Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent was driving an unlicensed all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on family-owned farm land when he wrecked the ATV and was injured. At the hospital, tests allegedly showed Respondent’s blood alcohol content was 0.17 percent. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles revoked Respondent’s privilege to drive for forty-five days. Respondent appealed, arguing that his license could not be revoked because he was driving the ATV only upon private, family-owned land, and there was no evidence he was driving on a public street or highway. The Office of Administrative Hearings upheld the Commissioner’s revocation order. The circuit court reversed, concluding that because Respondent’s actions occurred solely upon private land, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revoke Respondent’s driving privileges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person may lose his or her driver’s license if they are found driving a vehicle anywhere within the physical boundaries of the state while under the influence of alcohol, even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public. View "Reed v. Beckett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked in coal mining operations under Consolidated Coal Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CONSOL Energy, Inc. In 2013, CONSOL sold Consolidated Coal Company to Murray Energy Corporation. Prior to the sale, Plaintiffs’ terms of employment included CONSOL’s Equity Incentive Plan that provided for the award of CONSOL common stock to Plaintiffs in Restricted Stock Units (RSUs). The award of RSUs was subject to a vesting schedule. Pursuant to an Award Agreement, the vesting of RSUs would accelerate upon the occurrence of certain events. The acceleration event in controversy was the phrase “change in control.” At the time of the sale, Plaintiffs had been awarded RSUs. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to accelerated vesting of the unvested portion of the RSUs pursuant to the Award Agreement because a “change in control” occurred when CONSOL sold Consolidated Coal Company. CONSOL failed to accelerate the RSUs and asserted that Plaintiffs’ unvested RSUs were forfeited. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase “change in control” under the Award Agreement necessarily included CONSOL’s subsidiary, Consolidated Coal Company; and (2) the sale of Consolidated Coal Company to Murray Energy Corporation triggered the accelerated vesting of Plaintiffs’ RSUs. View "Consol Energy, Inc. v. Hummel" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to the misdemeanor crime of sexual abuse in the third degree and was sentenced to the maximum statutory term of ninety days in jail. Petitioner was also required to register as a sexual offender for life. After serving his sentence, Petitioner pled guilty to failing to provide a change in his sex offender registration information. The circuit court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate term of one to five years, then suspended the sentence and placed him on probation. Thereafter, Petitioner twice pled guilty to failing to report a change in his information. Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty-five years of incarceration. Petitioner later filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(b) arguing that his age at the time he committed the misdemeanor third degree sexual abuse and his actions thereafter warranted a lesser sentence. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to afford Petitioner mercy. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

University Park at Evansdale, LLC (UPE) was the lessor of certain property owned by the West Virginia University Board of Governors commonly known as “University Park.” The Monongalia County Assessor assessed UPE’s leasehold interest in University Park at just over $9 million for the tax year 2015. UPE challenged the assessment, arguing that its leasehold interest was $0 because the leasehold was neither freely assignable nor a bargain lease. The Board of Equalization and Review (BER) affirmed, determining that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability, rather than valuation, reviewable only by the Tax Commissioner. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that UPE advanced a challenge that the BER had no jurisdiction to review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability. Remanded. View "University Park at Evansdale, LLC v. Musick" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was ownership of coalbed methane (CBM) under a 1938 deed. Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioners seeking a declaration of ownership of all CBM on the property conveyed in the deed and an accounting of royalties from Petitioners. Petitioners filed counterclaims and cross claims also seeking a declaration of ownership and an accounting of royalties. The dispositive issue for determination at trial was whether CBM was considered “gas” for purposes of Petitioners’ “oil and gas” reservation in the deed. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the predecessors of Petitioners did not intend the reservation in the 1938 deed to include an interest in the CBM. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reservation in the 1938 deed did not include CBM due to the general opinion at the time that CBM was a hazard and a nuisance. View "Poulos v. LBR Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder with a recommendation of mercy and conspiracy to commit burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from a residence with the property owners’ consent; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from Defendant’s residence; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue; and (4) Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right not to wear jail attire during jury voir dire. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, concealment of a deceased human body, and other offenses relating to the death of her twenty-six-day-old infant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by admitting Defendant’s prior bad acts under W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) Defendant’s argument that her conviction for concealment of a human body and her related conspiracy conviction should be set aside because she took affirmative action within the meaning of W. Va. Code 61-2-5a was without merit; (3) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy by not merging the child neglect resulting in death and child neglect creating a substantial risk of death counts into a single offense; (4) Defendant’s remaining assignments of error were without merit; and (5) there was no error or abuse of discretion in the court’s sentencing order. View "State v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

William and Kerry Smith filed a complaint alleging that Reginald Grimmett damaged their real property while developing a mobile home community on his adjacent tract of land. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Grimmett. Thereafter, the Smiths filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and clearly wrong. The circuit court granted the motion. Grimmett appealed, arguing that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error by setting aside the jury verdict and granting the Smiths a new trial. Remanded for entry of an order reinstating the jury’s verdict. View "Grimmett v. Smith" on Justia Law

The State Tax Commissioner and the Berkeley County Assessor denied an ad valorem property tax exemption to University Healthcare Foundation, Inc. for its property known as the Dorothy McCormack Cancer Treatment & Rehabilitation Center. The circuit court overruled the denial, concluding that the healthcare and recreational services provided in the Center were primarily and immediately related to the joint charitable purposes of the Center and the Berkeley Medical Center. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Center was being used exclusively for charitable purposes. View "Matkovich v. Univ. Healthcare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit the destruction of property and attempt to commit grand larceny. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration of one to five years and one to three years, respectively. Petitioner later filed a motion to reduce his sentence under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 35(b). The circuit court denied Petitioner’s Rule 35(b) motion. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion in not reducing his sentence by awarding him probation or concurrent sentencing and by sentencing him on his felony conspiracy conviction when the evidence indicated that his crime was a misdemeanor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not commit reversible error in refusing to award either concurrent sentencing or probation; and (2) Petitioner’s assignment of error challenging his felony conspiracy conviction exceeded the scope of Rule 35(b). View "State v. Marcum" on Justia Law