married and living together. However, in 2009, Pethel had withdrawn all funds from the TSP. Petitioner filed a petition for contempt of the retirement benefits order. The family court declined to find Pethel in contempt, concluding that Kinsinger failed to timely file her QDRO and therefore forfeited her share of the TSP. The circuit court affirmed, interpreting the family court ruling as an application of the doctrine of laches. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s finding that Pethel was not in contempt of the QDRO; but (2) reversed the circuit court’s finding that Kinsinger forfeited her share of the TSP under the doctrine of laches. Remanded for entry of a judgment order awarding Kinsinger the amount to which she was entitled. View "Kinsinger v. Pethel" on Justia Law

Defendants defaulted on their obligation to Plaintiff, who had loaned them $200,000 secured by a first deed of trust on real property they owned. Plaintiff subsequently purchased the subject property at a trustee’s sale and then filed the instant lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance of Defendants’ promissory note. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and awarded Plaintiff post-judgment interest on this award. Defendants appealed, arguing that the deficiency judgment was too high and should have been adjusted to reflect the fair market value of their property when it was sold at the trust deed sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trust deed grantor may assert, as a defense in a lawsuit seeking a deficiency judgment, that the property was sold for less than its fair market value at the trust deed foreclosure sale. Remanded. View "Sostaric v. Marshall" on Justia Law