Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court concluding that a large inventory of jet engine repair parts were not exempt from ad valorem property taxation.Petitioner maintained a vast inventory of jet engine repair parts at its West Virginia facility. Petitioner argued that the repair parts were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to the Freeport Amendment contained in the West Virginia Constitution. The county assessor determined that the repair parts were not exempt from ad valorem taxation. The state tax commission upheld the determination. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the inventory of repair parts did not fall within the Freeport Amendment exemption. View "Pratt & Whitney Engine Services v. Steager" on Justia Law

In this ancillary statutory proceeding in aid of collection on a judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court awarding summary judgment in favor of Respondents. Respondents were previously awarded a judgment against Employer in a class action alleging violations of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. Respondents later caused a suggestion a personal property to be served upon Petitioner in which they sought amounts, obligations, and things of value owed to Employer. Respondents then sought to make Petitioner liable for Respondents’ judgment. The circuit court granted, in part, the motion to make Petitioner liable for Respondents’ judgment and then directed Petitioner to pay Respondents the amount of their judgment against Employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper where Petitioner’s contractual obligations to Employer were subject to Respondents’ suggestion and where West Virginia law provides for suggestion upon unmatured debts. View "IPacesetters, LLC v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court upholding the finding of just cause for Petitioner’s discharge made by the Mason County Civil Service Commission for Deputy Sheriffs.Petitioner was discharged from employment with the Mason County Sheriff’s Department based on two separate incidents. The Commission concluded that just cause existed for Petitioner’s discharge. The Circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner was not denied procedural due process; (2) the Commission’s practices and procedures were not flawed; and (3) The Commission’s finding of just cause not not clearly wrong or a misapplication of the law, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was not contrary to the evidence. View "Fruth v. Powers" on Justia Law

The circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in sua sponte dismissing the indictment charging Respondent with the felony offense of threatening to commit a terrorist act.A Brooke County grand jury returned a single count indictment charging that Defendant committed the felony offense of threats to commit a terroristic act. Although defense counsel did not file a motion to dismiss the indictment, the circuit court entered an order, sua sponte, dismissing the indictment with prejudice. The State filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded that relief in prohibition was warranted and, therefore, prohibited enforcement of the order dismissing the indictment, holding that the circuit court’s action deprived the State of its right to prosecute a criminal case or deprived the State of a valid conviction. View "State ex rel. State v. Honorable Ronald E. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by the State seeking to have the court prohibit enforcement of an order of the circuit court that allowed Respondent to testify at his criminal trial about the sexual history of his adolescent victim, M.Y.Respondent was indicted on several counts of sexual assault and sexual abuse. Respondent filed two motions seeking to introduce evidence of M.Y.’s sexual history. The trial court granted the motions. The Supreme Court (1) prohibited enforcement of that part of the circuit court’s order allowing Respondent to introduce evidence that M.Y. accused another man of sexual assault when she was eleven years old, holding that the evidence Respondent sought to introduce is not relevant; but (2) denied the State’s request to prohibit enforcement of that part of the circuit court’s order permitting Respondent to cross-examine M.Y. about whether she told him she had sex with anyone else during the seventy-two hour period prior to his purchase of the Plan B pill, holding that the State sought to introduce inadmissible evidence and that Respondent should be permitted to rebut that evidence with inadmissible evidence as authorized by the circuit court. View "State ex rel. Harvey v. Honorable John C. Yoder" on Justia Law

The 1977 deed at issue in this case was ambiguous and of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds disagreed as to the deed’s intent, and therefore, the circuit court erred in finding the deed was clear and in finding that the grantors did not convey one-half interest in oil and gas beneath a tract of land in Marshall County to the grantee.In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants asserting that, in the 1977 deed, Plaintiffs retained ownership of the one-half undivided interest in the oil and gas and, therefore, Defendants trespassed on their oil and gas interest and engaged in conversion. Plaintiffs then amended the complaint to request a declaratory judgment interpreting the 1977 deed. The circuit court determined that the deed was clear and unambiguous and declared that Plaintiffs kept for themselves the one-half interest in the oil and gas. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that the 1977 deed was unambiguous and in granting a declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Gastar Exploration Inc. v. Rine" on Justia Law

The commercial general liability policy at issue in this case is internally inconsistent and therefore ambiguous, and therefore, the policy is interpreted in favor of the insured.An employer’s commercial general liability policy was amended by an endorsement that included a “Stop Gap - Employers Liability Coverage Endorsement - West Virginia” that expressly provided coverage for bodily injury to employees, as well as an exclusion for statutory deliberate intent claims. At issue was whether coverage existed for a statutory deliberate intent action under the circumstances of this case. Insurer brought this appeal from an order of the circuit court that granted partial summary judgment for Employer/Insured and Employees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that ambiguous policy language must be construed in favor of Insured and that the Stop Gap endorsement operated to provide coverage for the deliberate intent claims of Employees against Employer/Insured, and the conflicting exclusion may not be enforced. View "First Mercury Insurance Co., Inc. v. Russell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents in this action in which Respondents added Petitioner as a defendant. Respondents settled a lawsuit against certain companies (the Brozik companies) for failing to pay the purchase price under an agreement to buy the assets of Respondents’ business. The circuit court later awarded Respondents $47,184 to be paid by the Brozik companies based upon the cessation of payments pursuant to the settlement. This judgment became a lien. The assets of one of the Brozik companies was then sold to Petitioner, and Respondents amended their complaint to add Petitioner as a defendant. In reversing the circuit court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that Respondents did not satisfy their burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Kourt Security Partners, LLC v. Judy's Locksmiths, Inc." on Justia Law

West Virginia’s consumer credit protection statute does not regulate the residential rental fees a landlord may charge a tenant pursuant to a lease for residential real property.The Attorney General filed a civil action against Defendant Landlord, one of the largest residential lessors in the state, alleging that Landlord’s residential leases included fees and charges that violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (CCPA), W.Va. Code 46A-1-101 et seq. Landlord filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the CCPA does not apply to residential leases. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, the circuit court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the CCPA applies to the relationship between a landlord and tenant under a residential lease. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. Copper Beech Townhome Communities Twenty-Six, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court upholding the order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinding George Zipf’s driver’s license revocation. Zipf was arrested at a sobriety checkpoint for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Consequently, the Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his driver’s license. The OAH found insufficient evidence that the DUI arrest was lawful and rescinded the driver’s license revocation. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence that Zipf’s DUI arrest was lawful, and therefore, the circuit court erred in upholding the OAH’s order. View "Reed v. Zipf" on Justia Law