Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case in question arose from a multi-million-dollar loss suffered by Westlake Chemical Corporation and Axiall Corporation (the respondents) at their chlorine manufacturing plant in Natrium, West Virginia. The loss occurred when 90 tons of liquid chlorine leaked from a rupture in a railroad tanker car that had been recently repaired by third-party contractors. The liquid chlorine vaporized into a cloud or plume that caused corrosion damage to the equipment at the plant. The respondents claimed the damage costs from their insurance companies (the petitioners). However, the insurance companies denied coverage based on three exclusions in the insurance policies relating to corrosion, faulty workmanship, and contamination. The case reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which was asked to review three orders of the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia, Business Court Division. The lower court had granted partial summary judgment to the respondents, finding that none of the three exclusions barred the respondents’ coverage claims. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded that the lower court's orders were not final orders subject to appeal at this stage of the proceedings. This was due to unresolved issues of causation and damages, and because the orders did not conclusively determine the disputed controversy, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, or were effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal, without prejudice. View "NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA. v. WESTLAKE CHEMICAL CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Bailey, an RN employed by MMBH, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) psychiatric facility, alleges that he intervened when M.C., a patient with a known history of self-harm, attempted to harm himself. A struggle ensued. M.C. suffered minor injuries. Subsequently, an employee of Legal Aid of West Virginia (LAWV), observed M.C.'s bruising, read the nursing notes, and viewed a security video of the struggle, then filed a referral with Adult Protective Services. MMBH’s Director of Nursing filed a patient grievance form on behalf of M.C. Bailey was suspended. Several witnesses were never interviewed and the report failed to relate M.C.’s history of self-harm. Bailey’s employment was terminated. The Board of Nursing initiated proceedings against his nursing license.The West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board reinstated Bailey. The Board of Nursing dismissed the complaint against his license. During the investigation, MFCU allegedly made Bailey submit to a “custodial interrogation,” conducted by MFCU employees and a West Virginia Attorney General’s Office lawyer. Bailey was not advised of his Miranda rights. Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) investigator Lyle then referred the matter to the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, which filed criminal charges. MMBH again suspended Bailey. The charges were later dismissed.Bailey sued DHHR, MMBH, MFCU, LAWV, and several individuals under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on unreasonable and unlawful seizure of the person, malicious prosecution, and violation of the Whistle-Blower Law.The West Virginia Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition. Bailey cannot maintain section 1983 claims against MFCU and Lyle. Bailey’s whistle-blower claim against Lyle is unsustainable because Lyle had no authority over Bailey’s employment. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim fails to allege sufficient facts to meet the required heightened pleading standard to overcome MFCU’s and Lyle’s qualified immunity. View "State of West Virginia v. Ballard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court terminating the parental rights of Father and Mother two their two minor children, holding that numerous procedural errors substantially affected the integrity of the underlying proceedings.On appeal, Mother and Father argued that the circuit court erred by terminating their parental rights in its dispositional order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court properly adjudicated the children and the parents in the underlying abuse and neglect proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order, holding (1) the circuit court erred in adjudicating Z.S.-1 as a neglected child and Mother and Father as neglectful parents based upon the parents' defective stipulations; and (2) because the circuit court could not locate any definitive adjudication of Z.S.-2 as an abused and/or neglected child or of Mother or Father as abusive and/or neglectful of Z.S.2 the circuit court's dispositional order as to Z.S.-2 must be vacated. View "In re Z.S.-1" on Justia Law

Hagerman used a shotgun to kill his former brother-in-law, while drinking with friends at Hagerman’s home. Charged with first-degree murder, he argued self-defense. After his conviction for second-degree murder, a lesser included offense, Hagerman discovered that six individuals who reside in or near the community of Bradshaw, where the shooting occurred, had been selected for the jury panel but the circuit court had directed the circuit clerk not to call them. The trial court denied Hagerman a new trial, stating: No juror was excluded from the case on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status or being a qualified individual with a disability. The six jurors were from a “tight-knit community” of approximately 259 people, would generally know each other, and would be aware of the local knowledge or gossip. The court reasoned that the jurors would have likely been removed from the jury panel based on their relationships with people involved in the case.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting arguments that the circuit court violated his right to a randomly selected jury representing a fair cross-section of the community and committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. View "State of West Virginia v. Hagerman" on Justia Law

Ward, charged with felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, moved to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment. He alleged that Raleigh County Sheriff’s Officers arrived at his mother’s residence, questioned him regarding a dispute, and asked him for identification. Ward stated he could retrieve it from “downstairs in [his] mother’s house in the [t]-shirt shop.” Both officers and Ward walked around to the door. Ward opened the door. The officers grabbed the door and followed him in. Ward then walked through another door that led into a separate room used for his t-shirt printing shop. While Ward retrieved his identification, an officer observed a firearm. Ward testified that a person standing at the entryway to the basement door would not have been able to see the firearm because it would have been obscured by two doors and a curtain. The basement was not his residence and there was a lock on the front door. Detective Queen stated that he watched Ward retrieve his identification “[f]or officer safety” although he did not have a specific reason to fear for his safety.The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Officers conducted the search and seized the firearm without a warrant; the plain view and officer safety exceptions do not apply. View "State of West Virginia v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the sentencing order of the circuit court and remanded this case with instructions to dismiss Petitioner's conviction for malicious assault and resentence him on the remaining charges, holding that the indictment was insufficient because it did not include an essential element of the offense of malicious assault.Before trial, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the malicious assault count of the indictment because it did not reference the intent to "maim, disfigure, disable or kill." The circuit court denied the motion, finding that a person may commit malicious assault (1) by maliciously shooting, stabbing, cutting, or wounding any person; or (2) by any means causing a person bodily injury with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's sentencing order, holding (1) the intent to main, disfigure, disable, or kill is an essential element of the offenses of malicious assault and unlawful assault pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-29; and (2) therefore, the indictment in this case was insufficient. View "State v. Maichle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's claim alleging that Respondents Frontier West Virginia, Inc. and its supervisory employees wrongfully discharged him after he reported conduct that he alleged violated W. Va. Code 61-3-49b, holding that harm to the public is not required to prove that the offense of crime against property has occurred.Petitioner filed this suit against Frontier for retaliatory discharge. The circuit court granted Frontier's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, ruling that Petitioner "failed to allege a substantial public policy supporting a wrongful discharge exception to a non-public employer termination of an employee." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 61-3-49b does not constitute a substantial public policy to support a Harless claim for wrongful discharge. View "Jarell v. Frontier W. Va., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents, the owners of electrical and communication lines that electrocuted Eugene Boyce (Petitioner), in this negligence action brought by Eugene and his wife Kimberly Boyce, holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner was attempting to make a delivery in the course of his employment when he attempted to move overhead communication lines by climbing on top of his truck and wrapping shrink-wrap around the communication lines. The lines were in close proximity to an energized electrical line, which Petitioner contacted and was electrocuted. The circuit court found that Petitioner's actions were negligent and served as the only proximate cause of the incident. The court further found that, even if a issue of fact existed as to Respondents' negligence, Petitioner's actions constituted an intervening and superseding cause of the incident and injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that Petitioner's actions were (1) the sole proximate cause of the incident, and (2) constituted an intervening cause. View "Boyce v. Monongahela Power Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction of sexual assault in the first degree following a jury trial, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree; (2) did not err when it denied Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial regarding a photographic identification; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it denied an in camera hearing on the suggestibility of the pretrial photographic identification; and (4) did not err when it denied Petitioner's motions for a mistrial due to vouching. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court finding that the City of Morgantown had incorrectly calculated compensation for Petitioners, fifty-four current and former firefighters employed by the City, and finding that the compensation required by W. Va. Code 8-15-10a was not a "fringe benefit" or "wage" covered by the Wage Payment and Collection Act (WPCA), holding that the court erred in part.At issue was section 10a, which requires the City to provide extra compensation to firefighters for days designated by the Legislature as legal holidays. The circuit court granted summary judgment in part to the firefighters and in part to the City. In so doing, the court reduced the period of time that currently employed firefighters could recover improperly calculated compensation and imposed the doctrine of laches to deprive former firefighters of any past compensation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the City incorrectly interpreted section 10a; and (2) section 10a created a fringe or wage benefit for firefighters that was protected by the WPCA. View "Nicewarner v. City of Morgantown" on Justia Law