Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After soil and rock slid down a hill located to the rear of Responents’ property and damaged a building, Respondents submitted a claim for property damage to Erie Insurance Property, their insurance carrier. Erie denied coverage based upon its conclusion that Respondents’ loss was not covered due to the policy’s earth movement exclusion. Respondents sued Erie and Stephen Myers, an adjuster for Erie (collectively, Petitioners), seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether coverage existed. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter with instructions to enter declaratory judgment for Petitioners, holding (1) the plain and unambiguous terms of the ensuing loss provision of the policy provided a narrow exception to the earth movement exclusion and permitted coverage for the portion of the loss caused by glass breakage; and (2) the other damage caused by the earth movement was not covered. View "Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Co. v. Chaber" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action arising from an automobile accident, Defendants - Robert Jackson and the Joelynn Family Preservation Trust - appealed from an order of the circuit court denying their motion for a new trial following a jury verdict favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s ruling granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on the issue of Jackson’s liability for causing the automobile accident; (2) reversed the circuit court’s denial of Jackson’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the Trust’s liability, as Jackson was not “in the course of administering” the Trust when the automobile accident occurred; and (3) affirmed the circuit court’s award of prejudgment interest on Plaintiff’s award for lost wages. View "Jackson v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a fatal vehicular accident, Christina Varvel asserted a declaratory judgment action against Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. and Zurich American Insurance Co. (collectively, Zurich) to determine the amount of insurance coverage available. Varvel also sued Salvatore Cava, Daniel Cava, and Dan’s Car World, LLC (collectively, the Cava defendants). The Cava defendants filed individual cross-claims against Zurich, their insurer. Zurich filed a motion to dismiss the Cava defendants’ cross-claims under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The circuit court denied Zurich’s motion to dismiss, determining that the Cava defendants asserted recognized causes of action against Zurich. Zurich sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, as moulded, holding that the Cava defendants’ cross-claims against Zurich were not ripe for adjudication. Therefore, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and the order denying Zurich’s motion to dismiss the Cava defendants’ cross-claims was void and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Universal Underwriters Insurance v. Honorable Patrick N. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed an order of the circuit court that granted summary judgment to Steve Sayre in connection with determining the amount of underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) owed by GEICO to Sayre. Concluding that the GEICO policy language was ambiguous, the trial court ruled that, where there were two underinsured motorists in this case, the UIM coverage was triggered separately by each of those motorists. The court then ordered GEICO to pay an additional $20,000 in UIM coverage. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in applying the policy language to require GEICO to pay double the amount of UIM coverage purchased by Sayre. View "Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Sayre" on Justia Law

Where a lessee designates tracts of land for pooling regarding horizontal drilling and production of oil and gas from the Marcellus Shale Formation, which includes nonparticipating royalty interests (NPRI), consent or ratification by the holders of the nonparticipating royalty interests is not required where the holders of the NPRIs have conveyed the oil and gas in place and the executive leasing rights thereto to the lessor.At issue was a voluntary pooling and unionization lease provision regarding horizontal drilling and production of oil and gas from the Marcellus Shale Formation. PPG Industries, Inc., the lessor, and Gastar Exploration USA, Inc., the lessee, signed a lease under which 700 acres were designated by Gastar as the Wayne/Lily Unit for purposes of pooling the oil and gas interests held by various individuals and entities. PPG and Gastar challenged the circuit court’s entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, who collectively held a nonparticipating royalty interest in the oil and gas underlying a parcel included within the Wayne/Lily Unit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the validity of the pooling provision in the PPG-Gastar lease and the designated Wayne/Lily Unit were void until such time as pooling was consented to and ratified by Plaintiffs. View "Gastar Exploration Inc. v. Contraguerro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking reinstatement to his position as a member of the Meadow Bridge Sanitary Board. The circuit court concluded that Petitioner was not a municipal officer and thus declined to find a legal duty on the part of the Town of Meadow Bridge to comply with the procedural protections of W. Va. Code 6-6-7 in removing Petitioner from his position on the Sanitary Board. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Petitioner was not a municipal officer for purposes of W. Va. Code 6-6-7; and (2) Petitioner’s removal by a majority vote of the Meadow Bridge Town Council was proper. View "Cales v. Town of Meadow Bridge" on Justia Law

Both the legislative intent and language utilized in W. Va. Code 22-6-8 permits allocation or deduction of reasonable post-production expenses actually incurred by the lessee of an oil and/or gas lease and, more specifically, permits use of the “net-back” or “work-back” method of royalty calculation.Here the Supreme Court answered certified questions presented by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia regarding whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006), has any effect upon whether a lessee subject to section 22-6-8 may deduct post-production expenses from the lessor’s royalty. Upon rehearing, the court concluded that royalty payments pursuant to an oil or gas lease governed by the statute may be subject to pro-rata deduction or allocation of all reasonable post-production expenses incurred by the lessee, and therefore, an oil or gas lessee may utilize the “net-back” or “work-back” method to calculate royalties owed to a lessor pursuant to a lease governed by section 22-6-8(e). View "Leggett v. EQT Production Co." on Justia Law

Respondent hired a law firm to investigate a potential malpractice claim against a nursing home. The law firm made a request to the hospital owned by Petitioner for a copy of Respondent’s medical records. Petitioners sent an invoice to the law firm demanding $4,463.43 plus sales tax and shipping costs for the medical records. The law firm paid the invoice. Troubled by the allegedly excessive amount of the invoice, however, the law firm filed suit against Petitioners in the name of the client. The circuit court found that Respondent could pursue a claim for the allegedly excessive costs of the medical records. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition to Petitioners and directed the circuit court to dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice, holding that because Respondent did not pay the invoice and suffered no personal loss caused by the allegedly illegal fee, Respondent could not show an injury in fact. Therefore, Respondent did not have standing to pursue the lawsuit. View "State ex rel. Healthport Technologies, LLC v. Honorable James C. Stucky" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of one count of embezzlement. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by (1) not granting his motions for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction, and (2) not granting his motion for a mistrial after the prosecuting attorney made improper remarks during closing arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction and therefore did not err by denying Petitioner’s motions for judgment of acquittal; and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks were not clearly prejudicial and did not result in manifest injustice, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial. View "State v. Berry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, filed a complaint against Monroe County alleging negligence in performing statutory duties, thereby allowing vicious dogs to remain at large, and wrongful death. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the County based upon the court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish a disputed issue of material fact in relation to the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. The court then entered, sua sponte, an order summarily dismissing all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because there was disputed evidence on each of the factors required to establish the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine, the the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the County; and (2) because the summary judgment order upon which the dismissal order was apparently based was dismissed, likewise, the circuit court’s dismissal order is vacated. View "Bowden v. Monroe County Commission" on Justia Law