Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Mass Litigation Panel through which summary judgment was granted in favor of Defendants, Pfizer, Inc., Roerig, a division of Pfizer, Inc., and Greenstone, LLC (collectively, Pfizer) on Plaintiffs’ claims that Pfizer negligently failed adequately to warn them of the risk of birth defects through the ingestion of Zoloft, a prescription medication, during pregnancy.The Court held (1) this was a case where expert testimony was necessary, and therefore, the Panel did not erroneously based its decision on the absence of expert testimony to support Plaintiffs’ claims that Pfizer failed adequately to warn women of childbearing age of the risks of Zoloft; (2) Petitioners could not sustain their evidentiary burden with Pfizer’s witnesses; and (3) there was no unfairness in requiring Plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof with expert testimony under the circumstances of this case. View "J.C. v. Pfizer, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Mass Litigation Panel through which summary judgment was granted in favor of Defendants, Pfizer, Inc., Roerig, a division of Pfizer, Inc., and Greenstone, LLC (collectively, Pfizer) on Plaintiffs’ claims that Pfizer negligently failed adequately to warn them of the risk of birth defects through the ingestion of Zoloft, a prescription medication, during pregnancy.The Court held (1) this was a case where expert testimony was necessary, and therefore, the Panel did not erroneously based its decision on the absence of expert testimony to support Plaintiffs’ claims that Pfizer failed adequately to warn women of childbearing age of the risks of Zoloft; (2) Petitioners could not sustain their evidentiary burden with Pfizer’s witnesses; and (3) there was no unfairness in requiring Plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof with expert testimony under the circumstances of this case. View "J.C. v. Pfizer, Inc." on Justia Law

There is no cause of action in West Virginia for failure to warn and negligent misrepresentation against a branded drug manufacturer when the drug ingested was produced by a generic manufacturer.Petitioners, Kimmy and Larry McNair, filed an action against Respondent, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, alleging that Kimmy developed acute respiratory distress after ingestion the generic drug levofloxacin that was manufactured by Dr. Reddy’s Laboraties Limited. Janssen originally trademarked and sold levofloxacin under the brand Levaquin and produced the warnings on the label that accompanied the distribution of the drug, which were subsequently used by generic manufacturers of levofloxacin. The McNairs alleged that Janssen had exclusive control of the content of the warning for both the brand-name and generic forms of the drug and was therefore liable for their alleged injuries. The federal district court granted summary judgment to Janssen, finding that because Janssen did not manufacture the product ingested by Kimmy, there was no basis on which to hold Janssen liable. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court a question of law. In answering as set forth above, the Supreme Court declined to expand its products liability law. View "McNair v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

The biological child of a deceased parent whose parental rights were either voluntarily relinquished or involuntarily terminated prior to the parent’s death does not meet the statutory definition of a descendant of the parent and therefore does not qualify to inherit under the descent and distribution provisions of the West Virginia Code when the parent dies intestate.Plaintiff appealed the circuit court’s award of summary judgment to Defendants. The award was based upon the circuit court’s conclusion that a child may not inherit from a parent who died intestate after his parental rights to that child were legally terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s determination that Plaintiff may not inherit from her father’s intestate estate because a parent whose parental rights have been terminated does not meet the definition of a “parent” set out in W. Va. Code 42-1-1. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated for want of subject-matter jurisdiction a family court order granting permanent guardianship of three children to their maternal grandparents.This case was originally removed to family court to circuit court because the preceding petition for temporary guardianship was based on allegations of abuse and neglect. However, contrary to the Rules of Practice and Procedure of Minor Guardianship Proceedings and the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court, the circuit court remanded this case back to family court to proceed as a guardianship case rather than an abuse and neglect case. The Supreme Court held that because the allegations of abuse and neglect were substantiated, the circuit court erred in concluding that a then-temporary guardianship order negated the need for the abuse and neglect petition and therefore erred in remanding the matter to family court. View "In re Guardianship of K.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants, the Town of Grantsville and its police chief, holding that the claims set forth in the complaint were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.After the Office of Administrative Hearsing reversed the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles’ revocation of Plaintiff’s driving privileges, Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against the police chief and alleging the negligent employment of the police chief against the town. The circuit court dismissed the complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Richards v. Walker" on Justia Law

The order of the Tax Commissioner of the State of West Virginia penalizing Ashland Specialty Company, Inc. (Ashland) $159,398 for unlawfully selling 12,230 packs of cigarettes in West Virginia that were not approved for sale - a penalty equal to 500 percent of the cigarettes’ retail value - was not an abuse of discretion.The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) ordered the Commissioner’s penalty reduced by twenty-five percent, finding the Commissioner’s original penalty to be erroneous, unlawful, void, or otherwise invalid. The circuit court reversed the order of the OTA and reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the OTA when it reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty; (2) the Commissioner’s penalty was not an abuse of the discretion afforded him by W. Va. Code 16-9D-8(a) and need not be cancelled or reduced due to circumstances that allegedly mitigated their unlawful cigarette sales; and (3) the Commissioner’s penalty did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the West Virginia Constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Ashland Specialty Co., Inc. v. Steager, State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The circuit court violated the requirements of W.Va. Code 62-12-11 by imposing a second five-year probationary period upon Petitioner.Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny and received a five-year probationary period. The initial probation period commenced on March 24, 2011. On February 10, 2016, approximately one month before Petitioner’s five-year probation period was set to expire, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, contending that Petitioner had failed to make his required restitution payments. Petitioner admitted to the violation. The circuit court subsequently revoked Petitioner’s probation by order dated March 16, 2016 and imposed a second five-year probation period. Petitioner argued that the circuit court had violated section 62-12-11 by extending his probation beyond the original five-year period. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the restrictions of section 62-12-11 prohibited the circuit court from imposing a second five-year probationary period. View "State v. Cookman" on Justia Law

The circuit court violated the requirements of W.Va. Code 62-12-11 by imposing a second five-year probationary period upon Petitioner.Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny and received a five-year probationary period. The initial probation period commenced on March 24, 2011. On February 10, 2016, approximately one month before Petitioner’s five-year probation period was set to expire, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, contending that Petitioner had failed to make his required restitution payments. Petitioner admitted to the violation. The circuit court subsequently revoked Petitioner’s probation by order dated March 16, 2016 and imposed a second five-year probation period. Petitioner argued that the circuit court had violated section 62-12-11 by extending his probation beyond the original five-year period. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the restrictions of section 62-12-11 prohibited the circuit court from imposing a second five-year probationary period. View "State v. Cookman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Plaintiff and vesting title to Defendant’s home to Plaintiff, holding that because there was no dispute that Plaintiff failed to have notice to redeem mailed to Defendant’s address, as required by W. Va. Code 11A-3-22(d), the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.As a result of Defendant’s property taxes not having been paid, the county sheriff held an action to sell the tax lien on Defendant’s home. Plaintiff purchased the tax lien on the property at the auction. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to have Defendant notified by mail and newspaper publications of her right to redeem the property. A deed to the property was subsequently conveyed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed this proceeding to quiet title to the property. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit court with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant, set aside Defendant’s tax deed to her home, and determine the amount to be paid by defendant to redeem the property, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted. View "Archuleta v. US Liens, LLC" on Justia Law