Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and refused to submit to a secondary breath test. Respondent’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles for both DUI and the refusal to submit to the designated chemical test. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinded the driver’s license revocation on the grounds that (1) Respondent was misled to believe that he had a choice as to whether he wanted to take a breath test or a blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was inappropriate; and (2) Respondent was effectively denied his right to obtain an independent blood test. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court found that Respondent’s license revocations for refusal to submit to the secondary breath test were proper but his license revocations for DUI were erroneous, holding (1) the lower tribunals erroneously concluded that Respondent had a rational basis for perceiving that he had a choice between the breath test and the blood test, and therefore, revocation for refusing the secondary chemical test was appropriate; and (2) Respondent was denied his statutory and due process rights to have his blood tested independently. View "Reed v. Hall" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder without mercy and concealment of a deceased human body. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) determining that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the first degree murder conviction; (2) refusing to disqualify the prosecuting attorney’s office when the assistant prosecutor who tried the case became a potential witness during her trial preparation of a potential witness; (3) failing to conduct an in camera hearing due to alleged juror misconduct and by failing to order a mistrial regarding this issue; (4) allowing the State to play a video recording to the jury of the Petitioner at the sheriff’s department; and (5) allowing the co-defendant’s plea agreement to be admitted for purposes of assessing the witness’s credibility. View "State v. Murray" on Justia Law

After a trial, the circuit court convicted Petitioner of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory and conspiracy to operate or attempt to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, as both counts one and two in the indictment each charged Petitioner with a single offense, and not two separate offenses as Petitioner argued, so there was no violation of W. Va. R. Crim. P. 8; (2) failing to give the entirety of Petitioner’s proposed instruction concerning the burden of proof for actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance; (3) denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress; and (4) determining that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. View "State v. Brock" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed this civil action under the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requesting from West Virginia University School of Medicine (WVU) documents relating to eight articles co-authored by a WVU associate professor suggesting that the environmental impacts of surface coal mining plan a role in the health problems of the area’s residents. WVU released certain documents to Petitioner but withheld or redacted other documents, claiming they were statutorily exempt from disclosure. The circuit court eventually granted summary judgment for WVU, concluding that WVU had properly refused to provide all withheld and redacted documents on the basis of FOIA’s statutory exemptions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) WVU may invoke the FOIA’s “internal memoranda” exemption to withhold documents that reflect the author’s deliberative process; (2) WVU may not claim an “academic freedom” privilege to justify its wholesale avoidance of the plain language of the FOIA; (3) the FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemption is not applicable to documents containing anonymous peer review comments of the draft articles, but those documents are nevertheless exempt from disclosure under the “internal memoranda” exemption; and (4) Petitioner should have been afforded the opportunity to modify its FOIA requests before the circuit court dismissed the action. View "Highland Mining Co. v. W. Va. Univ. Sch. of Medicine" on Justia Law

Jarrett Smith was injured when his vehicle collided with a truck owned by Modular Building Consultants of West Virginia, Inc. and operated by Billy Joe McLaughlin. Prior to the collision, McLaughlin had arrived at a job site to retrieve a Modular storage container being leased and utilized by Poerio, Inc. Smith filed suit against Modular, alleging negligence. Modular brought a third-party complaint against Poerio, seeking contribution and indemnification pursuant to the lease agreement. Before trial, Modular settled with Smith. Trial as to Modular’s third-party complaint proceeded. A jury found that Poerio did not breach the lease agreement but found that Poerio, Modular, and Smith were all comparatively negligent. The circuit court subsequently entered judgment in Poerio’s favor on its contribution claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury’s finding that Poerio was negligent was not inconsistent with its finding that Poerio did not breach the lease agreement; (2) the circuit court erred in ruling that Modular’s contribution claim was extinguished by its good faith settlement with Smith as a matter of law; but (3) the jury’s verdict was neither inconsistent nor impermissibly considered the comparative fault of Smith. View "Modular Building Consultants of W. Va., Inc. v. Poerio, Inc." on Justia Law

Two individuals (Claimants) who sustained work-related injuries received workers’ compensation benefits. Claimants sought additional benefits as a result of further symptoms related to their original workplace injuries and timely requested that the new diagnoses be added to their original claims. In both cases, however, denials of compensability and/or medical treatment required extensive litigation through the workers’ compensation system. The Supreme Court ultimately found Claimants to be entitled to the compensability ruling/medical treatment they had requested, but as a result of the litigation delays, Claimants’ requests for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits associated with the newly added diagnoses were denied by the workers’ compensation system as untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the Board of Review denying Claimants’ PPD evaluation requests as untimely and remanded, holding (1) Claimants’ requests for a PPD evaluation were timely pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-16(a)(2); and (2) to hold otherwise would effectively deny Claimants their statutory rights to receive a permanent disability evaluation and to be compensated for their workplace injuries. Remanded. View "Hammons v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Shanton was indicted in a fifty-four count indictment connected to her use of a purchasing card (P-card) issued pursuant to West Virginia’s Purchasing Card Program. The circuit court dismissed fifty-three counts, each of which alleged that Shanton used the P-card in violation of W. Va. code 12-3-10b. The circuit court determined that the inclusion of these counts in the indictment violated principles of double jeopardy because (1) each swipe of the P-Card was part of a continuing offense, and therefore, Shanton could only be charged with one violation of section 12-3-10b; and (2) the elements of the crime described in the fifty-three dismissed counts overlapped completely with the elements of the remaining count. The State sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order dismissing the fifty-three counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred by (i) collapsing counts 2 through 54 into a single count, thereby effectively dismissing all but one of those counts, and (ii) dismissing the condensed count, thereby dismissing all counts in the indictment alleging violations of section 12-3-10b; and (2) the State was entitled to the writ it sought. View "State ex rel. Lorenzetti v. Hon. Sanders" on Justia Law

American Towers LLC hired BPI, Inc., a West Virginia contractor, to construct a cell tower and cell tower compound in Kentucky. The access road collapsed within one year after the completion of the project. American Towers filed a civil action against BPI. BPI filed a cross-claim against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, claiming that BPI’s potential liability was covered under the commercial general liability policy it had purchased from Nationwide. Nationwide sought a declaration that it was not obligated to insure BPI for this incident. The determinative issues in this case depended upon the application of West Virginia law regarding BPI’s insurance policy covering property damage caused by an “occurrence.” Under Cherrington v. Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Co., issued by the Supreme Court after American Towers filed the underlying civil action against BPI, held that defective workmanship may qualify as an occurrence, allowing resulting damages to be covered under a policy such as the policy at issue in this case. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky requested the Supreme Court to answer the question of whether the decision in Cherrington applies retroactively. The Supreme Court held that Cherrington applies retroactively. Remanded. View "BPI, Inc. v. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) filed a petition in the circuit court initiating the underlying abuse and neglect case. The petition alleged that Respondent Stepfather sexually abused K.P. and that Respondent Mother failed to protect K.P. from Stepfather and committed acts of emotional abuse against K.P. The DHHR removed all minor children from the home. After a multi-day adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court dismissed the abuse and neglect petition, concluding that DHHR had not met its burden of proving that K.P. was abused by either respondent and that Stepfather’s refusal to testify and rebut the abuse charges could not be used as evidence against him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Respondents were abusing parents with regard to K.P., and therefore, the health and welfare of the other children in the home was also at risk; and (2) accordingly, the circuit court erred by refusing to adjudicate all the minor children as abused children. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ car and a work-truck owned by Energy Corporation of America (ECA) were involved in a wreck that occurred in Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs filed a tort claim in Harrison County against ECA. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for improper venue. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a bad faith claim in Harrison County against their insurer and joined ECA as a co-defendant, seeking tort damages for the wreck. ECA filed a motion to sever for improper joinder and dismiss for improper venue. The circuit court denied relief, concluding (1) joinder of ECA and Plaintiffs’ insurer was improper under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 20; and (2) Harrison County was a proper venue for ECA based on the “venue-giving defendant” principle. ECA petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ as moulded, holding (1) the joinder of Plaintiffs’ insurer and ECA was improper because it failed to satisfy the requirements under Rule 20(a); and (2) once Plaintiffs’ insurer is properly severed from the claim against ECA, there will be no venue-giving defendant in this action, and therefore, Harrison County was not a proper venue for ECA. View "State ex rel. Energy Corp. of Am. v. Hon. John Lewis Marks" on Justia Law