Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Defendant’s post-trial motions following an adverse jury verdict in this “deliberate intention” action.The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in this personal injury action, finding that Defendant acted with “deliberate intent.” Defendant filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, a motion for a new trial and a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The trial court denied the motions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to satisfy all of the statutory requirements for a “deliberate intention” claim. View "FirstEnergy Generation, LLC v. Muto" on Justia Law

A condition of parole prohibiting Respondent, a registered sex offender, from possessing or having contact with a computer or other device with internet access was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.Respondent challenged the West Virginia Parole Board’s decision to revoke his parole. The circuit court vacated the Board’s decision, partly on the ground that Respondent’s special condition of parole prohibiting his possession or contact with a computer with internet access was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Respondent’s condition of parole was broader than the statute struck down in Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730 (2017), which barred registered sex offenders from accessing social media networking websites, it was an overboard restriction of free speech in violation of the First Amendment. View "Mutter v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting Plaintiff’s petition for declaratory judgment. In the order, the circuit court ruled that Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company was required to provide Plaintiff, Erie’s insured, with the statutory minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage for an ATV that Plaintiff was towing when he was struck by an at-fault, uninsured motorist. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court correctly granted declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the coverage issue; and (2) Erie’s challenge to the circuit court’s order denying its motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s separate claims for common law bad faith and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act was an interlocutory matter and not subject to appeal at this time. View "Erie Insurance Co. v. Dolly" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition sought by Southland Properties LLC against the circuit court for denying Southland’s alleged right to intervene in an action instituted under W. Va. Code 11A-3-60 (section 60 proceedings) by Kenneth Jones. Jones sought to compel the Deputy Commissioner of Delinquent and Nonentered Lands of Marion County to deliver deeds to two tracts of land Jones purchased at a tax sale. The Deputy Commissioner declined to issue the deeds to Jones because the statutory timeframe for issuance of the deeds following the tax sale had passed. Southland, which owned the properties at issue and failed to pay property taxes for several years, moved to intervene in the section 60 proceeding on the grounds that it was an indispensable party. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Southland’s motion to intervene, holding that Southland was not an indispensable party to the section 60 proceedings because Southland made no attempt to redeem and its ownership interest as a delinquent taxpayer was predicated on redemption. View "State ex rel. Southland Properties, LLC v. Honorable David R. Janes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for accessory to murder and conspiracy to commit murder and his sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, holding that none of Defendant’s assignments of error warranted reversal. Specifically, the Court held (1) the circuit court’s refusal to grant Defendant’s third motion for a continuance did not result in prejudice to Defendant; (2) the circuit court did not err by refusing to grant a discovery violation against the State; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting autopsy photographs of the victim; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of first degree murder. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the circuit court’s reversal of a permanent alimony award, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and remanded the case for reinstatement of the family court’s order awarding Wife permanent alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month, holding that the circuit court’s overturning of the family court’s findings was in error.The family court ordered Husband to pay permanent alimony to Wife in the amount of $1,500 per month. The circuit court reversed the award and remanded to the family court for calculation of spousal support “in accordance” with its order. On remand, the family court ordered Husband to pay Wife $439.02 per month. The circuit court refused Wife’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in overturning the family court’s findings and inexplicably replaced the family court’s credibility determinations with determinations of its own. View "Cowger v. Cowger" on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in applying the grandparent preference contained in W. Va. Code 49-4-114(a)(3) when it permanently selected the grandparents of twins K.E. and K.E. for permanent placement.The twins were in foster care when the circuit court terminated the parental rights of their biological parents. Both the twins’ foster parents and their paternal grandparents sought to provide the twins with a permanent home. The circuit court ruled that the twins should be permanently placed with their grandparents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the best interest of the twins were best served by permanent placement with their foster parents, not their grandparents. View "In re K.E." on Justia Law

The circuit court erred in applying the grandparent preference contained in W. Va. Code 49-4-114(a)(3) when it permanently selected the grandparents of twins K.E. and K.E. for permanent placement.The twins were in foster care when the circuit court terminated the parental rights of their biological parents. Both the twins’ foster parents and their paternal grandparents sought to provide the twins with a permanent home. The circuit court ruled that the twins should be permanently placed with their grandparents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the best interest of the twins were best served by permanent placement with their foster parents, not their grandparents. View "In re K.E." on Justia Law

In this action brought by Plaintiff alleging a deliberate intent claim and violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (Act) the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s rulings and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the action and compelling arbitration.Plaintiff instituted this civil action against Hampden Coal, LLC, his employer, and his supervisor alleging a deliberate intent claim related to his workplace injury and two violations of the Act arising from his demotion. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement Appellant signed as a condition of his employment. The circuit court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss and refused to compel arbitration, concluding, among other things, that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it lacked consideration and was both substantively and procedurally unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) more stringent or different standards do not apply to consideration of arbitration agreements in the employment context; (2) the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes served as consideration for the agreement; (3) the agreement was neither substantively or procedurally unconscionable; (4) Plaintiff’s claims did not fall outside the scope of the agreement; and (5) the circuit court erred in finding that the agreement was an employment contract. View "Hampden Coal, LLC v. Varney" on Justia Law

J.G. was born at 34 weeks’ gestation with drugs in his system. Noting mother’s prior involuntary termination of parental rights, the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed an abuse and neglect petition. J.G. was placed in foster care with petitioners in February 2015 and remains there. J.G. requires medical monitoring and treatment. The birth parents canceled multiple visits, frequently fell asleep during visits, failed to return calls from DHHR, and had multiple positive drug screens. The circuit court granted a six-month improvement period. DHHR indicated that the improvement period was a failure. Subsequent psychological evaluations indicated little likelihood that the parents would improve. The court granted another six-month improvement period, during which the parents were evicted, had positive drug tests, and engaged in a physical altercation. The court granted two more six-month improvement periods. During an overnight visit, a CPS worker arrived at the parents’ home to pick up J.G and observed large amounts of blood. She found J.G., screaming and in a saturated diaper, on the bed beside his father, who was unresponsive. Mother “was high as a kite.” The guardian ad litem and DHHR requested termination. Despite observations that the infant was bonded with the foster family and that returning J.G., to the parents “could be traumatizing” and continuing positive drug screens, the court ordered transition of J.G., to the parents’ custody. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed. The circuit court failed to comply with the requirements of West Virginia Code 49-4-610 and the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect and abused its discretion in failing to terminate parental rights. View "In re: J.G., II" on Justia Law