Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) filed a petition in the circuit court initiating the underlying abuse and neglect case. The petition alleged that Respondent Stepfather sexually abused K.P. and that Respondent Mother failed to protect K.P. from Stepfather and committed acts of emotional abuse against K.P. The DHHR removed all minor children from the home. After a multi-day adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court dismissed the abuse and neglect petition, concluding that DHHR had not met its burden of proving that K.P. was abused by either respondent and that Stepfather’s refusal to testify and rebut the abuse charges could not be used as evidence against him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Respondents were abusing parents with regard to K.P., and therefore, the health and welfare of the other children in the home was also at risk; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court erred by refusing to adjudicate all the minor children as abused children. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ car and a work-truck owned by Energy Corporation of America (ECA) were involved in a wreck that occurred in Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs filed a tort claim in Harrison County against ECA. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for improper venue. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a bad faith claim in Harrison County against their insurer and joined ECA as a co-defendant, seeking tort damages for the wreck. ECA filed a motion to sever for improper joinder and dismiss for improper venue. The circuit court denied relief, concluding (1) joinder of ECA and Plaintiffs’ insurer was improper under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 20; and (2) Harrison County was a proper venue for ECA based on the “venue-giving defendant” principle. ECA petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ as moulded, holding (1) the joinder of Plaintiffs’ insurer and ECA was improper because it failed to satisfy the requirements under Rule 20(a); and (2) once Plaintiffs’ insurer is properly severed from the claim against ECA, there will be no venue-giving defendant in this action, and therefore, Harrison County was not a proper venue for ECA. View "State ex rel. Energy Corp. of Am. v. Hon. John Lewis Marks" on Justia Law

Respondent owned the mineral rights to a certain parcel of land. When the Division of Highways (DOH) began construction of a highway through the land owned by the surface owner, the DOH excavated approximately 237,187 tons of limestone from the property. Respondent filed a mandamus action against DOH seeking to force DOH to institute a condemnation proceeding for the limestone removed from her mineral reservation in the land. The DOH filed this condemnation action, and the condemnation commission returned a verdict favorable to DOH. Respondent subsequently demanded a jury trial. Based on the jury’s findings, the trial court awarded Respondent $941,304. DOH appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "W. Va. Dep’t of Transp. v. Newton" on Justia Law

When an officer working at a sobriety checkpoint encountered Respondent, the officer administered a series of field sobriety tests. The officer then administered a preliminary breath test, which Respondent failed. A secondary chemical test of Respondent’s breath indicated that Respondent’s blood alcohol content was .157. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) subsequently revoked Respondent’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the State for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversed the DMV’s order of revocation, finding that the sobriety checkpoint deviated from the police department’s “DUI Sobriety Checkpoint Operations Manual” and that those deviations rendered Respondent’s arrest unlawful. The circuit court affirmed the order of the OAH and reinstated Respondent’s driver’s license. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded for reinstatement of the DMV’s revocation order, holding that the sobriety checkpoint at issue was legally valid and that Respondent’s arrest for DUI was lawful. View "Reed v. Pettit" on Justia Law

Larry Myers, a sales associate, worked at Outdoor Express, Inc., a recreational vehicle dealership. Myers received no pay if no sales were finalized during the preceding two-week period. Myers filed claims for, and received, unemployment compensation benefits for periods when he did not receive commission checks for sales of recreational vehicles. A deputy commissioner with Workforce West Virginia subsequently determined that the benefits were to be repaid by Myers, finding that Myers was neither totally nor partially unemployed during various periods between November 29, 2008 and March 17, 2012, and was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The circuit court affirmed the administrative decision and directed that Myers pay back $39,713 in benefits he received for the periods in question. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that Myers was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he was neither totally nor partially unemployed during the periods in question; but (2) the $39,713 was improperly calculated based on the statute of limitations pertaining to the overpayments in this case. View "Myers v. Outdoor Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty-nine individual Respondents filed eight separate civil actions alleging that Petitioners - three pharmacies and a physician - and other medical providers negligently prescribed and dispensed controlled substances causing Respondents to become addicted to and abuse the controlled substances. Petitioners moved for summary judgment asserting that Respondents’ claims were barred as a matter of law on the basis of Respondents’ admissions of their own criminal activity associated with the prescription and dispensation of controlled substances by Petitioners. Specifically, Petitioners maintained that Respondents’ actions were barred by the “wrongful conduct” rule and/or the doctrine of in pari delicto. The circuit court concluded that the actions were not barred but certified questions regarding the issue to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that any wrongdoing on the part of Respondents must be assessed under the Court’s precepts of comparative negligence and does not per se operate as a complete bar to Respondents’ causes of action. View "Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below" on Justia Law

This case involved the proper placement for two siblings, L.M., a three-year-old boy, and L.S., a two-year-old girl. The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resrouces filed an abuse and neglect petition regarding the children and sought and received custody of the children. The children’s maternal Grandparents filed a motion to intervene and, further, moved for placement of the children in their home. The circuit court denied the Grandparents’ motion to intervene and for placement of the minor children. The Grandparents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient was properly considered by the circuit court; and (2) the circuit court correctly applied the grandparent preference statute, W. Va. Code 49-3-1(a)(3), and did not err in determining that the Grandparents were not an appropriate adoptive placement for the minor children. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law

In 2013, the parties in this case were divorced pursuant to an agreed final order of divorce that included a mutual restraining order. The family court later found Respondent in contempt of court with regard to her attempts at contacting Petitioner. Respondent then filed a pro se petition for appeal challenging the contempt ruling and the inclusion of the mutual restraining order in the final order of divorce. The circuit court reversed the family court’s issuance of the mutual restraining order, concluding that the record was devoid of a proper evidentiary showing of abuse to support the issuance of the mutual restraining order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a court is prohibited from entering a mutual protective order unless each party has filed a petition asserting allegations of domestic violence against the order and established those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Riffle v. Riffle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs signed a form contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause within which was a provision that Defendant contended was a “delegation provision” stating that the parties agreed to delegate, from the courts to an arbitrator, any question about the enforceability of the arbitration clause. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against Defendant for alleged defects in the house. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have enforced the delegation provision and referred the parties’ claims about arbitrability to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the delegation provision did not reflect a clear and unmistakable intent by the parties to assign to the arbitrator all questions about the enforceability of the arbitration clause; and (2) the circuit court was correct in deciding that the arbitration provision was unenforceable under West Virginia contract law. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Respondent requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Appeals (OAH) to contest the Department of Motor Vehicle’s (DMV) revocation of his driver’s license. The OAH issued a final order (the “original final order”) reversing the DMV’s revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license. The DMV subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the OAH revoke the original final order. The OAH granted the motion for reconsider and issued a revised final order (“revised final order”) that effectively reinstated the DMV’s revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license. The circuit court reversed the OAH’s revised final order and reinstated the OAH’s original final order, finding that the OAH had no statutory or regulatory authority to revoke its original final order and that Respondent never received notice regarding the DMV’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH was without authority under statute or its administrative rules to reconsider, revoke, or amend its original final order. View "Reed v. Thompson" on Justia Law