Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted and sentence for first-degree sexual assault and sexual abuse by a parent or guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in circuit court alleging that his sentence for first-degree sexual assault was illegal. The circuit court determined that the issue was properly resolved under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35. During a hearing, Petitioner argued that he was entitled to a de novo resentencing hearing. The trial court disagreed and corrected the sentence at the hearing. The court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of not less than fifteen years nor more than thirty-five years for first-degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for a de novo resentencing hearing. View "State v. Tex B.S." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the principal owner of a vacation facility open to the public (“the resort”), was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. Petitioner’s sentence included placement on supervised release for twenty-five years. After serving consecutive terms in the penitentiary and being placed on parole, Petitioner was discharged from parole and placed on supervised release. Petitioner challenged the conditions of the terms of his supervised release that he not be employed at the resort and that he not visit the resort. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s motion to strike those conditions from the terms of his supervised release. The circuit court also, sua sponte, entered an order setting forth additional conditions governing Petitioner’s conduct, including a condition banning him from his farm. The Supreme Court (1) upheld the two conditions banning Petitioner from the resort; and (2) upheld the additional conditions imposed sua sponte by the circuit court, except for the condition banning Petitioner from his farm, as this prohibition warranted a more detailed analysis by the circuit court. Remanded. View "State v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

This institutional reform litigation began in 1981 when a group of patients filed a mandamus action seeking judicial intervention for deplorable conditions in West Virginia’s mental institutions. In these consolidated appeals, Petitioner, the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Behavioral Health and Health Facilities (“the DHHR”), sought relief from two 2014 orders of the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in refusing to certify its prior rulings on appeal as partial final judgments; (2) did not exceed its authority under the separation of powers doctrine and West Virginia precedent by compelling the DHHR to comply with an agreed order entered in 2009 through the immediate implementation of a pay raise restructuring plan at two state mental health hospitals; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by compelling the DHHR to develop a plan that included the means to increase salaries of existing direct care employees, as required by the 2009 agreed order. View "W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res. v. E.H." on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit arose out of Fred Hlad’s agreement to construct a house for Travis and Teresa Nelson. The Nelsons sued Hlad for breach of contract, various intentional tort claims, and negligence in constructing their house. Hlad had a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company at all times relevant to this case. Nationwide provided Hlad a defense in the underlying lawsuit under a reservation of rights. Nationwide also intervened in the lawsuit and filed a complaint for declaratory relief to determine whether it had a duty to defend or indemnify Hlad. The circuit court denied Nationwide’s request for declaratory relief, finding that the CGL policy provided coverage to Hlad for any damages that may be recovered in the underlying lawsuit. Nationwide then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted Nationwide’s requested writ, holding (1) most of the claims asserted by the Nelsons did not trigger coverage under the CGL policy, and the claims that did trigger coverage were precluded by clear and unambiguous exclusions; and (2) therefore, Nationwide had no duty to provide coverage, defend, or indemnify Hlad in the underlying lawsuit. View "State ex rel. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hon. Ronald E. Wilson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three sexual offenses against an infant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements Defendant made to the police; (2) the evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of the offenses set out in the indictment; (3) Defendant’s juvenile record was properly used to impeach Defendant’s trial testimony; and (4) although polygraph-related evidence has been deemed inadmissible in this State, the improper admission of such evidence does not automatically warrant a new trial, and in this case, testimony mentioning that Petitioner took a polygraph test was error, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Tyler G." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. Petitioner was sentenced to life without mercy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if deemed gruesome, the probative value of autopsy and crime scene photographs is greater at the mercy phase of a bifurcated trial than at the guilt phase of such trial; (2) the circuit court in this case did not err in admitting autopsy and crime scene photographs during the mercy phase; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that alleged jury misconduct did not prejudice Petitioner; (4) the circuit court did gave a proper reading to jury of West Virginia Slayer Statute; (5) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the mercy phase closing argument; (6) Petitioner waived her argument regarding the admission into evidence of a summary chart; and (7) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. View "State v. Trail" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a pilot, filed a complaint alleging that Potomac Highlands Airport Authority (“PHAA”) wrongfully banned him from the Greater Cumberland Regional Airport. Petitioner’s complaint alleged a loss of income as a result of his inability to access the airport premises and sought injunctive relief. The circuit court granted PHAA’s motion to dismiss pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s complaint, holding that Petitioner failed sufficiently to identify and plead the legal basis of his cause of action and failed adequately to state a claim sufficient to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). View "Malone v. Potomac Highlands Airport Auth." on Justia Law

Petitioner served as general counsel to the West Virginia Department of Agriculture (WVDA) for approximately twenty-five years. The WVDA submitted employer and employee contributions to the Public Employees Retirement System (“PERS”) on Petitioner’s behalf for twenty-one years. In 2013, the the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (“Board”) notified Petitioner that he was not eligible to participate in PERS because he was not a full-time employee. The Board subsequently entered a final order denying Petitioner’s request to participate in PERS on the grounds that he was not a full-time employee. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner was statutorily prohibited from participating in PERS because he never worked more than approximately three hundred hours in any one year. View "Curry v. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

The decedent died while participating in the Tough Mudder Mid-Atlantic event in Gerrardstown, Berkeley County, West Virginia. Plaintiff, the decedent’s mother and personal representative, filed a wrongful death action in Marshall County against several Tough Mudder defendants. Defendants objected to the venue and requested that the matter be transferred to Berkeley County. The circuit court concluded that venue was proper in Marshall County. Defendants filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the circuit court of Marshall County to transfer the case to the circuit court of Berkeley County, holding that venue did not lie in Marshall County. View "State ex rel. Airsquid Ventures, Inc. v. Hon. David W. Hummel, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land within a larger tract of land owned by Respondent. When Petitioner was conveyed the land, the deed contained a restrictive covenant stating that Petitioner “shall install no septic or sewage system of any kind, no septic tank or leach bed on the real estate herein conveyed.” Relations between Petitioner and Respondent deteriorated, and Petitioner filed a complaint alleging that Respondent was interfering with his use of the right-of-way. Respondent counterclaimed that Petitioner had installed a septic or sewage system on his property in violation of the covenants in his deed. The circuit court ruled against Petitioner on the septic system issue, concluding that the restrictive covenant in Petitioner’s deed was perpetual, rather than personal, thereby running with the land. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) abused its discretion in concluding that the restrictive covenant in Petitioner’s deed was enforceable; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in determining the width and use of a right-of-way across Respondent’s land. View "Cottle v. Davis" on Justia Law