Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

William Gill, a firefighter with the City of Charleston, had injured his back before being hired by the City. During his employment, he again injured his back. This injury was ruled compensable and diagnosed as lumbar and thoracic sprain. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (the OOJ) later added four new diagnoses to Gill’s initial compensable claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that the additional four diagnoses were noncompensable preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no evidence supported the OOJ’s determination that Gill’s compensable injury aggravated his preexisting injuries; and (2) a noncompensable preexisting injury may not be added as a compensable component of a claim for workers’ compensation medical benefits merely because it may have been aggravated by a compensable injury. View "Gill v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Stephanie Mills had a thyroidectomy, performed by Dr. Ghaphery at Wheeling Hospital. Mills’s nerves surrounding her thyroid gland were severed during the thyroidectomy, resulting in bilateral vocal cord paralysis. Mills filed suit against Dr. Ghaphery, A.D. Ghaphery Professional Association, and Wheeling Hospital, Inc. (collectively, Wheeling Hospital), alleging medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and negligent credentialing. Mills sought discovery of certain documents from Wheeling Hospital. When the Hospital failed to respond to the discovery requests, Mills filed a motion to compel. The circuit court ordered the majority of the disputed documents to be disclosed. Wheeling Hospital sought a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the circuit court’s order, asserting that the disputed documents were protected by the statutory peer review privilege. The Supreme Court granted as moulded the requested writ, holding (1) certain of the challenged documents, including those comprising Dr. Ghaphery’s request to renew his staff privilege, are specifically protected by the peer review privilege; and (2) the circuit court did not conduct a thorough in camera review of the remaining challenged documents, and Wheeling Hospital did not provide a sufficiently detailed privilege log to permit the circuit court to determine whether such documents are protected by the peer review privilege. View "State ex rel. Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Hon. Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioners, chair of the state Democratic Executive Committee and the members of the state Democratic Executive Committee for the Ninth Senatorial District, requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus against Respondents, the Governor and members of the state Republic Executive Committee for the Ninth Senatorial District, seeking to compel the Governor to fill a vacancy in the West Virginia Senate from a list of three candidates to be selected by Petitioners. The Supreme Court issued a rule to show cause and ordered Respondents to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be awarded as requested by Petitioners. After an oral hearing, the Supreme Court denied the requested writ, holding that the vacancy is to be filled from a list of three candidates to be selected by the Republic Executive Committee for the Ninth Senatorial District based upon the outgoing senator’s most recent affiliation with the Republican Party. View "State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin" on Justia Law

Respondent was injured in a car accident caused by a hit-and-run driver. Respondent filed an uninsured motorist suit against the unknown driver seeking damages. State Farm, Respondent’s uninsured motorists’ insurance carrier, defended the lawsuit. State Farm advanced Respondent $30,628 on her damages before trial, but after the jury returned a verdict for Respondent, the circuit court refused State Farm any credit against the final judgment for the advance payment. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment order, holding that the court erred (1) when it refused to deduct State Farm’s advance payment against the final judgment, and (2) in calculating prejudgment interest. Remanded. View "Doe v. Pak" on Justia Law

This appeal involved three different leases negotiated by Defendant between plaintiff-landowners and an oil and gas company. Each of the three leases engendered a different lawsuit against Defendant. In each case, Plaintiffs claimed that the nature of the services provided by Defendant constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and sought to compel Plaintiffs to participate in arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in each lease. Plaintiffs challenged the arbitration clauses as void on the grounds that the arbitration clauses were contrary to public policy because they were procured through the unauthorized practice of law. In all three suits, the circuit court concluded that a plaintiff’s claim that a defendant engaged in the unauthorized practice of law can never, as a matter of matter of state law, be referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any state-based rule that prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Geological Assessment & Leasing v. O'Hara" on Justia Law

The complex issues at issue in these three consolidated appeals revolved around four overlapping leases to extract oil and gas from land owned by Plaintiff. Each lease contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff filed the instant case against Defendants seeking a declaration as to which lease was controlling as to which defendants and seeking damages from Defendants. The circuit court entered an order voiding two of the four leases, addressing the substantive terms of two other leases, and compelling the parties to arbitrate any remaining claims by Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) properly found the arbitration clause in one lease to be unenforceable and correctly ruled that the entire lease was unenforceable; (2) erred in compelling certain defendants to participate in arbitration under the terms of a second lease but did not err when it made findings of fact and conclusions of law that addressed the substance of Plaintiff’s claims regarding that lease; (3) erred in voiding a third lease, and its included arbitration clause, in violation the doctrine of severability; and (4) erred in its substantive rulings interpreting a fourth lease, as the court should have referred questions about the lease to arbitration. View "Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Hickman" on Justia Law

Donal Bowers was charged with alleged sex crimes against an eleven-year-old girl. The assistant prosecutor filed a motion in limine to obtain an advance ruling on the admissibility of the diary of the alleged victim. The circuit court concluded that the statements within the diary were admissible under hearsay rules. The court, however, excluded a certain two-page entry, reasoning that the statements, though relevant to the prosecution’s case and probative of the crimes of which Bowers was charged, presented an unacceptable risk of improperly inflaming the jury. Furthermore, the circuit court ruled that photocopies of the diary entries and illustrations would be substituted in place of the diary itself. The prosecutor filed this petition for extraordinary relief challenging the exclusion ruling and the substitution ruling. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ as mounded, holding (1) the circuit court manifestly erred in excluding the substantive two-page entry at issue; but (2) the circuit court’s ruling relating to the manner in which the diary should be presented to the jury was not manifestly in error. View "State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Hon. Gray Silver III" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a police officer with the Department of Natural Resources, lost his right eye as a result of a workplace injury. Petitioner was awarded thirty-three percent permanent partial disability for the “total and irrevocable loss of sight in one eye” under W. Va. Code 23-5-6(f) but was awarded nothing for the permanent impairment caused by his continuing problems with infections and related conditions in his eye socket or for the permanent disfigurement caused by his eye injury. The Office of Judges affirmed the Claims Administrator’s award of no additional permanent partial disability above and beyond the statutory thirty-three percent disability award. The West Virginia Worker Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board erred as a matter of law in its application of section 23-5-6(f). Remanded for further development of medical evidence related to what, if any, additional award Petitioner should receive for permanent disability caused by the physical removal of his right eye beyond the loss of vision in that eye. View "Goff v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the second degree and two counts of sexual assault in the third degree. Defendant was effectively sentenced to not less than ten nor more than twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) allowing the State to present an expert witness on the issue of Gamma-Hydroxybutyrate intoxication; (2) not allowing Defendant to introduce evidence or question a State witness on what activity took place immediately prior to the victim going into the house where she was allegedly assaulted; (3) allowing the jury to consider both second degree sexual assault and third degree sexual assault based on the evidence; and (4) allowing the bailiff to have a conversation with a juror about a potential witness. View "State v. Wakefield" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Racing Commission suspended the occupational permits of each of seven jockeys for thirty days and imposed a $1,000 fine on each of the jockeys for certain rules governing horse racing. The circuit court reversed and vacated the Commission’s order, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the Commission’s factual findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fact that the circuit court’s review of the evidence resulted in the circuit court reaching an alternative conclusion based on substantial evidence was not a valid reason to reverse the Commission’s findings; and (2) the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. View "W. Va. Racing Comm’n v. Reynolds" on Justia Law