Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In 2001, the decedent presented to the Wetzel County Hospital Emergency Room in New Martinsville and came under the care of Dr. Murthy, a surgeon; she slipped into shock and died the next day. Her estate filed a medical negligence action, alleging that Murthy failed to perform exploratory surgery to identify, diagnose and correct the decedent’s “intraabdominal condition.” A jury awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. After the trial, the circuit court allowed amendment of the complaint to add Murthy’s insurance carrier, Woodbrook, alleging that Woodbrook made all relevant decisions for Murthy’s defense and acted vexatiously and in bad faith. Following a remand, Murthy paid a reduced judgment, plus interest, in the total amount of $1,162,741.60 and filed motions in limine to preclude certain matters from consideration on the issue of attorney fees and costs, including an unrelated case that resulted in a $5,764,214.75 verdict against Dr. Murthy in March 2007. The court dismissed Woodbrook as a party-defendant and awarded the estate attorney fees and costs. The precise calculation was to be later determined. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed, concluding that the lower court’s reliance on certain conduct by Murthy did not justify the award. View "Murthy v. Karpacs-Brown" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sued Sugar Rock, seeking a dissolution of partnerships, alleging them to be mining partnerships and attempted to obtain class action status. The circuit court granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment, finding that the partnerships should be dissolved, and appointed a special receiver and a distribution company to achieve that result. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact and questions of law regarding the type of partnerships involved in the case, the parties who are the partners thereof, whether the partnerships’ property includes leases, and whether the procedural requirements for a decree of dissolution have been satisfied. View "Sugar Rock, Inc. v. Washburn" on Justia Law

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Petitioner has been employed by the Raleigh County Board of Education as a physical therapist since 1987. Her initial “Teacher’s Probationary Contract of Employment” provided that she would be paid an annual salary “for an annual employment term of 120 days.” In 1989, petitioner executed a “Continuing Contract of Employment,” which likewise provided that she was to be employed “for an employment term of 120 days.” She requested enrollment in the Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS). Contributions on petitioner’s behalf were made to TRS continuously from 1987 through 1991, when she enrolled in the newly-created Teachers’ Defined Contribution System and froze her TRS contributions. In 1999, she transferred her TRS funds and service credit into TDC. In 2008, petitioner transferred back to the TRS. The Board ascertained that petitioner was ineligible to participate in either plan because she was only working 120 days a year and indicated that the money contributed would be returned to her and her employer. Petitioner testified that she believed that those working less than 200 days were not ineligible, but would merely receive fractional service credit for the year. The hearing examiner determined that West Virginia Code 18-7A-3 requires a 200-day contract before one may participate in TRS, but that there was no such 200-day requirement to participate in TDC. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was “sympathetic," but could not confer statutory eligibility where none exists. View "Ringel-Williams v. W.V. Consol. Pub. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

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The Kanawha County Commission is a member of the Central West Virginia Regional Airport Authority, which owns and operates Yeager Airport. At the behest of the FAA, they began a project to remove a hill in Charleston's Coal Branch Heights neighborhood. The Commission wanted to acquire the 10-acre “Nutter Farm” to deposit material removed from the hill and purchased a two-thirds interest, paying $58,333.33 for each one-third interest, then filed a condemnation petition against the third owner, Gomez. The court determined that the Commission’s stated purposes were a proper public use and appointed condemnation commissioners, who valued Gomez’s share at $33,335. The court permitted the Commission to deposit $33,335 and granted immediate possession. Following discovery, the court struck the testimony of Gomez’s expert, struck Gomez’s claims, and granted the Commission summary judgment. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed in part. The court upheld the determination of public use; the holding that any enhancement or depreciation in value caused by the project for which the land was taken must be disregarded in determining market value; and striking Gomez’s expert. The court erred in striking Gomez’s “claims” as a sanction for her failure to appear at her deposition; in taking judicial notice of the commissioners’ report on the value of the land; and in entering summary judgment. Gomez has a right to testify to the value of her interest in the property on the date of the taking by the Commission. View "Gomez v. Kanawha County Comm'n" on Justia Law

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Streets, a 32-year Berkeley County Sheriff’s Department veteran, was indicted for felony embezzlement and fraudulent schemes, with respect to 13 guns taken from the Department and sold to a gun dealer, Glockcop. He was found not guilty of fraudulent schemes; the jury hung on the embezzlement count. A mistrial was declared. The state filed a notice of intent to use Rule 404(b) evidence, consisting of certified public records of judgments against Streets from lawsuits involving wrongful occupation and defaults on residential rental agreements, a default on a furniture installment agreement, nonpayment of medical bills, wage garnishment and home foreclosure, to establish debt in excess of $38,000. The court determined that the evidence was admissible to show motive, During retrial, the state also presented Glockcop’s business records and testimony that Streets was the sole officer in charge of the evidence room. Streets claimed that he mistakenly sold the guns, thinking that they were guns he had inherited from his father. After a conviction, the court granted a retrial. The Supreme Court of Appeals granted mandamus, finding that the trial court erred by granting a new trial when Streets failed to object to alleged error during trial; in determining that the state improperly attacked Streets’ character, when he first placed his character in issue; and by granting a new trial when the alleged error was harmless. The overwhelming evidence would support the conviction without the state’s closing argument comments implicating character. View "Games-Neely v. Yoder" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2004, the Petitioner was charged with sexual abuse in the first degree, attempt to commit a felony of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree and sexual abuse by a custodian, based on 2001 incidents involving his step-granddaughter. He was convicted in 2005. The court ordered that, following his discharge from the penitentiary after serving a 10-20 year sentence for his sexual abuse by a custodian conviction, he “shall be placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years” with specific conditions. In 2006, the Legislature amended the statute to require a mandatory period of extended supervised release, West Virginia Code 62-12-2631. In 2015, the circuit court modified petitioner’s probationary period to five years followed by 20 years of “intensive supervision as a sex offender.” The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the extension of his sentence, citing the ex post facto clause found in both the West Virginia and United States Constitutions. View "West Virginia v. Deel" on Justia Law

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In 2014, Shafer, a drug addict, his girlfriend, Hughes, also addicted to drugs, and their friend, Wilson, conspired to rob 66-year-old Lynch, who lived alone with her dog in St. Albans. They had learned that she had been robbed several times, but had not report edthe robberies because she feared repercussions. Shafer took a toy gun and. Wilson took a kitchen knife; neither wore masks or gloves. When Lynch returned home, found them outside her house, and did not take their threats seriously, they became angry. Inside the house, Wilson stabbed Lynch to death. They took property and later returned with Hughes to steal a car. They repeatedly returned to the house, stealing additional property and allowing the dog to starve to death. A friend discovered Lynch’s decaying body. Shafer agreed to plead guilty to first-degree murder in the commission of the felony offense; conspiracy; three counts of burglary by breaking and entering; and two counts of grand larceny; the state agreed to recommend that the court sentence Shafer to life with mercy for the felony murder and to stand silent on whether his sentences should run consecutively or concurrently. The PSR revealed that as a juvenile, Shafer was charged with breaking and entering; he had other offenses and a long history of drug use. The court imposed, and the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, consecutive sentences, including life in the penitentiary without mercy. View "West Virginia v. Shafer" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2013, the petitioner was charged with nine counts involving his minor daughter, M.C., that pertained to three separate incidents of first-degree sexual assault (West Virginia Code 61-8B-3(a)(2)), sexual abuse by a parent (61-8D­ 5(a)), and incest (61-8-12). Two additional counts involved a single incident with A.O., a minor neighbor, and charged first-degree sexual abuse and sexual abuse by a custodian or person in a position of trust (61-8D-5(a)). Before trial, the state, possessing M.C.’s shirt on which semen had been found, unsuccessfully moved to compel a blood or a saliva sample from the petitioner. A month later, the state successfully sought and obtained saliva sample. The state then successfully moved to exclude the introduction of the DNA test results at trial because they eliminated the petitioner as a potential donor of the semen. The state argued the evidence would violate the rape shield law. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 50-165 years of incarceration. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed as to M.C., based on the exclusion of the DNA evidence. The court upheld the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence (the testimony of four minors) for the purpose of showing the petitioner’s lustful disposition for children and rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that the petitioner was a “custodian” or “person in a position of trust. ” View "West Virginia v. Timothy C." on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The parties were divorced in 2012. The original order provided that, for tax exemption purposes, the father would claim Child B. and the mother would claim Child C. In 2014, mother sought modification of child support and medical support and requested an order providing that when one of the children reaches the age of majority, the remaining exemption should be rotated between the parents annually. Father requested the court to amend the order to include details of a joint parenting plan and to allocate the tax exemptions according to West Virginia Code 48-13-801.3, which requires that tax exemptions be proportioned between the parents according to income. After a remand from the circuit court, the family court clarified that the parties had agreed to “equal custodial allocation” and that the father had requested re-allocation of the tax exemptions only if no agreement was reached and observed: “It did not appear that the [mother’s] income and child support would be greater if the payor was awarded the exemption.” The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed, stating that the oral agreement regarding custodial allocation and other tangential issues did not eliminate the need to allocate the exemptions according to the statutory requirements, and remanded for financial analysis under the statute. View "Eric M. v. Laura M." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law, Tax Law
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Adams dropped out of school in the 11th grade, moved to West Virginia, and receives social security disability on the basis of severe hypertension, migraine headaches, and mild mental retardation with marginal illiteracy. In 2007, Adams began receiving calls from a collection agency regarding a $2,500 guaranteed student loan procured in her name in 1986, for the purpose of attending school in Florida. Adams denied entering into the loan agreement, executing an application or promissory note, or attending school, but, nonetheless entered into a “rehabilitation agreement,” and made about 30 payments of $86.00/month to remove the “default” status of the loan, which was then owned by the Department of Education as a federally guaranteed Stafford Loan. She claims the agency threatened to take her social security if she did not make payments. In 2010, she again disavowed the loan, claiming identity theft. An investigation was launched. Adams eventually agreed to assume responsibility again, but, in 2011, asserted that she was entitled to discharge because she was disabled. She submitted her social security award decision, but failed to produce a required physician’s report. She retained counsel, but the agency continued written and telephone contact. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the agency, holding that the debt collection activity is required by Federal Family Education Loan Program regulations promulgated under the Higher Education Act of 1965. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, finding her state Consumer Credit and Protection Act claim preempted by federal law. View "Adams v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency" on Justia Law