Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the paternal grandparents of a child, M.F. III, who sought to intervene in an abuse and neglect proceeding following the fatal stabbing of the child's mother by his father. The grandparents, who lived in Baltimore, Maryland, but had a second home in Charleston, West Virginia, filed three motions to intervene in the proceedings, seeking placement of the child and/or visitation rights. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied all three motions. The grandparents appealed, arguing that the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to conduct a home study to determine their suitability as adoptive parents, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3).The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had previously reviewed the case. The court denied the grandparents' motions to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court also did not order the DHS to conduct a home study to assess the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents, despite the termination of the father's parental rights and the child's placement in the DHS's permanent custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the grandparents' motions to intervene, as they did not fall within the class of individuals who may seek permissive intervention under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h). However, the court found that the DHS had failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) to consider the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents. The court remanded the case with directions for the DHS to comply with the statute and for the circuit court to determine the child's best interests for permanent placement following the DHS's compliance. View "In Re M.F. III" on Justia Law

The case involves Brian Frye, a homeowner who claimed that his property had suffered damage due to underground mine subsidence. He submitted a claim to his home insurer, Erie Insurance Company, and notified the Board of Risk Insurance and Management (BRIM) of the damages. Both Erie and BRIM investigated the claim, but both denied it, stating that the damage was not due to mine subsidence. Frye then sued Erie for breach of contract and other claims. The Circuit Court of Ohio County granted summary judgment to Erie, concluding that Erie functioned as BRIM’s agent in the adjustment of Frye’s claim. Frye moved the court to alter or amend that judgment, arguing that it threatened the constitutionality of certain West Virginia statutes.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the lower court erred by failing to notify the Attorney General of the constitutional questions raised in Frye’s motion to alter or amend the summary judgment order. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the lower court’s order denying Frye’s motion and to remand the matter to permit the lower court to notify the Attorney General of these proceedings in accordance with Rule 24(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Frye v. Erie Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a lawsuit filed by Rosemary Lambert and Carolyn Hinzman, individually and as co-executors of the estate of Delmar P. Fields, against Eldercare of Jackson County, LLC, Community Health Association, and Dr. Irvin John Snyder. The plaintiffs allege that Mr. Fields contracted COVID-19 while a resident at Eldercare and died while under the care of Jackson General and Dr. Snyder. The defendants sought dismissal of the lawsuit, arguing that they were immune from liability under the COVID-19 Jobs Protection Act.The Circuit Court of Jackson County denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court interpreted the term "actual malice" in the COVID-19 Jobs Protection Act to mean that the defendant acted with the intent to injure or harm the plaintiff or decedent. The court found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court held that the term "actual malice" in the COVID-19 Jobs Protection Act means that the defendant acted with the deliberate intent to commit an injury, as evidenced by external circumstances. The court found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to show that Eldercare engaged in intentional conduct with actual malice. However, the court found that the allegations against Jackson General Hospital and Dr. Snyder were insufficient to establish that they engaged in intentional conduct with actual malice. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Eldercare of Jackson County, LLC v. Lambert" on Justia Law

The case involves Michael D. Ruble and Brenda K. Ruble, who filed a lawsuit against Rust-Oleum Corporation and other defendants. Michael Ruble alleged that he was injured due to exposure to defective, toxic chemicals at his workplace, which were manufactured by third parties. He filed a product-defect lawsuit against these manufacturers and a workers' compensation claim with his employer. The workers' compensation administrative process concluded that Ruble failed to prove he developed an injury as a result of his employment. The third-party manufacturers then moved to dismiss the product-defect lawsuit, arguing that Ruble was barred from litigating causation in court due to the workers' compensation decision. The Circuit Court of Cabell County granted the motion to dismiss.The Circuit Court of Cabell County ruled in favor of the third-party manufacturers, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court held that the workers' compensation decision precluded Ruble from litigating the causation issue in court. The court found that the workers' compensation process involved legal standards and procedural rules that were substantially different from those in a courtroom, and that process did not afford Ruble a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the third-party manufacturers' chemicals were a cause of his injury.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision. The court found that the workers' compensation administrative procedures were not an adequate substitute for juridical procedures in the circuit court. The court held that Ruble did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of causation in the prior workers' compensation administrative proceedings. The court concluded that it was error for the circuit court to have applied collateral estoppel to Ruble's claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ruble v. Rust-Oleum Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the burden of proof in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The petitioners, Judith and Gary Shears, filed a lawsuit against Ethicon, Inc., and Johnson & Johnson, alleging injuries caused by Ethicon’s Tension-Free Vaginal Tape (TVT), a mesh sling used to treat stress urinary incontinence. The Shearses claimed that the TVT device was defectively designed. The case was part of a multidistrict litigation proceeding against Ethicon.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, where Ethicon argued that the plaintiffs must prove that an alternative, feasible design would have materially reduced the plaintiff’s injuries. The district court rejected this argument. However, after the publication of the West Virginia Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases (PJI) § 411, which stated that a plaintiff must prove that there was an alternative, feasible design that eliminated the risk that injured the plaintiff, the district court reconsidered its decision and agreed with Ethicon's argument. The case was then transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was asked to clarify certain elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The court held that PJI § 411 does not correctly specify a plaintiff’s burden of proof in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The court further held that a plaintiff asserting a strict liability claim for a design defect must prove that an alternative, feasible design was available to the manufacturer at the time the product in question was manufactured. Lastly, the court held that a plaintiff is required to prove that an alternative, feasible design existing at the time the subject product was made would have substantially reduced the risk of the specific injury suffered by the plaintiff. View "Shears v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a former underground coal miner, Randy Brown, who contracted occupational pneumoconiosis (OP) due to his exposure to coal dust. In 2016, he was granted a 30% permanent partial disability (PPD) award for his OP. In 2018, Brown sought an increase in his award, claiming his condition had worsened. The Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board (OP Board) examined Brown and determined that he had an additional 20% impairment, bringing his total impairment rating to 50%. The claims administrator granted an additional 20% PPD award, which was protested by Brown's employer, Rockspring Development, Inc.Rockspring's protest was heard by the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges, which affirmed the claims administrator’s decision. Rockspring then appealed to the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review, which also affirmed the decision. During the pendency of the claim process, Brown underwent a bilateral lung transplant. Post-transplant, Brown’s pulmonary function testing and x-ray reports showed no evidence of OP. Rockspring argued that the Board of Review was clearly wrong in affirming the additional 20% PPD award because Brown no longer had OP or any pulmonary impairment.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia disagreed with Rockspring's argument. The court noted that the relevant statutes do not indicate whether the decisionmaker should consider the pulmonary function of the pre-transplant lungs or the function of the post-transplant lungs when the transplant occurred during the pendency of the claim proceedings. Given the unique circumstances of the case and the deference afforded to the Board of Review, the court affirmed the Board of Review’s decision granting Brown an additional 20% PPD award. View "Rockspring Development, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves Logan-Mingo Area Mental Health, Inc., the employer, and David M. Lester, the employee. Lester had a preexisting impairment from a 1999 workers’ compensation claim for injuries to his lumbar and thoracic spine, which resulted in a 20% Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) award. In 2017, Lester fell off a ladder at work, sustaining additional injuries to his lumbar and thoracic spine, along with injuries to his cervical spine, left shoulder, right knee, and left knee. The dispute arose over the method of apportioning Lester's preexisting impairments when determining his PPD award for the 2017 injuries.The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (OOJ) affirmed the claims administrator's decision to grant Lester an additional 2% PPD award, resulting in a total 10% PPD award for the 2017 claim. This decision was based on a method of apportioning preexisting impairments suggested by Dr. Thaxton, who reviewed Lester's records. Lester appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR), which reversed the OOJ's decision and granted a 19% PPD award based on a different method of apportionment suggested by Dr. Guberman, who performed an independent medical evaluation of Lester. Logan-Mingo, the employer, appealed the BOR's decision.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the BOR's decision and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the OOJ's decision. The court held that when a claimant has preexisting, definitely ascertained impairments to multiple body parts and then sustains new compensable injuries that affect the previously impaired body parts, the proper method for apportioning the preexisting impairments is to first determine the claimant’s total, unapportioned whole-person impairment using the Combined Values Chart of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Then, the total amount of the claimant’s preexisting impairment that has been definitely ascertained must be deducted from the total, unapportioned whole-person impairment to calculate the amount of the claimant’s Permanent Partial Disability award. The court found that the BOR erred by granting Lester a 19% PPD award that was based on Dr. Guberman’s erroneous apportionment method. View "Logan-Mingo Area Mental Health, Inc. v. Lester" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Judge Timothy L. Sweeney of the Circuit Court of Pleasants County, West Virginia. The petition was filed against the Hearing Panel Subcommittee (HPS) of the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board (LDB) and several attorneys. The case stems from consolidated lawyer disciplinary proceedings concerning several lawyers who were involved with a program operated by the City of St. Marys, West Virginia, called “Slow Down for the Holidays.” The program allowed certain criminal charges to be dismissed in exchange for donations to benefit needy children and seniors during the holiday season. Judge Sweeney reported the program to the appropriate authorities, leading to disciplinary proceedings against the involved attorneys.The HPS granted a motion by one of the attorneys to depose Judge Sweeney, who then moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the requested deposition testimony and documents were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The HPS denied the motion to quash, leading to Judge Sweeney's petition for a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ of prohibition. The court found that the HPS clearly erred in ordering Judge Sweeney to submit to a deposition and produce documents. The court held that the testimony and records sought by the subpoena were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The court also found that the HPS erred in failing to hold a mandatory hearing pursuant to Hatcher v. McBride, which sets forth the limited circumstances in which judicial testimony may be compelled. The court concluded that the HPS exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering Judge Sweeney to appear for a deposition and produce documents. View "State ex rel. Sweeney v. Mundy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Bradley Rohrbaugh, who was charged with fleeing from an officer with reckless indifference, a violation of West Virginia Code § 61-5-17(f). The charges stemmed from an incident where a state trooper attempted to stop Rohrbaugh for speeding, but he allegedly continued to accelerate, reaching speeds of approximately 100 miles per hour. Rohrbaugh was later arrested, and a grand jury returned a one-count indictment against him.The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of Grant County. During the pretrial motions hearing, the prosecuting attorney informed the court that Rohrbaugh's defense counsel had expressed a desire for a bench trial. The court did not directly address Rohrbaugh about his desire for a bench trial or his right to a jury trial. The court then scheduled the bench trial, and Rohrbaugh was found guilty of the charged offense and sentenced to one to five years imprisonment.Rohrbaugh appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, arguing that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. He also claimed that the circuit court's factual findings did not support his conviction. The Supreme Court agreed with Rohrbaugh's argument regarding the waiver of his right to a jury trial. The court found that the record did not firmly establish that Rohrbaugh's waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. As a result, the court vacated Rohrbaugh's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Rohrbaugh" on Justia Law

The case involves two petitioners, Daniel Dilly, Superintendent of the Rubenstein Juvenile Center (RJC), and Nancy Oldaker, Health Services Administrator at RJC, who were held in contempt of court by Judge Kurt Hall of the Circuit Court of Lewis County, West Virginia. The contempt charges arose from an incident involving a resident of RJC, identified as D.P., who suffered a broken jaw during a fight with other residents. The court had ordered that D.P. be taken off RJC grounds for an X-ray and that his mother be notified of his medical appointments. The court found that these orders were not adequately followed by the petitioners.The Circuit Court of Lewis County held a hearing to review D.P.'s placement and medical care, resulting in a "Medical Care Order" that directed RJC to schedule an appointment for D.P. with his oral surgeon and to allow D.P.'s mother to attend the appointment. The court also ordered RJC to provide a report concerning the incident that led to D.P.'s injury. When these orders were not fully complied with, the court held a "show cause" hearing and found both Superintendent Dilly and Ms. Oldaker in contempt of court, fining each of them $250.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that procedural errors in the lower court's contempt proceedings deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose such sanctions. The court noted that the lower court failed to provide the petitioners with adequate notice that they were facing indirect criminal contempt proceedings and did not afford them jury trials before imposing the fines. The court concluded that the contempt orders were void and granted the petitioners' requested writs of prohibition, thereby preventing the lower court from enforcing the contempt orders. View "State ex rel. Dilly v. Hall" on Justia Law