Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 1977 deed at issue in this case was ambiguous and of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds disagreed as to the deed’s intent, and therefore, the circuit court erred in finding the deed was clear and in finding that the grantors did not convey one-half interest in oil and gas beneath a tract of land in Marshall County to the grantee.In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants asserting that, in the 1977 deed, Plaintiffs retained ownership of the one-half undivided interest in the oil and gas and, therefore, Defendants trespassed on their oil and gas interest and engaged in conversion. Plaintiffs then amended the complaint to request a declaratory judgment interpreting the 1977 deed. The circuit court determined that the deed was clear and unambiguous and declared that Plaintiffs kept for themselves the one-half interest in the oil and gas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the 1977 deed was unambiguous and in granting a declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Gastar Exploration Inc. v. Rine" on Justia Law

The commercial general liability policy at issue in this case is internally inconsistent and therefore ambiguous, and therefore, the policy is interpreted in favor of the insured.An employer’s commercial general liability policy was amended by an endorsement that included a “Stop Gap - Employers Liability Coverage Endorsement - West Virginia” that expressly provided coverage for bodily injury to employees, as well as an exclusion for statutory deliberate intent claims. At issue was whether coverage existed for a statutory deliberate intent action under the circumstances of this case. Insurer brought this appeal from an order of the circuit court that granted partial summary judgment for Employer/Insured and Employees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that ambiguous policy language must be construed in favor of Insured and that the Stop Gap endorsement operated to provide coverage for the deliberate intent claims of Employees against Employer/Insured, and the conflicting exclusion may not be enforced. View "First Mercury Insurance Co., Inc. v. Russell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents in this action in which Respondents added Petitioner as a defendant. Respondents settled a lawsuit against certain companies (the Brozik companies) for failing to pay the purchase price under an agreement to buy the assets of Respondents’ business. The circuit court later awarded Respondents $47,184 to be paid by the Brozik companies based upon the cessation of payments pursuant to the settlement. This judgment became a lien. The assets of one of the Brozik companies was then sold to Petitioner, and Respondents amended their complaint to add Petitioner as a defendant. In reversing the circuit court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that Respondents did not satisfy their burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Kourt Security Partners, LLC v. Judy's Locksmiths, Inc." on Justia Law

West Virginia’s consumer credit protection statute does not regulate the residential rental fees a landlord may charge a tenant pursuant to a lease for residential real property.The Attorney General filed a civil action against Defendant Landlord, one of the largest residential lessors in the state, alleging that Landlord’s residential leases included fees and charges that violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (CCPA), W.Va. Code 46A-1-101 et seq. Landlord filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the CCPA does not apply to residential leases. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, the circuit court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the CCPA applies to the relationship between a landlord and tenant under a residential lease. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. Copper Beech Townhome Communities Twenty-Six, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court upholding the order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinding George Zipf’s driver’s license revocation. Zipf was arrested at a sobriety checkpoint for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Consequently, the Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his driver’s license. The OAH found insufficient evidence that the DUI arrest was lawful and rescinded the driver’s license revocation. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence that Zipf’s DUI arrest was lawful, and therefore, the circuit court erred in upholding the OAH’s order. View "Reed v. Zipf" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in granting a writ of mandamus in favor of the Nicholas County Board of Education (Board) requiring the West Virginia Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Schools (collectively, the WVBOE) to approve the Board’s amended consolidated educational facilities plan (CEFP), which constituted a prerequisite to the Board’s efforts to consolidate four Nicholas County schools and its Career and Technical Education Center. The circuit court found (1) the WVBOE lacks the authority to reject a county board’s CEFP if the county complies with certain regulatory requirements; and (2) the WVBOE’s stated reasons for rejecting the CEFP amendment were arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court held (1) the WVBOE is vested with authority to exercise its discretion in accepting or rejecting an amended CEFP, and mere procedural compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements does not entitle a county board of education to approval of its proposed plan; and (2) the reasons adopted by the WVBOE for rejection of the plan were neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "West Virginia Board of Education v. Board of Education of the County of Nicholas" on Justia Law

In this dispute concerning a liability insurance policy, the Supreme Court granted relief in prohibition to State Auto Property Insurance Companies, holding that State Auto was entitled to a dismissal of CMD Plus, Inc.’s third-party complaint as a matter of law.When Plaintiffs filed an action against CMD, a residential construction company, seeking recovery for damages to their house and property, CMD filed a third-party complaint against State Auto, its insurer, alleging that State Auto delayed investigating Plaintiffs’ claim, settling Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, and indemnifying CMD. In this petition for a writ of prohibition, State Auto challenged the circuit court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that relief in prohibition was warranted because the record showed that State Auto defended and indemnified CMD throughout the lawsuit as required by the commercial general liability policy, and the terms of the policy provided no coverage to CMD for damage to its own property. View "State ex rel. State Auto Property Insurance Cos. v. Honorable James C. Stucky" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to the sheriff and treasurer of Barbour County and the assessor of Barbour County (collectively, Respondents) and finding that Petitioners were liable for payment of certain property taxes for the years 2011 and 2012. Petitioners had purchased a tax lien on certain mineral interests from the Deputy Commission of Delinquent and Nonentered Lands of Barbour County on September 19, 2011 and secured a deed to the property on January 23, 2012. On appeal, Petitioners argued that they were not liable for the 2011 and 2012 property taxes because they were not owners in possession of the property during those years. Respondents argued that Petitioners were liable for the taxes at issue because their deed specified that they acquired title in 2004. The Supreme Court held that because W. Va. Code 11A-3-62 relates the tax lien purchaser’s title back to the year of the assessment for the property taxes that became delinquent, the circuit court did not err in determining that Petitioners were liable for the 2011 and 2012 property taxes. View "Ancient Energy, Ltd. v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order denying Bluestem Brands, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration brought by Respondent. Bluestem, a retailer of consumer goods, partnered with various bands to offer credit to its customers. The circuit court concluded that the arbitration agreement entered into by the parties was not binding on Respondent. Specifically, the circuit court found that Respondent did not assent to arbitration because she did not receive a copy of the most recent credit card agreement containing arbitration language and that Bluestem’s credit partners, and not Bluestem itself, were party to any potentially applicable credit agreement requiring arbitration. In reversing, the Supreme Court held (1) although the most recent amendments to the credit agreement lacked mutual assent, a prior version of the credit agreement contained a properly formed arbitration agreement and encompassed Respondent’s claims; and (2) Bluestem, as a non-signatory to the agreement, may utilize the theory of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration under the agreement. View "Bluestem Brands, Inc. v. Shade" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted two petitions for writs of prohibition, one sought by the State to prohibit enforcement of an order of the circuit court that reduced the criminal sentence of James Wilkerson, the other sought by the State to prohibit enforcement of an order of the circuit court that reduced the criminal sentence of Robert McFarland. The Supreme Court granted both petitions, holding (1) prohibition was appropriate to preclude enforcement of the circuit court’s order reducing Wilkerson’s sentence because the State did not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard on Wilkerson’s motion to reduce his sentence; and (2) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to reduce McFarland’s sentence because the W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(b) motion that McFarland relied upon to obtain relief was untimely. View "State ex rel. State v. Honorable David J. Sims" on Justia Law