Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Robert Perry was issued a Citibank MasterCard account in 1998. The terms and conditions of the Citibank Card Agreement governing Perry’s account included an arbitration agreement. In 2010, Citibank filed a debt collection action against Perry seek to recover the balance owed on Perry’s account. In 2015, Perry filed an answer to Citibank’s complaint and a class counterclaim alleging that Citibank had violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Thereafter, Citibank filed a motion asking the court to compel arbitration of the parties’ claims. The circuit court concluded that Citibank had implicitly waived its right to arbitration by filing suit in circuit court and waiting nearly five years before seeking to invoke its contractual right to arbitrate. Citibank appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Citibank did not waive its right to compel arbitration in this matter. Remanded. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Perry" on Justia Law

In 1976, Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. The life sentence included the element of mercy, and Petitioner was released on parole in 1986. While on parole, Petitioner was convicted in Pennsylvania of murder. After Petitioner completed his Pennsylvania sentence, his parole was revoked, and Petitioner’s life sentence, with mercy, was reimposed. Thereafter, Petitioner was informed that he would be ineligible for parole. Petitioner filed this habeas petition, alleging that the lack of a sentencing record regarding his armed robbery conviction violated the requirements of State v. Houston and Pratt v. Holland and that the West Virginia Parole Board violated his right to due process by denying a hearing before the Parole Board prior to the Board’s determination of his ineligibility for parole. The habeas court concluded that the sentence was fair and imposed the life sentence, with mercy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the habeas court did not include an impermissible factor as a reason for Petitioner’s life sentence; and (2) the denial of a hearing before the Parole Board in which to participate in the comparison of the two murder statutes did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process of law. View "Pratt v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Braxton Lumber Company filed suit against Lloyd’s Inc. seeking payment on a promissory note. Braxton Lumber did not file suit within six years of the due date on the promissory note owed to it. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding, in part, that the statute of limitations expired on Braxton Lumber’s claims. Braxton Lumber appealed, arguing that its suit was not time-barred because tolling provisions in two West Virginia statutes extended the time in which it could have filed suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of the tolling provisions relied upon by Braxton Lumber tolled the six-year statute of limitations on its lawsuit. View "Braxton Lumber Co. v. Lloyd's Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on eight charges relating to the alleged sexual abuse of his eight-year-old daughter S.F. S.F. received treatment from the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR), which maintained files to which the prosecutor had access. Defendant requested S.F.’s DHHR files on the ground that the prosecutor was required to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence in its possession. After an in camera review, the circuit court granted Defendant’s lawyer access to the DHHR files, finding that Defendant had a constitutional right to review the DHHR’s files on S.F. on the grounds that the files contained exculpatory information that was material to the defense. The prosecutor then sought a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by finding that Defendant had a constitutional right to review the DHHR’s files on S.F.; and (2) the circuit court followed the correct procedure in determining that these files could be reviewed by Defendant’s lawyer. View "State ex rel. Lorenzetti v. Honorable David H. Sanders" on Justia Law

In 2012, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) sent Petitioner an order of revocation revoking Petitioner’s driving privileges and enhancing her penalty based on a 2003 license revocation. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) affirmed the revocation of Petitioner’s driver’s license. Petitioner filed a petition for review and writ of prohibition alleging that the 2003 DUI denied her due process rights because notice was mailed to an address from which she had moved. The circuit court granted Petitioner’s writ of prohibition to exclude the previous DUI offense from enhancing the current penalty, concluding that the 2003 DUI “controverts justice.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Petitioner failed timely to contest the 2003 revocation order, the circuit court erred as a matter of law by granting Petitioner’s writ of prohibition to prevent the DMV from enhancing her 2012 DUI penalty based on her 2003 revocation. View "Reed v. Haynes" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the use of educational interventionists to assist elementary and middle school students in Monongalia County who need educational support beyond that provided by the regular classroom teacher. The interventionists utilized by the Monongalia County Board of Education (MCBOE) were obtained through a contract it has with its Regional Education Service Agency (RESA), were required to be certified teachers, and were employees of the West Virginia Board of Education. The circuit court concluded that an interventionist met the statutory definition of “classroom teacher” and, therefore, must be directly hired by MCBOE. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory definition of “classroom teacher” is not intended to include within its meaning an “interventionist”; and (2) a county board of education may contract with its RESA to provide interventionist services to county students. View "Monongalia County Board of Education v. American Federation of Teachers" on Justia Law

In September 2014, M.B. filed a complaint with the West Virginia Board of Medicine alleging that Petitioner had engaged in an improper sexual relationship with her while he was her treating physician and that he failed correctly to treat her. A deadline of March 16, 2016 was established for the Board to issue a final ruling on M.B.’s complaint. In February 2016, the Board obtained M.B.’s consent to extend the time for a final ruling on her complaint under September 2016. Petitioner then filed this petition for writ of prohibition, contending that the Board had failed to proceed in a timely manner. The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of prohibition, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate an error of law or that the Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. O.H. v. West Virginia Board of Medicine" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against the City of Wheeling, alleging that the City negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and operate its waterworks and fire hydrant system, resulting in the total loss of her home due to a fire. The City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in which it asserted statutory immunity for fire protection services. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on its determination that both statutory and common law immunity barred the civil action. Petitioner appealed, arguing that her complaint was based solely on the City’s aqueduct system and not on the provision of fire protection services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in applying statutory immunity as a bar to further prosecution in Petitioner’s case. View "Albert v. City of Wheeling" on Justia Law

Respondent was driving an unlicensed all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on family-owned farm land when he wrecked the ATV and was injured. At the hospital, tests allegedly showed Respondent’s blood alcohol content was 0.17 percent. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles revoked Respondent’s privilege to drive for forty-five days. Respondent appealed, arguing that his license could not be revoked because he was driving the ATV only upon private, family-owned land, and there was no evidence he was driving on a public street or highway. The Office of Administrative Hearings upheld the Commissioner’s revocation order. The circuit court reversed, concluding that because Respondent’s actions occurred solely upon private land, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revoke Respondent’s driving privileges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person may lose his or her driver’s license if they are found driving a vehicle anywhere within the physical boundaries of the state while under the influence of alcohol, even if the vehicle is driven only upon private property not open to the general public. View "Reed v. Beckett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked in coal mining operations under Consolidated Coal Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CONSOL Energy, Inc. In 2013, CONSOL sold Consolidated Coal Company to Murray Energy Corporation. Prior to the sale, Plaintiffs’ terms of employment included CONSOL’s Equity Incentive Plan that provided for the award of CONSOL common stock to Plaintiffs in Restricted Stock Units (RSUs). The award of RSUs was subject to a vesting schedule. Pursuant to an Award Agreement, the vesting of RSUs would accelerate upon the occurrence of certain events. The acceleration event in controversy was the phrase “change in control.” At the time of the sale, Plaintiffs had been awarded RSUs. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to accelerated vesting of the unvested portion of the RSUs pursuant to the Award Agreement because a “change in control” occurred when CONSOL sold Consolidated Coal Company. CONSOL failed to accelerate the RSUs and asserted that Plaintiffs’ unvested RSUs were forfeited. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase “change in control” under the Award Agreement necessarily included CONSOL’s subsidiary, Consolidated Coal Company; and (2) the sale of Consolidated Coal Company to Murray Energy Corporation triggered the accelerated vesting of Plaintiffs’ RSUs. View "Consol Energy, Inc. v. Hummel" on Justia Law