Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources’ (DHHR) motion for summary judgment, in which DHHR argued that it was entitled to qualified immunity.The circuit court determined that DHHR was not entitled to qualified immunity because it was alleged that DHHR had violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional law. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the complained-of conduct involved discretionary functions and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional law, and therefore, the circuit court should have granted summary judgment for DHHR on the basis of qualified immunity. View "Crouch v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the circuit court properly granted Shutler Cabinets, Inc.’s motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum seeking all of Shutler’s business records for a one-year period and whether the court properly awarded Shutler attorney fees and costs. Shutler was a nonparty to the litigation in this case, which was filed in Pennsylvania.Plaintiff sought discovery information from Shutler, a West Virginia company that was a nonparty to the litigation in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s order quashing the subpoena, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the category of information in the subpoena that sought business records for a one-year period, including that names and addresses of Shutler’s customers, was unduly burdensome; and (2) affirmed the attorney fee award regarding the fees counsel for Shutler incurred in its initial response to the petition for a subpoena duces tecum and reversed the attorney fee award regarding fees counsel for Shutler incurred in connection with Plaintiff’s W.Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. View "Kahle's Kitchens, Inc. v. Shutler Cabinets, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue was whether the circuit court properly granted Shutler Cabinets, Inc.’s motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum seeking all of Shutler’s business records for a one-year period and whether the court properly awarded Shutler attorney fees and costs. Shutler was a nonparty to the litigation in this case, which was filed in Pennsylvania.Plaintiff sought discovery information from Shutler, a West Virginia company that was a nonparty to the litigation in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s order quashing the subpoena, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the category of information in the subpoena that sought business records for a one-year period, including that names and addresses of Shutler’s customers, was unduly burdensome; and (2) affirmed the attorney fee award regarding the fees counsel for Shutler incurred in its initial response to the petition for a subpoena duces tecum and reversed the attorney fee award regarding fees counsel for Shutler incurred in connection with Plaintiff’s W.Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. View "Kahle's Kitchens, Inc. v. Shutler Cabinets, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Garland DeCourcy’s petition for writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the circuit court from proceeding in this action brought by William Williams to recover a computer, telephone system, and keys to a vehicle from DeCourcy. After a bench trial in magistrate court, DeCourcy was ordered to return certain property to Williams. DeCourcy appealed and filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that Williams could not meet his burden of proof because the evidence should be limited to the evidence presented to the magistrate court. The circuit court ruled that a trial de novo authorized it to consider additional evidence, including witness testimony not presented in magistrate court. DeCourcy then filed this petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) an appeal of a civil action tried before a magistrate without a jury under W. Va. Code 50-5-12(b) shall be a trial de novo, meaning a new trial in which the parties may present new evidence including witness testimony not presented in magistrate court; and (2) the circuit court did not err in its determination that new evidence, including witness testimony, was proper in this appeal from magistrate court. View "State ex rel. DeCourcy v. Honorable Jennifer P. Dent" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals requiring the Supreme Court to interpret various provisions of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Rule (WVSCMRR), W.Va. CSR 38-2-1, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that the WVSCMRR does not require a coal company, in its application for modification of its mining permit, to demonstrate compliance with the Utility Protection Standard found at W.Va. 38-2-14.17; (2) did not err in ruling that the permit application sufficiently described how the coal operator would comply with the Utility Protection Standard; but (3) erred in finding that the WVSCMRR applied regardless of a coal operator’s common law property rights. View "Texas Eastern Transmission v. W. Va. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

At issue was the admissibility of expert testimony valuing wetland property for the purpose of just compensation in a condemnation proceeding where the highest and best use of the wetlands was determined to be the development of a wetlands mitigation bank. The Supreme Court held (1) the highest and best use of the wetland property as a mitigation bank may be considered in a condemnation proceeding to the extent that such a factor would be weighed in negotiations between private persons participating in a voluntary sale and purchase of the land at the time it was taken; (2) however, the market price of mitigation credits that ultimately may be produced from the property cannot be the sole basis for measuring the land’s value in determining just compensation; and (3) because the expert testimony at issue in this case provided a value that was based solely upon the market price of mitigation credits that could be developed from the land, as opposed to the fair market value of the land itself in a voluntary transaction between a knowledgeable buyer and seller, the circuit court erred in admitting that testimony. The court remanded the case for a new trial. View "W. Va. Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. CDS Family Trust, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the City of Fairmont, which entered into a lease purchase agreement for equipment with Comvest, Ltd., may assert claims and defenses against Blue Ridge Bank - to whom Comvest assigned its interest in the lease purchase agreement, including its right to the City’s monthly payments - based on Comvest’s conversion of funds designated for the purchase of the equipment. The Supreme Court held (1) the Bank took its assignment subject to the City’s claims and defenses arising from Comvest’s breach of the lease purchase agreement; and (2) therefore, the City may assert claims and defenses against the Bank based on Comvest’s conversion. View "Blue Ridge Bank, Inc. v. City of Fairmont" on Justia Law

The felony offense of driving on a license revoked for driving under the influence (DUI) does not involve actual or threatened violence.Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment under the recidivist statute based upon a predicate felony conviction for unlawful assault and two prior felony convictions for driving while license revoked for DUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that his life sentence was not proportionate because the two prior felony offenses did not involve actual or threatened violence. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s sentence, holding that the recidivist life sentence imposed on Defendant based upon the predicate felony conviction for unlawful assault, together with two prior non-violent felony convictions, violated the proportionality principle in W. Va. Const. art. III, 5. View "State v. Kilmer" on Justia Law

In this dispute between the West Virginia State Lottery, the Lottery Commission, the Lottery Director (collectively, the State Lottery) and certain entities issued permits to operate limited video lottery game terminals (Permit Holders), the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying the State Lottery’s denial of its motion to dismiss on the grounds that it waived its sovereign and qualified immunity defenses. The dispute arose after the State Lottery instructed the Permit Holders that they would be required to use a different software program at their expense. The Permit Holders alleged a taking without just compensation, deprivation of property without due process, and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court held (1) the State Lottery did not waive its rights to sovereign and qualified immunity; and (2) because the circuit court did not make any findings or inquiries relating to qualified immunity, this case must be remanded for a determination of whether the State Lottery was qualifiedly immune under the circumstances. View "West Virginia Lottery v. A-1 Amusement, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation’s (Hospital) motion to dismiss Dr. Tuan Nguyen’s (Physician) claims alleging that the Hospital discriminated and retaliated against him for reporting patient safety concerns. The Hospital sought dismissal under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Physician’s claims were linked to its decision not to reappoint him to its medical staff, and therefore, it enjoyed qualified immunity pursuant to Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 404 S.E. 2d 750 (W. Va. 1991). The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Physician’s claims were distinguishable from Mahmoodian; and (2) accordingly, Physician sufficiently pled his causes of action to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corp. v. Nguyen" on Justia Law