Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stacy Stevens, the personal representative of her late husband, Scott Stevens, filed suit on behalf of Scott’s estate against MTR Gaming Group, Inc. and International Game Technology, Inc. after Scott allegedly developed “gambling disorder,” embezzled more than $7 million from his employer to play video lottery machines, spent his family’s savings, and fatally shot himself. Stacy brought claims for negligence, breach of the duty of care, products liability, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court questions of law relevant to resolving the motions. The Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the negative and declined to answer, as effectively moot, the remaining certified questions, holding that no duty of care under West Virginia law exists on the part of manufacturers of video lottery terminals, or the casinos in which the terminals are located, to protect users from compulsively gambling. View "Stevens v. MTR Gaming Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging that he suffered past medical expenses arising from a car accident. Defendant admitted liability for the accident but denied that the accident injured Plaintiff’s right knee and caused the need for knee surgery. Rather, Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s knee problems were caused by preexisting conditions unrelated to the accident. The jury awarded Plaintiff past medical expenses of $9,620, which is the amount of damages that Plaintiff alleged were the result of his neck and back injuries. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that there was uncontroverted evidence that his knee condition was caused by the car accident. The circuit court granted a new trial, finding that the preexisting conditions in Plaintiff’s right knee were aggravated in the car accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in deciding to grant Plaintiff a new trial based on its finding that the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence. View "Harnish v. Corra" on Justia Law

In 2004, Edward Birch received a workplace injury. In 2011, a claims administrator granted Birch and eight percent permanent partial disability (PPD) award. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (OOJ) granted an additional five percent PPD award for a total of thirteen percent PPD. The West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was the correct methodology for apportioning the level of impairment in workers’ compensation cases involving preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BOR and reinstated the claims administrator’s order granting Birch an eight percent PPD award, holding that the BOR’s affirmation of the OOJ’s decision was clearly the result of an erroneous conclusion of law. View "SWVA, Inc. v. Birch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff later brought suit against Defendant, claiming that there were defects in the house. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by ruling on questions of arbitrability despite the existence of a delegation provision in the arbitration agreement that vested the arbitrator with authority to determine issues of arbitrability relating to the dispute. The Supreme Court determined that the circuit court was within its rights not to enforce the delegation language because the language did not reflect the parties’ clear and unmistakable intention to delegate issues about the validity, revocability, or enforceability of the arbitration agreement to an arbitrator. The United States Supreme Court granted Defendant’s requested writ of certiorari, vacated the Supreme Court’s opinion, and remanded for further consideration in light of their decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order, holding that because Plaintiffs never specifically challenged the delegation language before the circuit court or Supreme Court, Plaintiffs waived any right to challenge the delegation language. Remanded for arbitration. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law

The Division of Highways (DOH) of the West Virginia Department of Transportation acquired a portion of commercial property owned by MCNB Bank and Trust Company to facilitate construction of a new highway and tendered $417,100 to MCNB. The DOH applied to the circuit court to condemn the parcel and determine the compensation due MCNB. The circuit court ordered the DOH to deposit a total of $1,012,500 to gain defeasible title and right of entry to the property. The DOH filed this petition for extraordinary relief seeking to prohibit enforcement of the circuit court’s order insofar as it required the DOH to deposit funds in excess of its estimate and tender of $417,100. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of prohibition, holding that the DOH was entitled to acquire the right and title to the property upon its deposit of the lesser sum of $417,100. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t of Transp. v. Hon. Robert A. Burnside" on Justia Law

Rubin Resources, Inc. filed a legal malpractice action against Garold Morris, alleging that Morris was negligent in performing a title examination and preparing a title opinion for Rubin regarding an oil and gas leasehold, resulting in $278,455 in damages. Morris did not dispute that he was negligent in performing the title examination and title opinion. The circuit court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of Morris, concluding that Morris’s negligence was not the proximate cause of Rubin’s damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the damage Rubin asserted was the direct and proximate result of Morris’s professional negligence. View "Rubin Resources v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in accident while working for Speed Mining LLC. Plaintiff and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Speed Mining. Plaintiffs also named as defendants related companies and individuals (collectively, the Baughan defendants). At the time of the accident, Speed Mining was a named insured on a workers’ compensation policy of insurance issued by Old Republic. Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits under Speed Mining’s workers’ compensation policy. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add a declaratory judgment action against Old Republic, as it had asserted a statutory subrogation lien with respect to any settlement obtained by Plaintiffs from the Baughan defendants. Old Republic asserted its own declaratory judgment action against Plaintiffs. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Old Republic subsequently filed a W. Va. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from entry of judgment order. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in denying Old Republic’s Rule 60 motion; but (2) the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs because Old Republic’s claim for subrogation failed. View "Old Republic Ins. Co. v. O'Neal" on Justia Law

During a 2007 fight, Smith attacked Thomas with a hammer, and, following a struggle over a loaded shotgun, Smith discharged the shotgun into Thomas’s leg. Thomas’s minor son (C.), was present. Smith was convicted of malicious assault involving a hammer, malicious assault involving a firearm, wanton endangerment of C., involving a firearm, and attempted murder, W. Va. Code sections 61-2-9(a), 61-7-12, 61-11-8, 61-2-1. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Smith sought habeas corpus relief, alleging violation of his due process rights and ineffective assistance of counsel. His memorandum of law argued that conviction and sentence for both the malicious assault of Thomas using a firearm and the wanton endangerment of C. involving a firearm placed Smith in double jeopardy. Before filing that memorandum, Smith did not mention the double jeopardy issue in any habeas filings, at trial, at sentencing, or on appeal. The court granted relief on the double jeopardy claim and permitted Smith to choose one of the two offending convictions and its corresponding sentence to be dismissed. He chose malicious assault with a firearm. The state filed an objection. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed; the “same transaction” test may not be used to decide whether prosecution and punishment imposed under two distinct statutory provisions violates double jeopardy principles. View "Mirandy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Painter was convicted, in 2007, of grand larceny, daytime burglary with breaking, petit larceny, two counts of first-degree murder, and possession of a stolen vehicle. His sentence included a prison term of life without mercy and a restitution order amount of about $7,000.00, to “be paid from monies contained within any prison account or any assets of the defendant." Painter began serving his sentence at Mount Olive in Fayette County, and received a Notice of Withholding, stating: Deductions will be based upon 40% of your earnings ... defined as all sums of money paid to an inmate on account of any work assignment, or other allowable means by which an inmate may be compensated for work… Earnings shall further include all sums of money received by the inmate on account of a settlement of a lawsuit, civil judgment, or other lawful process, inheritance, bequest, gift, except funds provided the inmate by family or friends." The warden began deducting 40% of the money Painter received from his family and friends. He unsuccessfully challenged the policy under W. Va. Code 25-1-3c(c)(1). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, concluding that funds gifted to an inmate by family and friends may be subject to deduction to pay court-ordered restitution. View "Painter v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Allegheny Country Farms entered into a contract to purchase a portion of Carper’s 33-acre property. The agreement was intended to resolve a boundary dispute. Before the conveyance was made, however, Carper sold her property at auction to the Huffmans, by a contract wherein the Huffmans agreed to abide by the terms of the first contract. Allegheny sought specific performance. The court granted summary judgment to the Huffmans and dismissed, as moot, and action against Carper. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed: the Huffmans are contractually bound to convey a portion of their property to Allegheny. “The Huffmans entered into this contract, and its attending obligation to execute the Boundary Line Agreement, with their eyes wide open. They were clearly put on notice and assented to this requirement at the property auction.” View "Allegheny Country Farms, Inc. v. Huffman" on Justia Law