Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The parties were divorced in 2012. The original order provided that, for tax exemption purposes, the father would claim Child B. and the mother would claim Child C. In 2014, mother sought modification of child support and medical support and requested an order providing that when one of the children reaches the age of majority, the remaining exemption should be rotated between the parents annually. Father requested the court to amend the order to include details of a joint parenting plan and to allocate the tax exemptions according to West Virginia Code 48-13-801.3, which requires that tax exemptions be proportioned between the parents according to income. After a remand from the circuit court, the family court clarified that the parties had agreed to “equal custodial allocation” and that the father had requested re-allocation of the tax exemptions only if no agreement was reached and observed: “It did not appear that the [mother’s] income and child support would be greater if the payor was awarded the exemption.” The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed, stating that the oral agreement regarding custodial allocation and other tangential issues did not eliminate the need to allocate the exemptions according to the statutory requirements, and remanded for financial analysis under the statute. View "Eric M. v. Laura M." on Justia Law

Adams dropped out of school in the 11th grade, moved to West Virginia, and receives social security disability on the basis of severe hypertension, migraine headaches, and mild mental retardation with marginal illiteracy. In 2007, Adams began receiving calls from a collection agency regarding a $2,500 guaranteed student loan procured in her name in 1986, for the purpose of attending school in Florida. Adams denied entering into the loan agreement, executing an application or promissory note, or attending school, but, nonetheless entered into a “rehabilitation agreement,” and made about 30 payments of $86.00/month to remove the “default” status of the loan, which was then owned by the Department of Education as a federally guaranteed Stafford Loan. She claims the agency threatened to take her social security if she did not make payments. In 2010, she again disavowed the loan, claiming identity theft. An investigation was launched. Adams eventually agreed to assume responsibility again, but, in 2011, asserted that she was entitled to discharge because she was disabled. She submitted her social security award decision, but failed to produce a required physician’s report. She retained counsel, but the agency continued written and telephone contact. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the agency, holding that the debt collection activity is required by Federal Family Education Loan Program regulations promulgated under the Higher Education Act of 1965. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, finding her state Consumer Credit and Protection Act claim preempted by federal law. View "Adams v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency" on Justia Law

Hardy County emergency ambulance services were provided by a mix of paid and volunteer crews. In 2011, there were three crews, one of which sought funding from the County Commission to remain solvent. Although the Commission provided $300,000, the squad closed suddenly in 2012. Its members provided emergency ambulance services on a volunteer basis for several months. Meanwhile, the Commission voted to hire a county medic and to create an Emergency Ambulance Authority. The Commission ultimately purchased a building and imposed an Ambulance Fee. Both actions were challenged by residents. The court found both the building purchase and the Ambulance Fee invalid for violation of the Open Governmental Proceedings Act, W. Va. Code 6-9A-1., and, alternatively, because the Commission failed to provide proper notice of special meetings under W. Va. Code 7-1-2. The court prohibited the Commission from voting, in a properly noticed open meeting, to validate its purchase of the building and from instituting an Ambulance Fee “until ambulance service is not otherwise available to all residents,” directed the Commission to pay $112,000 for attorney fees, and rendered judgment against individual commissioners, for the building purchase price, $1,130,000. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed. Acting under the Emergency Ambulance Service Act, W. Va. Code 7-15-18, the Commission was not required to comply with the Open Governmental Proceedings Act or W. Va. Code 7-1­ 2. View "Teets v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2014, Wilson and Shafer planned to rob Lynch-Burdette at her home , considering her an “easy mark” because she was 66 years old, weighed 100 pounds, lived alone, and had been robbed previously, but had never made a police report. They walked to Lynch-Burdette’s home, Wilson armed with a knife and Shafer with a toy gun, and demanded money and drugs. Enraged at her inability to provide what they wanted, they beat and stabbed Lynch-Burdette to death and ,took property from her home. In the days that followed, Shafer and his girlfriend and possibly Wilson returned to search for more valuables. They wrapped her body in a tarp and left her dog to starve to death. Police discovered the body three weeks later. Wilson entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder. The state dismissed related charges and agreed to stand silent at sentencing, reserving “the right to cross-examine witnesses offered in mitigation of punishment and to correct any factual inaccuracies.” At sentencing, the state made no recommendation with respect to a recommendation of mercy, but did dispute Wilson’s version of events in certain respects. The cour imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without mercy. Wilson moved to reduce sentence and to void the plea agreement. The court denied the motions, stating that the prosecutor’s statements had not influenced its decision. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. The state did not breach its agreement to remain silent as to sentencing, there were no improper factors considered in the sentencing decision, and the sentence was within the court’s discretion and justified under the circumstances. View "West Virginia v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Siron, “driving around drinking,” was joined by his cousin, Heater, who asked Siron to drive to the Oberg home. Heater did not tell Siron that Oberg was having an affair with Kelli and that Kelli’s husband had agreed to pay Heater $5,000.00 to kill Oberg. They spent time at Oberg’s apartment drinking beer, after which the three went out. Heater directed Siron to drive to a remote spot in Upshur County to smoke marijuana. When Heater and Oberg were out of Siron’s sight, Siron suddenly “saw a bright flash and heard a boom.” He heard Oberg ask “[w]hy?” and Heater respond “for f**ing someone’s wife.” Heater pistol-whipped Siron, and told him that, if he did not help dispose of Oberg’s body, he would die too. They put Oberg’s body into the truck and made several stops while driving to another rural area, where Siron dug a shallow grave. Heater used Siron’s phone to take a picture of the body and to make a call to announce that “it’s done.” The next day, they began destroying evidence and concocted a story about dropping Oberg off at a bowling alley. The body was discovered months later. Heater was convicted of first-degree murder, concealment of a deceased human body, and conspiracy, and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, rejecting arguments that Heater was denied his right to counsel of his choice; that the court erred in denying his request to poll the jury to determine whether any members had spoken to a protester who was sitting near the courtroom; and that the court erred in failing to sua sponte order bifurcation of the penalty phase. View "West Virginia v. Heater" on Justia Law

In 1995, Anstey was convicted first-degree murder, without a recommendation of mercy, in the death of his 81-year-old grandmother during a 1994 fire. There was extensive testimony about Anstey's physical and financial abuse of the victim; both sides presented extensive expert testimony about the cause of the fire. In his 2014 habeas petition, Anstey​ asserted he was entitled to a new trial because the advancement in fire science and arson investigation during the last 20 years constituted newly-discovered evidence which demonstrated the fundamental and unconstitutional unfairness of his trial. The court considered the affidavits of his new fire experts, and the underlying trial record, then denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. The circuit court’s decision was adequately supported by its 36-page order that recounted the evidence from the trial, over which it presided, and its “careful review” of the parties’ briefs and the new expert affidavits, which led it to conclude that “the relevant facts of the case . . . have been sufficiently and adequately developed” for the court to rule as a matter of law. View "Anstey v. Ballard" on Justia Law

On September 1, 2007, the Dattolis were at Oglebay Park Resort in Ohio County, when Mr. Dattoli leaned against a split rail fence after glancing at the fence to ensure that its parts were attached. As he leaned against a post and put his hand on the top rail, the end of the top rail broke into pieces causing Dattoli to fall down a hill and injure his shoulder, requiring surgery and months of physical therapy. The Dattolis brought a negligence claim and presented the testimony of Hargleroad, the Park's Director of Operations since 1990, that the fence was installed between the 1970s and the 1990s; that the Park Commission produced no documents in response to the Dattolis’ request for repair and maintenance records; that wood has a life expectancy; and that the Park was in a better position to ensure that the fence was in good repair than a Park guest. The Commission presented no witnesses. The jury awarded the Dattolis $36,894.47 in medical expenses and $19,000 in lost wages. The court later granted the Dattolis a new trial on damages for pain and suffering. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed; the Dattolis failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence, adducing no evidence that the Commission knew or should have known of the defect that allegedly caused Dattoli’s injury. View "Wheeling Park Comm'n v. Dattoli" on Justia Law

Bayles rolled over his 401(k) retirement account, signing an Ameriprise Brokerage Individual Retirement Account Application. Bayles later signed an Active Portfolios Application-IRA Account Application. The first page of each application states that a copy of the related Brokerage Agreement must be provided to the client; the IRA Application states: You acknowledge that you have received and read the Ameriprise Brokerage Client Agreement and agree to abide by its terms….. This brokerage account is governed by a predispute arbitration clause which is found on Section 26.... You acknowledge receipt of the predispute arbitration clause." Similar language appears in the Portfolios Application. Bayles died in 2013. His wife thought she was the beneficiary, but decedent’s children were the designated primary beneficiaries on both accounts. Mrs. Bayles challenged Ameriprise’s payout of the proceeds. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found the absence of a signature on a brokerage agreement created an ambiguity that invalidated the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded. Decedent signed the IRA Application, expressly acknowledging the arbitration clause, but there are unresolved issues, including whether the arbitration clause is unconscionable and whether anyof Mrs. Bayles’ claims “fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration agreement.” View "Jeffrey N. Evans/Ameriprise Fin. Servs. v. Bayles" on Justia Law

On June 11, 2013, Louk, then 37 weeks pregnant, injected methamphetamine into her arm. A few hours later,. Louk experienced breathing problems and went to Summersville Hospital. Dr. Lester treated Louk and testified that Louk presented to the emergency room with acute respiratory distress which was caused by her methamphetamine use. Due to concerns about the fetus being deprived of oxygen, Dr. Rostocki performed an emergency Cesarean section and delivered the child, Olivia Louk, who was born “essentially brain dead.” Olivia “had no movement, no spontaneous respirations, and they had to immediately put her on a ventilator to help her breathe.” Olivia died 11 days after she was born. Louk was convicted of child neglect resulting in death, W.Va. Code 61-8D-4a [1997], and sentenced to three to fifteen years of incarceration. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed. The child neglect resulting in death statute is not intended to criminalize a mother’s prenatal act that results in harm to her subsequently born child. Recognizing “that there may be significant policy implications and social ramifications surrounding the present issue,” the court confined its review to the plain language of the statute. View "West Virginia v. Louk" on Justia Law

Ervin was charged with first degree murder; use of a firearm to commit murder; stalking; wanton endangerment involving the use of a firearm; and domestic assault, in connection with the 2012 death of Layman. Ervin did not deny he shot the victim, with whom he had previously had an intimate relationship, but argued self-defense. Following a seven-day trial, involving 25 witnesses, the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, wanton endangerment involving a firearm, and first-degree murder using a firearm. . The jury did not recommend mercy with regard to the murder conviction. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder and to a five-year consecutive term for wanton endangerment. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in: not permitting the jury to visit the site of the alleged offenses; excluding testimony of one defense witness; allowing the jury to consider evidence not presented at trial; allowing the state to misrepresent evidence during closing argument; and not requiring the state to provide a bill of particulars regarding the alleged use of a firearm. The excluded testimony constituted hearsay, not subject to an exception; there was no evidence that the jury actually viewed a video that was not presented. View "West Virginia v. Ervin" on Justia Law