Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After K.H.’s mother died, the family court appointed the material grandmother (Grandmother) as guardian of the child. Father did not object to Grandmother’s appointment. The court subsequently granted primary custody to Grandmother with parenting time to Father. Father later field a petition to terminate Grandmother’s guardianship of the child. Grandmother responded by filing a motion seeking to be designated as K.H.’s “psychological parent.” After a series of hearings, the family court terminated Grandmother’s guardianship and denied her motion to be considered a psychological parent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the family court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Grandmother’s guardianship of K.H.; but (2) Grandmother was the psychological parent to K.H., and as such, Grandmother and K.H. were entitled to continued association with one another. View "In re K.H." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the prosecuting attorney of Ohio County, West Virginia, filed a juvenile petition against J.Y., a twelve-year-old boy charged with possession of a deadly weapon on the premises of an educational facility. Specifically, J.Y. possessed the deadly weapon with the express intent to intimidate another student. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that J.Y. was not competent to stand trial and that the charged offense did not involve “an act of violence against a person.” Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court judge from dismissing the juvenile petition, asserting that J.Y. was charged with an offense that involved “an act of violence against a person” within the meaning of W. Va. Code 27-6A-3 given the potential for harm to other students that existed as a result of J.Y.’s actions. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that J.Y.’s actions indicated that he posed a risk of physical harm and severe emotional and psychological harm to children, and therefore, J.Y. committed an offense involving an act of violence against a person within the meaning of section 27-6A-3. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Hon. David J. Sims" on Justia Law

Jack Garrett Ford, Inc. sold a Ford Expedition to an unidentified individual from a dealership located in West Virginia. The vehicle was manufactured and designed in Michigan by Ford Motor Company, which had its principal place of business in Michigan. The Expedition was later sold to a Michigan resident, who in turn sold it to Plaintiffs, also Michigan residents. After the Expedition rolled over multiple times, resulting in two children being killed, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in a West Virginia state court, asserting claims against Jack Garrett Ford and Ford. Defendants moved to dismiss the civil action based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that Michigan was the correct forum for the litigation. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendants then filed this petition for writ of prohibition asserting that the circuit court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court granted the writ as moulded, holding that the circuit court failed properly to evaluate Petitioners’ motion to dismiss in a manner that comported with W. Va. Code 56-1-1a. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Hon. David W. Nibert" on Justia Law

Mark and Tammy Davis owned property that secured a credit line deed of trust held by Huntington National Bank. The Davises failed to pay their 2005 and 2006 real property taxes, resulting in a notice of delinquency being published. The Davises subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A second notice of delinquency was then published announcing that the tax lien would be sold. A notice of the tax lien sale was mailed to the Davises but was returned undeliverable. The Davises received a discharge in bankruptcy, after which the tax lien was sold. No party redeemed the property, and the tax deed was issued to Rebuild America, Inc. The Davises then filed this action seeking to set aside the tax sale. The circuit court granted relief, finding that the issuance of the two statutory notices of delinquency while the Davises were under the protection of a bankruptcy stay voided the tax deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy stay rendered the statutory notices void ab initio, and therefore, the tax lien sale did not comply with the required statutory procedure. Accordingly, the tax deed issued in this matter must be set aside. View "Rebuild America v. Davis" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Respondent was convicted of one felony count of abduction with intent to defile and one misdemeanor count of battery. Respondent later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his right to a fair trial was violated because he was briefly placed in handcuffs in view of some members of the jury. The circuit court agreed, granted the writ, and vacated Respondent’s convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent being handcuffed in view of “at least some of the jurors” for a brief period of time was not sufficient to establish reversible error, nor grounds for a mistrial. View "Ballard v. Meckling" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Respondent was convicted for sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual abuse by a custodian for his acts involving an eleven-year-old boy. Respondent later filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his federal and state due process rights were violated because of unfair prejudice resulting from references to him, by the prosecutor and through testimony during trial, as a pedophile. The habeas court granted relief and vacated Respondent’s convictions and sentence, concluding that the testimony constituted inadmissible character evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) while the references to pedophilia were improper, the error was harmless; and (2) the State overwhelmingly established Respondent’s guilt of the crimes charged. View "Ballard v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual assault in the third degree and to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Prior to sentencing, Petitioner moved to withdraw his plea on the basis that at the time he accepted the State’s plea offer, he was not advised that his plea subjected him to a potential life sentence as a habitual offender. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, a jury found Petitioner guilty of being a habitual offender, and Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court and prosecuting attorney had no duty to inform Petitioner of enhanced sentencing before Petitioner entered his guilty plea; and (2) therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Keith D." on Justia Law

Tracie Dennis pleaded guilty to embezzlement. The circuit court sentenced Dennis to an indeterminate term of incarceration and directed that the sentence be suspended for a period of probation. While Dennis awaited transfer from the South Central Regional Jail to the Lakin Correctional Facility for women, the circuit court granted Dennis’s motion for work release during her incarceration in the Regional Jail. The work release was granted for period of time between the entry of the order granting work release and the commencement of Dennis’s probation. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections filed a petition for a writ of prohibition challenging the work release order, arguing that, by granting Dennis work release after she had been placed in the Division’s custody, the circuit court exceeded its authority and interfered with the Division’s responsibilities to its inmates and to the public. The Supreme Court denied the Division’s request for relief in prohibition, holding that the circuit court had the authority and the discretion to grant Dennis work release for the purpose of paying restitution. View "State ex rel. Rubenstein v. Hon. Louis H. Bloom" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree felony murder. The circuit court accepted Petitioner’s plea, finding that Petitioner had freely and voluntarily entered his guilty plea with the advice and consultation of competent legal counsel, and sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) Petitioner’s guilty plea to first degree felony murder was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a harsher sentence upon Petitioner than the sentences imposed upon his co-defendants. View "State v. Holstein" on Justia Law

In purchasing a vehicle, Robin Hinkle and her former husband purchased GAP Insurance issued by Safe-Guard Products International, LLC (Safe-Guard). The Hinkles were told that the GAP Insurance would relieve them of payment owed on the vehicle if it was declared a total loss as a result of an accident and more was owed for the vehicle than the value assigned to it at the time it was totaled. Robin was later involved in an accident that resulted in her vehicle being declared a total loss. To pay off the balance owed on the vehicle, Robin submitted a claim to Safe-Guard under the GAP Insurance. Safe-Guard denied coverage. Robin subsequently filed this action against Safe-Guard, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Robin filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the GAP Insurance constituted insurance under state law for purposes of this litigation. The circuit court granted the motion. Thereafter, Safe-Guard initiated the instant proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Safe-Guard’s GAP Insurance constituted insurance under the laws of West Virginia. View "State ex rel. Safe-Guard Prods. Int’l LLC v. Hon. Miki Thompson" on Justia Law