Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

L.A. Pipeline Construction Company, an Ohio corporation, admitted liability for failing to fully pay some of its employees - a group of engineers who worked on a pipeline job in West Virginia. L.A. Pipeline sought to avoid paying on that liability by claiming that a wage bond securing its employees’ wages had expired. Specifically, L.A. Pipeline asserted that a “Perpetual Irrevocable Letter of Credit/Wage Bond” that it obtained pursuant to the West Virginia Wage Payment Collection Act’s (WPCA) wage bond requirement was no longer in effect. The federal district court certified a question on the letter of credit/wage bond’s duration to the Supreme Court. Noting that the letter of credit/wage bond’s duration was governed by the WPCA and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the Court answered (1) to the extent they conflict, the WPCA prevails over the UCC on the duration of a letter of credit/wage bond obtained pursuant to the WPCA; and (2) therefore, under West Virginia law, the letter of credit/wage bond at issue in this case remains in effect until terminated with the approval of the Commissioner of the Division of Labor. View "Int’l Union of Operating Engineers v. L.A. Pipeline Constr. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner, a registered sex offender, was found guilty of failure to register or provide notice of registration charges. The circuit court sentenced Petitioner to a term of years in the penitentiary but suspended the sentence and placed him on a thirty-six month period of probation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner failed to update the registry as to his current physical address and that this decision was knowingly made; and (2) Petitioner’s argument that the Sex Offender Registration Act’s provision that requires Petitioner to register changes to his registry information is unconstitutionally vague for failing to define the terms “residence” and “address” was unpersuasive. View "State v. Beegle" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and a candidate seeking re-election to the Court. Petitioner began his election campaign as a “traditional candidate” - a candidate financed by contributions from supporters - but subsequently decided to enter the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign Financing Program (the Act) and became a “participating candidate” under the Act. The West Virginia State Elections Commission certified Petitioner’s campaign for public funding under the Act. Respondent, a traditional candidate seeking election to the Court, appealed the Commission’s decision. The circuit court ruled in favor of Respondent, concluding that the Commission’s certification of Petitioner was clearly erroneous and violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights to free speech and substantive due process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and reinstated the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that Petitioner satisfied all statutory requirements to be certified for public funding under the Act. View "Benjamin v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a candidate seeking election to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and was a “participating candidate” under the west Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign Financing Program. In his application to the West Virginia State Elections Commission to be certified to receive public financing, Petitioner timely filed his final report and all required substantive information but filed his sworn statement one day late. The Commission certified Petitioner’s campaign for public financing. Respondent, a non-participating candidate seeking election to the Court, challenged Petitioner’s certification. The circuit court concluded that the Commissioner’s certification of Petitioner for public financing of his candidacy under West Virginia Code 3-12-1 was not valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission has discretion to certify a participating candidate for public financing notwithstanding the candidate’s failure to meet the time deadlines set forth in the West Virginia Code of State Rules where the candidate has substantially complied with all requirements set forth in the Act and the Rules and where there is no showing of prejudice. View "Wooten v. Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner worked for a Hospital for seven years until she was fired at age sixty-five. The Hospital’s stated reason for Petitioner’s termination was that she had committed multiple violations of the Hospital’s patient confidentiality policy. Petitioner filed suit against the Hospital, asserting as her sole claim wrongful termination on the basis of her age in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in an age discrimination employment case brought under the WVHRA, the Court hereby adopts the “substantially younger” rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. Remanded to the circuit court to assess Petitioner’s prima facie argument in light of this holding. View "Knotts v. Grafton City Hospital" on Justia Law

Petitioners alleged, in addition to claims of gender discrimination and invasion of privacy, that they were discharged from their employment with West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) for discovering and alerting others to alleged errors or irregularities with the procurement process utilized by DHHR. The trial court granted summary judgment to DHHR and two DHHR officials (collectively, Respondents) on the entirety of Petitioners’ claims, concluding that Petitioners failed to create a genuine issue of material fact surrounding their claims and that Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity on Petitioenrs' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment as to Petitioners’ retaliatory discharge, gender discrimination, and false light invasion of privacy claims; but (2) erred in concluding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on their whistle-blower claim and concluding, as a matter of law, that Petitioners’ evidence could not satisfy the statutory requirements. View "Taylor v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and and attempted murder. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison without mercy for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion for a continuance of the trial; (2) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in excluding certain testimony; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of telephone calls Petitioner made while in jail awaiting trial; and (4) the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial. View "State v. Dunn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree without a recommendation of mercy. Petitioner filed a post-trial motion for new trial or judgment of acquittal, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by admitting expert opinion testimony from a deputy medical examiner; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti of murder; (3) the circuit court did not err by refusing to dismiss the case based upon the State’s destruction of evidence; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (5) the circuit court did not err in refusing to give three of Petitioner’s proposed jury instructions and with regard to the wording of the jury verdict form. View "State v. Surbaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed by Defendant, signed an employment agreement providing that all disputes with Defendant shall be resolved through arbitration. After Plaintiff’s employment ended, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant did not timely pay him his final wages as required by the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. After a seven-month delay, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court granted the motion, dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, and compelled the parties to participate in arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not waive its right to arbitrate through its acts and language. View "Parsons v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the circuit court concluded that Bernard Bossio had proven that the parties in this case intended to enter into and were bound by the terms of a 1990 stock purchase agreement requiring the Estate of Luigi Bossio to sell to Bossio Enterprises the corporate shares owned by Luigi Bossio at the time of his death in 2007. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit clear error in concluding that Bernard Bossio proved, with clear and convincing evidence, the terms of the 1990 stock purchase agreement. View "Estate of Luigi Bossio v. Bossio" on Justia Law