Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, were former students in the nursing program at Salem International University (Salem). When Plaintiffs enrolled, they signed enrollment agreements that contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against Salem and its president (collectively, Salem) alleging that they were denied the opportunity to complete their coursework in nursing at Salem as a result of the nursing program’s loss of accreditation. Salem filed a motion to stay proceedings pending mandatory alternative dispute resolution. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement did not include an enforceable class action litigation waiver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration agreement acted as a class action litigation waiver barring Plaintiffs from seeking judicial relief as a class. View "Salem International University v. Bates" on Justia Law

W. Va. Code 11-15A-10a affords taxpayers a credit for sales taxes paid to other states, which offsets the West Virginia Motor Fuel Use Tax (“use tax”) a fuel importer must pay under W. Va. Code 11-15A-13a. After it was assessed a use tax on the fuel it uses in West Virginia, CSX Transportation sought a refund of the sales taxes it had paid on its motor fuel purchases to cities, counties, and localities of other sales pursuant to section 11-15A-10a. The Tax Commissioner rejected the refund request. The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) granted CSX’s refund request and vacated the assessment, finding that CSX was entitled to a credit under section 11-15A-10a for the sales taxes it paid to other states’ subdivisions on its purchases of motor fuel therein. The circuit court affirmed. The Tax Commissioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by not limiting the credit to sales taxes paid only to other states upon the purchase of a motor fuel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sales tax credit afforded by section 11-15A-10a applies both to sales taxes paid to other states and to sales taxes paid to the municipalities of other states. View "Matkovich v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

This proceeding consisted of four consolidated appeals. The issue in two of the appeals was whether the alternative-energy infrastructures installed by Petitioners for their businesses met the statutory definition of “qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure” for the purpose of receiving an alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credit. The issue in the other two appeals was whether the alternative-energy infrastructures installed by Petitioners for their residences met the statutory definition of “qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure” for the purpose of receiving an alternative fuel-infrastructure tax credit. The circuit court affirmed the final orders of the West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals that denied Petitioners’ requests for alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credits under W. Va. Code 11-6d-4(c). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Martin Distributing Co. v. Matkovich" on Justia Law

Bryan and Doris McCurdy filed an action against Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) seeking a declaration that MVP had no right to enter their property to survey the area as a potential location for a natural gas transmission pipeline MVP planned to construct. The McCurdys further sought both a preliminary and a permanent injunction prohibiting MVP from entering their property. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment to the McCurdys and also granted the McCurdys a preliminary and a permanent injunction prohibiting MVP from entering their property. The circuit court based its decision on its finding that MVP’s pipeline is not being constructed for a public use in West Virginia. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding (1) MVP could enter the MCurdys’ land to survey the land only if the MVP pipeline was for a public use, and (2) the MVP pipeline was not being constructed for a public use in West Virginia. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline v. McCurdy" on Justia Law

Respondent David King, as administrator of the estate of Wilma Ann King, brought an action against the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) alleging that the DMV was negligent in approving the driver’s license application of the driver who killed Wilma King in an automobile accident without first submitting the driver’s medical information to the Driver’s Licensing Advisory Board (advisory board). The DMV filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that referral to the advisory board is discretionary. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that referral is nondiscretionary, and therefore, there was no qualified immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the governmental act or omission that gave rise to Respondent’s action against the DMV constituted a discretionary governmental function, and therefore, the DMV was immune to Respondent’s action. View "Department of Transportation v. King" on Justia Law

In 2013, the decedent filed a complaint alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act and other causes of action against Respondent, Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc. After the decedent died in 2014, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the decedent’s claims under the Act did not survive his death pursuant to W. Va. Code 55-7-8a(a) because the claims were personal to the consumer who owed the debt and that the decedent’s estate did not have standing to bring a claim under the Act because an estate is not a natural person under the Act. Petitioner, the executrix of the estate of the decedent, moved to substitute the decedent’s estate as plaintiff. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding that the decedent’s estate lacked standing to maintain a private right of action as a “consumer” within the meaning of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a claim brought under W. Va. Code 46A-2-127(c) of the Act is not sufficiently analogous to a claim for fraud so that the claim survives the death of the consumer pursuant to section 55-7-8a(a). View "Horton v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife were granted a divorce by order of the family court in 2014. The circuit court affirmed the family court’s orders. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) classifying certain property as marital property; (2) calculating Husband’s gambling losses; (3) denying Husband credit for payments Husband made during the parties’ separation; (4) ordering Husband to pay one-half of the attorney’s fees incurred by Wife; (5) calculating amounts due to Wife on one of the marital assets; and (6) failing to award Wife a cash sum to equalize the distribution of marital assets. View "P.A. v. T.A." on Justia Law

In 2013, fourteen plaintiffs, including ten from West Virginia and four from New York, filed products liability and negligence claims agist Pfizer, Inc. regarding their use of the medication, Lipitor, a drug manufactured by Pfizer. An amended complaint was later filed adding twenty-six plaintiffs from Texas. Ultimately, the circuit court granted Pfizer’s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens and dismissed the non-West Virginia plaintiffs from the underlying civil action. Plaintiffs sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order granting Pfizer’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court acted within its authority in granting the motion to dismiss. View "State ex rel. Almond v. Honorable Rudolph Murensky" on Justia Law

This litigation arose out of the construction of the home of Randie Lawson and Deanna Lawson (together, Respondents). G & G Builders, Inc. (Petitioner) filed suit asserting that it was owed $303,686 under the parties’ construction agreement. Respondents asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss Respondents’ counterclaim and to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration provisions in the construction agreement were not binding on Randie because they were set forth in a document that was never provided to him, nor were they binding on Deanna, who was a non-signatory to the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was no agreement between the parties to arbitrate their dispute. View "G & G Builders, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was indicted on one count of malicious assault. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of assault and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, arguing that his conviction must be set aside on the grounds that he was not charged with the offense for which he was convicted because the crime of misdemeanor assault is not a lesser included offense of malicious assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) misdemeanor assault is a lesser included offense of malicious assault; and (2) the evidence submitted at trial supported an instruction on assault. View "State v. Henning" on Justia Law