Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent owned the mineral rights to a certain parcel of land. When the Division of Highways (DOH) began construction of a highway through the land owned by the surface owner, the DOH excavated approximately 237,187 tons of limestone from the property. Respondent filed a mandamus action against DOH seeking to force DOH to institute a condemnation proceeding for the limestone removed from her mineral reservation in the land. The DOH filed this condemnation action, and the condemnation commission returned a verdict favorable to DOH. Respondent subsequently demanded a jury trial. Based on the jury’s findings, the trial court awarded Respondent $941,304. DOH appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "W. Va. Dep’t of Transp. v. Newton" on Justia Law

When an officer working at a sobriety checkpoint encountered Respondent, the officer administered a series of field sobriety tests. The officer then administered a preliminary breath test, which Respondent failed. A secondary chemical test of Respondent’s breath indicated that Respondent’s blood alcohol content was .157. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) subsequently revoked Respondent’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the State for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversed the DMV’s order of revocation, finding that the sobriety checkpoint deviated from the police department’s “DUI Sobriety Checkpoint Operations Manual” and that those deviations rendered Respondent’s arrest unlawful. The circuit court affirmed the order of the OAH and reinstated Respondent’s driver’s license. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded for reinstatement of the DMV’s revocation order, holding that the sobriety checkpoint at issue was legally valid and that Respondent’s arrest for DUI was lawful. View "Reed v. Pettit" on Justia Law

Larry Myers, a sales associate, worked at Outdoor Express, Inc., a recreational vehicle dealership. Myers received no pay if no sales were finalized during the preceding two-week period. Myers filed claims for, and received, unemployment compensation benefits for periods when he did not receive commission checks for sales of recreational vehicles. A deputy commissioner with Workforce West Virginia subsequently determined that the benefits were to be repaid by Myers, finding that Myers was neither totally nor partially unemployed during various periods between November 29, 2008 and March 17, 2012, and was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The circuit court affirmed the administrative decision and directed that Myers pay back $39,713 in benefits he received for the periods in question. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that Myers was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he was neither totally nor partially unemployed during the periods in question; but (2) the $39,713 was improperly calculated based on the statute of limitations pertaining to the overpayments in this case. View "Myers v. Outdoor Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Twenty-nine individual Respondents filed eight separate civil actions alleging that Petitioners - three pharmacies and a physician - and other medical providers negligently prescribed and dispensed controlled substances causing Respondents to become addicted to and abuse the controlled substances. Petitioners moved for summary judgment asserting that Respondents’ claims were barred as a matter of law on the basis of Respondents’ admissions of their own criminal activity associated with the prescription and dispensation of controlled substances by Petitioners. Specifically, Petitioners maintained that Respondents’ actions were barred by the “wrongful conduct” rule and/or the doctrine of in pari delicto. The circuit court concluded that the actions were not barred but certified questions regarding the issue to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that any wrongdoing on the part of Respondents must be assessed under the Court’s precepts of comparative negligence and does not per se operate as a complete bar to Respondents’ causes of action. View "Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below" on Justia Law

This case involved the proper placement for two siblings, L.M., a three-year-old boy, and L.S., a two-year-old girl. The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resrouces filed an abuse and neglect petition regarding the children and sought and received custody of the children. The children’s maternal Grandparents filed a motion to intervene and, further, moved for placement of the children in their home. The circuit court denied the Grandparents’ motion to intervene and for placement of the minor children. The Grandparents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient was properly considered by the circuit court; and (2) the circuit court correctly applied the grandparent preference statute, W. Va. Code 49-3-1(a)(3), and did not err in determining that the Grandparents were not an appropriate adoptive placement for the minor children. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law

In 2013, the parties in this case were divorced pursuant to an agreed final order of divorce that included a mutual restraining order. The family court later found Respondent in contempt of court with regard to her attempts at contacting Petitioner. Respondent then filed a pro se petition for appeal challenging the contempt ruling and the inclusion of the mutual restraining order in the final order of divorce. The circuit court reversed the family court’s issuance of the mutual restraining order, concluding that the record was devoid of a proper evidentiary showing of abuse to support the issuance of the mutual restraining order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a court is prohibited from entering a mutual protective order unless each party has filed a petition asserting allegations of domestic violence against the order and established those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Riffle v. Riffle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs signed a form contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause within which was a provision that Defendant contended was a “delegation provision” stating that the parties agreed to delegate, from the courts to an arbitrator, any question about the enforceability of the arbitration clause. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against Defendant for alleged defects in the house. The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have enforced the delegation provision and referred the parties’ claims about arbitrability to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the delegation provision did not reflect a clear and unmistakable intent by the parties to assign to the arbitrator all questions about the enforceability of the arbitration clause; and (2) the circuit court was correct in deciding that the arbitration provision was unenforceable under West Virginia contract law. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Respondent requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Appeals (OAH) to contest the Department of Motor Vehicle’s (DMV) revocation of his driver’s license. The OAH issued a final order (the “original final order”) reversing the DMV’s revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license. The DMV subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the OAH revoke the original final order. The OAH granted the motion for reconsider and issued a revised final order (“revised final order”) that effectively reinstated the DMV’s revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license. The circuit court reversed the OAH’s revised final order and reinstated the OAH’s original final order, finding that the OAH had no statutory or regulatory authority to revoke its original final order and that Respondent never received notice regarding the DMV’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH was without authority under statute or its administrative rules to reconsider, revoke, or amend its original final order. View "Reed v. Thompson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a dispute between a homeowners association that was a West Virginia Limited Expense Planned Community (“Association”), and homeowners who failed to pay their association assessments (“Homeowners”). The instant conflict revolved around the Association’s ability to place a lien on the real property of homeowners whose dues were delinquent. The Association filed separate complaints against the Homeowners, who responded by filing separate answers and counterclaims asserting violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (WVCCPA). The circuit court consolidated the cases and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Association as to all of the Homeowners’ counterclaims, concluding (1) the Association had valid common law liens against the Homeowners’ real property; and (2) a homeowner associations’ attempts to collect assessments are not subject to the WVCCPA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) an association is statutorily authorized to assert a consensual common law lien against real property; and (2) the unfair debt collection provisions of the WVCCPA do apply to a homeowner association’s attempts to collect delinquent assessments. View "Fleet v. Webber Springs Owners Ass’n" on Justia Law

In 1996, the Mason County Board of Education and Michael Whalen, the then-superintendent of schools, entered into a settlement agreement in which Whalen agreed to forego the final year of his superintendent contract in exchange for a lump sum payment of $60,000. Whalen retired in 1997. In 1998, the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board, as administrator of the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System, ruled that a $60,000 payment received by Whalen did not constitute “salary” and therefore would not be included when calculating his retirement annuity benefit. In 2001, Whalen filed a complaint in the circuit court that was, in essence, an appeal of the Retirement Board’s 1998 final order. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Whalen. The Retirement Board then filed this complaint seeking a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Whalen’s appeal was not filed within the thirty-day period specified in W. Va. Code 29A-5-4(bb), and therefore, the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling that Whalen’s appeal was timely. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Hon. David W. Nibert" on Justia Law