Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking reinstatement to his position as a member of the Meadow Bridge Sanitary Board. The circuit court concluded that Petitioner was not a municipal officer and thus declined to find a legal duty on the part of the Town of Meadow Bridge to comply with the procedural protections of W. Va. Code 6-6-7 in removing Petitioner from his position on the Sanitary Board. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Petitioner was not a municipal officer for purposes of W. Va. Code 6-6-7; and (2) Petitioner’s removal by a majority vote of the Meadow Bridge Town Council was proper. View "Cales v. Town of Meadow Bridge" on Justia Law

Both the legislative intent and language utilized in W. Va. Code 22-6-8 permits allocation or deduction of reasonable post-production expenses actually incurred by the lessee of an oil and/or gas lease and, more specifically, permits use of the “net-back” or “work-back” method of royalty calculation.Here the Supreme Court answered certified questions presented by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia regarding whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006), has any effect upon whether a lessee subject to section 22-6-8 may deduct post-production expenses from the lessor’s royalty. Upon rehearing, the court concluded that royalty payments pursuant to an oil or gas lease governed by the statute may be subject to pro-rata deduction or allocation of all reasonable post-production expenses incurred by the lessee, and therefore, an oil or gas lessee may utilize the “net-back” or “work-back” method to calculate royalties owed to a lessor pursuant to a lease governed by section 22-6-8(e). View "Leggett v. EQT Production Co." on Justia Law

Respondent hired a law firm to investigate a potential malpractice claim against a nursing home. The law firm made a request to the hospital owned by Petitioner for a copy of Respondent’s medical records. Petitioners sent an invoice to the law firm demanding $4,463.43 plus sales tax and shipping costs for the medical records. The law firm paid the invoice. Troubled by the allegedly excessive amount of the invoice, however, the law firm filed suit against Petitioners in the name of the client. The circuit court found that Respondent could pursue a claim for the allegedly excessive costs of the medical records. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition to Petitioners and directed the circuit court to dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice, holding that because Respondent did not pay the invoice and suffered no personal loss caused by the allegedly illegal fee, Respondent could not show an injury in fact. Therefore, Respondent did not have standing to pursue the lawsuit. View "State ex rel. Healthport Technologies, LLC v. Honorable James C. Stucky" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of one count of embezzlement. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by (1) not granting his motions for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction, and (2) not granting his motion for a mistrial after the prosecuting attorney made improper remarks during closing arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction and therefore did not err by denying Petitioner’s motions for judgment of acquittal; and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks were not clearly prejudicial and did not result in manifest injustice, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial. View "State v. Berry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, filed a complaint against Monroe County alleging negligence in performing statutory duties, thereby allowing vicious dogs to remain at large, and wrongful death. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the County based upon the court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish a disputed issue of material fact in relation to the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. The court then entered, sua sponte, an order summarily dismissing all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because there was disputed evidence on each of the factors required to establish the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine, the the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the County; and (2) because the summary judgment order upon which the dismissal order was apparently based was dismissed, likewise, the circuit court’s dismissal order is vacated. View "Bowden v. Monroe County Commission" on Justia Law

After the West Virginia Department of Education (DOE) terminated Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff filed a complaint containing a constitutional tort claim and a claim for wrongful termination. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the DOE leaked a letter it received from her previous government employer revealing that she was under investigation for misallocating public funds for personal use and that the leak of this letter violated her constitutionally-protected liberty interest. The circuit court denied the DOE’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to outline a liberty interest violation sufficient to overcome the DOE’s qualified immunity because the truth of the allegedly leaked letter was not disputed; and (2) therefore, the DOE’s qualified immunity barred Plaintiff’s claims. View "West Virginia Department of Education v. McGraw" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the third offense provision contained in W. Va. Code 61-8-5(b) is ambiguous. Therefore, the rule of lenity applies, requiring the court to strictly construe the statute against the State and in favor of Defendant, who was charged with third offense of soliciting an act of prostitution in violation of section 61-8-5(b). The circuit court rejected Defendant’s argument that the third offense provision does not apply to an alleged prostitute but, rather, applies only to third parties who derive a financial benefit from the earnings of a prostitute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the third or subsequent felony offense provision only applies to third parties who financially benefit from the earnings of a prostitute. Therefore, the circuit court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. View "State v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that Petitioner was not a “consumer” within the applicable definitions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondent, a debt collector, concluding that Petitioner lacked standing to seek relief under the Act because Petitioner did not have any specific debt in connection with the calls that Respondent made to her land line phone. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner clearly did not come within the definition of “consumer” set forth in the Act, and (2) therefore, the circuit court correctly ruled that Petitioner lacked standing to pursue a claim under the Act. View "Young v. EOSCCA" on Justia Law

The State appealed the circuit court’s order dismissing two counts of an indictment returned against Defendant charging Defendant with criminal civil rights violations under W. Va. Code 61-6-21(b), arguing that the circuit court erred in determining that the word “sex” in section 61-6-21(b) could not be expanded to include “sexual orientation.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the word “sex” in section 61-6-21(b) is unambiguous and does not include “sexual orientation”; and (2) this Court’s exercise of discretion under W. Va. R. App. P. 17 in refusing to docket a certified question presented to this Court under W. Va. Code 58-5-2 is neither an express nor an implicit ruling on the merits of the legal issue presented therein, and thereafter, the circuit court may take such action and make such rulings in the matter as it deems appropriate. View "State v. Butler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ruled that the revocation of the driver’s license of Respondent was improper, thus rejecting the arguments of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) on appeal. The Court affirmed the order of the circuit court, which reversed the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) that had affirmed the DMV’s revocation of Respondent’s driver’s license. The Court held that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the OAH’s delay in issuing its decision was prejudicial to Respondent and declined to address the merits of DMV’s two remaining assignments of error. View "Reed v. Staffileno" on Justia Law