Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the West Virginia Department of Health, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, and Dr. Allen R. Mock (collectively "Petitioners") and Dr. Patsy Cipoletti, Jr., administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, June Cipoletti ("Respondent"). The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioners, alleging that they violated the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) by negligently determining Mrs. Cipoletti’s cause of death. The Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Respondent had not asserted a proper cause of action under the MPLA. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, determining that the MPLA applied and that Petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied the Petitioners' motion to dismiss. The court determined that the MPLA applied and that Petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Dr. Mock’s conduct fell under and was governed by the MPLA, thus depriving Petitioners of qualified immunity.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision. The court found that the Petitioners' actions were discretionary and not in violation of any "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws" and were not "otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive." Therefore, the court concluded that the Petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity from the lawsuit. The court also found that the Respondent had failed to plead a viable MPLA cause of action against the Petitioners. The court remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to grant the Petitioners' motion to dismiss. View "West Virginia Department of Health v. Cipoletti" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Christopher Sullivan, the respondent, and several police officers and cities, the petitioners. Sullivan filed a complaint against the petitioners following a confrontation with the police officers that led to his arrest on various charges. Sullivan asserted twenty-three state law causes of action against the petitioners. In response, the petitioners filed motions to dismiss Sullivan's complaint, alleging varying theories of immunity. The Circuit Court of Jefferson County partially granted the petitioners' motions to dismiss. The court determined that the police officers were not entitled to "qualified immunity" and that the cities and their respective police departments and police chiefs were entitled to "qualified immunity" from Sullivan's negligence claims. The court also determined that Sullivan was entitled to allege claims of negligence and intentional torts from the same facts.The petitioners appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The Supreme Court found that the Circuit Court erred by basing its immunity decisions on common law qualified immunity principles, which are only applicable to the State, its agencies, officials, and employees, rather than applying the provisions of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, which govern immunity for the claims asserted against the petitioners as they are undisputedly political subdivisions and employees of political subdivisions. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kent v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

The case involves Tony Paletta, the petitioner, and Nelson Phillips, III, Nathan Phillips, Robert Nelson Phillips, II, and the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, the respondents. The petitioner and the Phillips respondents own adjacent land in Harrison County, West Virginia. A road, Harrison County Route 36/5 (CR 36/5), crosses the Phillips respondents' property and provides access to the petitioner's property. The road was never improved by the West Virginia Division of Highways (WVDOH) but appears on WVDOH maps for Harrison County beginning in 1937. After the Phillips respondents impeded the petitioner's access by way of CR 36/5, the petitioner brought suit in circuit court seeking an order requiring the Phillips respondents to remove the gates/fences and allow him access to his property, using CR 36/5.The Circuit Court of Harrison County granted summary judgment in favor of the Phillips respondents, finding that CR 36/5 was not a public road. The court based its decision on several factors, including the lack of specific description of the road, the WVDOH's admission that the road no longer exists in an identifiable form, and the lack of plans by the WVDOH to make any improvements to CR 36/5.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the circuit court erred in concluding that CR 36/5 is not a public road and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Phillips respondents. The court held that the burden of showing that a public road was abandoned falls on the party asserting the abandonment. In this case, the Phillips respondents failed to demonstrate that CR 36/5 was discontinued or abandoned. The court concluded that CR 36/5 was properly made a part of the state road system in 1933 and was never properly abandoned, discontinued, vacated, or closed by the WVDOH in the manner prescribed by West Virginia law. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Paletta v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The State of West Virginia sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Monongalia County from enforcing its order dismissing a six-count indictment against J.L. and D.F., who were charged with crimes relating to child abuse and neglect. The Circuit Court had dismissed the indictment based on its assessment of the evidence presented in a related abuse and neglect proceeding, concluding that no trial jury could convict the parents based on that evidence. The State argued that the Circuit Court had exceeded its legitimate powers by dismissing the indictment.Previously, the Circuit Court had dismissed the indictment on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support it. The court based its decision on its knowledge of the evidence from a related abuse and neglect proceeding, and its opinion regarding the State's likelihood of obtaining convictions by a petit jury.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ of prohibition. The court found that the Circuit Court had exceeded its legitimate powers by dismissing the indictment based on its improper consideration of evidence in a prior proceeding. The court held that a circuit court may not grant a defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on the basis of the sufficiency of the evidence or whether a factual basis for the indictment exists. The court concluded that the State was entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, as the Circuit Court's order was clearly erroneous as a matter of law, and the State would be damaged in a way that was not correctable on appeal. View "State of West Virginia ex rel. State of West Virginia v. Gwaltney" on Justia Law

The case involves Rachel Louise Adkins, who was charged with one felony count of driving under the influence causing death, along with four misdemeanor charges. Adkins entered a Kennedy plea in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, under the impression that she would be sentenced to home confinement, based on off-the-record plea discussions with the court. However, the court sentenced her to not less than two nor more than ten years of incarceration. Adkins objected, stating that she entered the plea because the court had promised to sentence her to home confinement.The Circuit Court of Cabell County denied Adkins's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and resentenced her for the purpose of this appeal following her conviction for DUI causing death. Adkins appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, arguing that she would not have accepted the plea had the court not promised to sentence her to home confinement.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the lower court's participation in plea discussions was a violation of Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly prohibits judicial participation in plea discussions with criminal defendants. The court concluded that this violation constituted plain error, affecting the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The case was remanded with directions to allow Adkins to withdraw her plea and for assignment to a different circuit court judge. View "State of West Virginia v. Adkins" on Justia Law

The case involves T & C Construction Services and Theodore Miller (collectively, T & C), who operate a rental building in St. Albans, West Virginia. The City of St. Albans inspected the premises after a tenant reported a fire, revealing numerous fire hazards and building code violations. The City issued two citations for these violations, and the St. Albans Municipal Court fined T & C $81,250.00 for the fire code violations and $116,900.00 for the building code violations. After T & C failed to appeal these orders, the City sought enforcement in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County issued a cease-and-desist order that enjoined T & C from operating its rental business on the premises, granted the City a money judgment for the criminal fines, and appointed a special commissioner to sell the property to satisfy the judgment. T & C appealed this enforcement order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to grant injunctive relief, rejecting T & C’s challenges to the injunctive relief. The court found that the lower court had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. However, the court reversed the lower court's appointment of a special commissioner to sell the property. The court held that the issuance and return of a writ of fieri facias showing “no property found” is a precondition to a circuit court’s jurisdiction to order the sale of a debtor’s property to satisfy a judgment for a criminal fine. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T & C Construction Services, LLC v. City of St. Albans" on Justia Law

The case involves David Duff II, a Kanawha County Deputy Sheriff, who injured his back while on duty. He applied for workers' compensation benefits and was awarded a 13% Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) award. The award was based on a medical report that found Duff had a 25% whole person impairment, but 12% of this was attributed to a preexisting condition. Duff protested this award to the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR), arguing that no apportionment was indicated. However, the BOR affirmed the 13% PPD award. Duff then appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA), which also affirmed the BOR's decision.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The court found that the ICA erred in affirming the BOR's decision. The court held that under West Virginia Code § 23-4-9b (2003), the employer has the burden of proving apportionment is warranted in a workers' compensation case. This requires the employer to prove the claimant "has a definitely ascertainable impairment resulting from" a preexisting condition(s). The court found that the respondent failed to carry its burden of proving the degree of impairment to be attributed to any preexisting condition for purposes of apportionment. The court reversed the ICA's decision and remanded the case to the BOR with directions to grant Duff an additional 12% PPD award for a total PPD award of 25%. View "Duff v. Kanawha County Commission" on Justia Law

The defendant, Kristen Nicole Wetzel, was convicted of unlawful taking of a vehicle, also known as "joyriding," under West Virginia Code § 17-8-4(a). As part of a plea agreement, she was sentenced to six months of incarceration, with only ten days of actual confinement and the remainder of the sentence suspended in favor of probation. The court later amended the confinement period to 240 hours of actual incarceration. Wetzel filed a motion to correct her sentence, arguing that the language of the sentencing order was denying her "good time" credit, a reduction of sentence for good conduct.The Circuit Court of Barbour County denied Wetzel's motion. The court found that the issue of good time credit was within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the court. The court also noted that its sentencing order did not prohibit Wetzel from receiving good time credit. If Wetzel believed she should be receiving credit for good time, the court suggested she should file a civil action against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Wetzel's sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on any impermissible factor. The court agreed with the lower court that the issue of good time credit fell within the discretion of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Therefore, the court found no basis to grant Wetzel any relief under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. View "State of West Virginia v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Kyle Slaughter, who was arrested and charged in two separate counties in West Virginia. In Fayette County, he was arrested after leading police on a high-speed chase and subsequently charged with bribery and other offenses. While incarcerated for these charges, his bond was revoked for separate charges pending in Raleigh County. At sentencing in Fayette County, the court credited Slaughter with thirty days for time served—the time between when he was first incarcerated and when his Raleigh County bond was revoked. Slaughter appealed, arguing that he should have been credited for the entire 263-day period that he was incarcerated.The Circuit Court of Fayette County determined that any credit for time served after Slaughter's bond had been revoked in Raleigh County should be applied to the charges in Raleigh County, not Fayette County. Slaughter appealed this decision, arguing that he should receive credit for the entire period he was incarcerated on the Fayette County charges.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the Circuit Court of Fayette County erred in failing to credit Slaughter for the full 263 days he spent incarcerated on Fayette County charges and awaiting sentencing in Fayette County. The court stated that criminal defendants are entitled to credit for time served awaiting trial and sentencing while incarcerated on the underlying offense if the offense is bailable. However, the court deemed the error harmless and affirmed the lower court's decision because Slaughter was ultimately credited his full time served in the Raleigh County sentencing order. View "State v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

Two campus police officers at Shepherd University, Jay Longerbeam and Donald Buracker, were terminated due to alleged "misconduct" and "unprofessionalism" during two incidents in 2018 and 2019. The officers claimed that their termination was a result of age and disability discrimination, retaliation under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (HRA), violation of the West Virginia Whistle-blower Law, and common law wrongful discharge. The Circuit Court of Jefferson County granted summary judgment against both officers on all claims.The officers appealed the decision, arguing that the lower court erred in finding no genuine issues of material fact and in its handling of the burden-shifting paradigm. They contended that their conduct during the incidents was legally proper and that the court failed to consider intervening acts of reprisal which were more temporally proximate to their protected activity than their discharge.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the lower court erred in its handling of the "temporal proximity" issue and the burden-shifting paradigm. The court also found that the officers offered more than sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find retaliatory motivation. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment as to the officers’ whistle-blower and Harless claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment as to Buracker’s HRA disability discrimination claim, finding his evidence insufficient to create an inference of disability discrimination. View "Jay Longerbeam v. Shepherd University" on Justia Law