Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, an attorney practicing primarily in the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit (judicial circuit), sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondents, the mental hygiene commissioners of the judicial circuit, from appointing legal counsel for alleged protected persons in actions instituted under the West Virginia Guardianship and Conservatorship Act (Act). Specifically, Petitioner asserted that W. Va. Code 44A-2-7(a) mandates that circuit courts, rather than mental hygiene commissioners, make such appointments. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the provisions of section 44A-2-7(a) require the circuit court to appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected persons instituted under the Act, and therefore, Respondents exceeded their legitimate powers by appointing legal counsel for alleged protected persons under section 44A-2-7(a). View "State ex rel. Barrat v. Dalby" on Justia Law

In 2010, an abuse and neglect petition was filed alleging that Child’s mother (Mother) was under the influence of drugs while caring for Child. The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) subsequently placed Child in the care of his paternal grandparents (Grandparents). In 2013, the circuit court held a permanency hearing and granted legal guardianship to Grandparents. Thereafter, Mother filed a petition to overturn legal guardianship, asserting that her recovery and continued sobriety constituted a material change in circumstances justifying a modification of the custody of Child. After a hearing held in 2015, the circuit court terminated Grandparents’ legal guardianship and ordered the transfer of Child to Mother. Grandparents appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence in the record indicating that alteration of custody would serve Child’s best interests at this time. View "In re S.W." on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed in magistrate court charging Respondent with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, which is a felony. Before the preliminary hearing commenced, the State filed a motion with the magistrate court seeking to dismiss the criminal complaint without prejudice. The magistrate court granted the motion to dismiss the criminal complaint. Respondent subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the circuit court to require the magistrate to hold a preliminary hearing for Respondent. The circuit court ruled that Respondent was entitled to a preliminary hearing provided the hearing could be held prior to the return of an indictment against her. The court reasoned that a magistrate may not dismiss a felony charge before holding a preliminary hearing where the State might seek an indictment for the alleged criminal conduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Respondent did not have a clear legal right to a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate had no legal duty to provide such a hearing. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

After DUI and hit and run charges were filed against Robert Conniff, the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) notified Conniff that his driver’s license was being revoked for DUI. After a fifth and final hearing, the DMV revoked Conniff’s driving privileges. The circuit court reversed the final order of the DMV and reinstated Conniff’s driver’s license, concluding that the DMV had no authority to continue the initial revocation hearing in view of the fact that the DMV erred in securing the attendance of the investigating officer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that the continuance of the original hearing was lacking in good cause and therefore violated Conniff’s due process rights; but (2) the cumulative effect of multiple continuances and overall delay in this matter warranted an award of attorney fees and costs. View "Reed v. Conniff" on Justia Law

Morgan County Emergency Medical Services Board, Inc. is authorized by the County Commission of Morgan County to collect delinquent ambulance service fees. The Board brought an action against Petitioner, the owner of a mobile home park, alleging that Petitioner owned delinquent special emergency ambulance service fees on rental units in Petitioner’s mobile home park. The circuit court granted the Board all of the relief it requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that (1) the Board may bring an action to collect delinquent special emergency ambulance service fees; (2) an owner and a renter may be jointly and severally liable for paying the emergency ambulance service fee; and (3) the county ordinance does not violate W. Va. Code 7-15-17 by assessing Petitioner ambulance service fees for units that were vacant on the date of assessment. View "Waugh v. Morgan County Emergency Med. Servs. Bd., Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed an abuse and neglect petition against Parents. After an adjudicatory hearing on the DHHR’s petition, the circuit court granted the DHHR custody of Parents’ minor children, and the children were placed in foster care. Parents subsequently filed motions for improvement periods. After two evidentiary hearings, the circuit court entered a dispositional order denying Parents an improvement period and terminating Parents’ parental and custodial rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Parents’ motions for improvement periods; and (2) did not err in terminating Parents’ parental and custodial rights. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Billy Hoosier, Jr. mistakenly placed a modular home on a parcel of land owned by Heartwood Forestland Fund IV, LP. Heartwood filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief to inform its ownership of the tract of land at issue and an ejectment order for the removal of Hoosier’s modular home. The circuit court entered an order directing that Hoosier receive title to the portion of Heartwood’s parcel encroached upon and that Heartwood receive from Hoosier the fair market value thereof, less Hoosier’s improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hoosier’s modular home must be removed from Heartwood’s property and relocated at Hoosier’s expense, as that Hoosier’s modular home was not an improvement or benefit to Heartwood’s tract, and Hoosier’s failures concerning procedural matters precluded him from any relief. Therefore, Hoosier was entitled to neither a conveyance of title from Heartwood nor compensation for alleged improvements to Heartwood’s property. View "Heartwood Forestland Fund IV, LP v. Hoosier" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a circuit court order directing the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the Bureau for Behavioral Health and Health Facilities (DHHR) to restore access without limitation to patient and patient records to patient advocates working at Sharpe and Bateman Hospitals, the State’s two psychiatric hospitals. The DHHR appealed, arguing that the circuit court order violated both the patients’ constitutional rights to privacy and the Federal Health Insurance Portability and accountability Act (HIPAA). The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to restore the access afforded to the patient advocates to the level they experienced prior to June 2014, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that the DHRR’s revocation of patient advocate access to patients, staff, and patient records absent express consent did not violate state law. View "W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res. v. E.H." on Justia Law

Tenant died in a fire that he caused on property he rented from Landlords. Insurer paid Landlords, its insureds, for the property damage caused by the fire. Plaintiff, individually and in his capacity as the administrator of Tenant’s estate, filed a wrongful death claim against Landlords. Landlords filed an answer, which included a counterclaim filed by Insurer asserting a subrogation claim against Tenant’s estate for the proceeds Insurer paid to Landlord following the fire. The estate, in turn, argued that Tenant was an additional insured under Insurer’s homeowner’s policy and that Insurer could not seek subrogation against its own insured. Insurer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Tenant was not an insured under the homeowner’s policy. The circuit court concluded that Tenant was an “equitable insured” of Landlord’s insurance policy and, therefore, Insurer could not maintain a subrogation action against tenant’s estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Insurer had a right of subrogation against Tenant where (1) Tenant was not a named or definitional insured of Landlord’s policy; (2) Tenant purchased his own renter’s insurance after being advised to do so by Landlord; and (3) the lease agreement stated that Tenant was solely responsible for any damage he caused to the property. View "Farmers & Mechanics Mut. Ins. v. Allen" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a bank, filed suit against Respondent seeking the outstanding balance remaining on a loan it made to him in 2012. Rather than litigate the matter, Respondent entered into an “Agreed Order Confessing Judgment” with the Bank for the full amount. The circuit court entered the order and dismissed the matter. Thereafter, the Bank’s vice president, who also arranged Respondent’s loan, pleaded guilty to bank fraud. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for relief from the confessed judgment pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming that after he learned of the vice president’s conviction, he suspected there were improprieties regarding his loan. The circuit court concluded that relief from judgment was justified, finding that the circumstances surrounding the loan made the loan questionable and that a decision on the merits was favored. Petitioner subsequently filed this action seeking a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order granting Respondent’s motion for relief from judgment. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Respondent’s motion to vacate the judgment. View "State ex rel. First State Bank v. Hon. F. Jane Hustead" on Justia Law