Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants, the Town of Grantsville and its police chief, holding that the claims set forth in the complaint were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.After the Office of Administrative Hearsing reversed the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles’ revocation of Plaintiff’s driving privileges, Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against the police chief and alleging the negligent employment of the police chief against the town. The circuit court dismissed the complaint as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Richards v. Walker" on Justia Law

The order of the Tax Commissioner of the State of West Virginia penalizing Ashland Specialty Company, Inc. (Ashland) $159,398 for unlawfully selling 12,230 packs of cigarettes in West Virginia that were not approved for sale - a penalty equal to 500 percent of the cigarettes’ retail value - was not an abuse of discretion.The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) ordered the Commissioner’s penalty reduced by twenty-five percent, finding the Commissioner’s original penalty to be erroneous, unlawful, void, or otherwise invalid. The circuit court reversed the order of the OTA and reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the OTA when it reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty; (2) the Commissioner’s penalty was not an abuse of the discretion afforded him by W. Va. Code 16-9D-8(a) and need not be cancelled or reduced due to circumstances that allegedly mitigated their unlawful cigarette sales; and (3) the Commissioner’s penalty did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the West Virginia Constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Ashland Specialty Co., Inc. v. Steager, State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The circuit court violated the requirements of W.Va. Code 62-12-11 by imposing a second five-year probationary period upon Petitioner.Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny and received a five-year probationary period. The initial probation period commenced on March 24, 2011. On February 10, 2016, approximately one month before Petitioner’s five-year probation period was set to expire, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, contending that Petitioner had failed to make his required restitution payments. Petitioner admitted to the violation. The circuit court subsequently revoked Petitioner’s probation by order dated March 16, 2016 and imposed a second five-year probation period. Petitioner argued that the circuit court had violated section 62-12-11 by extending his probation beyond the original five-year period. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the restrictions of section 62-12-11 prohibited the circuit court from imposing a second five-year probationary period. View "State v. Cookman" on Justia Law

The circuit court violated the requirements of W.Va. Code 62-12-11 by imposing a second five-year probationary period upon Petitioner.Petitioner was convicted of petit larceny and received a five-year probationary period. The initial probation period commenced on March 24, 2011. On February 10, 2016, approximately one month before Petitioner’s five-year probation period was set to expire, the State filed a motion to revoke probation, contending that Petitioner had failed to make his required restitution payments. Petitioner admitted to the violation. The circuit court subsequently revoked Petitioner’s probation by order dated March 16, 2016 and imposed a second five-year probation period. Petitioner argued that the circuit court had violated section 62-12-11 by extending his probation beyond the original five-year period. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the restrictions of section 62-12-11 prohibited the circuit court from imposing a second five-year probationary period. View "State v. Cookman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Plaintiff and vesting title to Defendant’s home to Plaintiff, holding that because there was no dispute that Plaintiff failed to have notice to redeem mailed to Defendant’s address, as required by W. Va. Code 11A-3-22(d), the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.As a result of Defendant’s property taxes not having been paid, the county sheriff held an action to sell the tax lien on Defendant’s home. Plaintiff purchased the tax lien on the property at the auction. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to have Defendant notified by mail and newspaper publications of her right to redeem the property. A deed to the property was subsequently conveyed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed this proceeding to quiet title to the property. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit court with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant, set aside Defendant’s tax deed to her home, and determine the amount to be paid by defendant to redeem the property, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted. View "Archuleta v. US Liens, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court revising the order of the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoking Petitioner’s driver’s license after he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that Petitioner suffered actual and substantial prejudice as a result of a post-hearing delay by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).When Petitioner challenged the revocation by appeal, the OAH conducted a hearing but then took no action for two and a half years. The OAH eventually affirmed the revocation. The circuit court reversed the revocation. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded for reinstatement of the DMV’s order revoking Petitioner’s driver’s license, holding that the circuit court’s finding of prejudice was erroneous. View "Reed v. Boley" on Justia Law

In this action alleging claims under the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, W. Va. Code 22-31 to 22-3-38, the Supreme Court answered several questions of law certified to it by the federal court. The Court answered, inter alia, that (1) a 1902 deed provision transferring the right to mine coal “without leaving any support for the overlying strata and without liability for any injury which may result to the surface from the breaking of said strata” prohibits a surface owner from pursuing a common law claim for loss of support arising from subsidence caused by the extraction of the coal from below the surface; (2) assuming the surface lands and residence of a landowner have been materially damaged from subsidence that is a natural result of underground mining, the surface owner is limited to the remedies provided for in the West Virginia Code of State Rules 38-2-16.2.c to 38-2-16.2.c.2; and (3) if a surface owner proves that his or her person or property was injured through a coal operator’s violation of a rule, order, or permit, the surface owner can receive monetary compensation for such injury pursuant to W. Va. Code 22-3-25(f). View "McElroy Coal Co. v. Schoene" on Justia Law

The circuit court found merit in Petitioners’ assignments of error regarding attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest in this litigation in which a jury awarded Respondent damages on his breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1.5 million and prejudgment interest in the amount of $959,000.Respondent and his brothers and sisters owned three corporations and one limited partnership. After Respondent’s employment with one corporation was terminated and his shares and interest in the remaining entities were redeemed, Respondent sued his four siblings and the four entities (collectively, Petitioners). Respondent prevailed after an eleven-day trial. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioners were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Respondent’s breach of contract and fiduciary duty claims; (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees without making sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Respondent’s entitlement to the sum awarded or its reasonableness; and (3) the circuit court erred by finding that the entire jury verdict in this case, net of offsets, constituted “special damages” subject to W. Va. Code 56-3-31 and awarding Respondent prejudgment interest. View "Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Coyne" on Justia Law

Under the plain language of W. Va. Code 23-4-8, the claims administrator did not have discretion to deny Claimant reimbursement for his meal expense he incurred while attending a required medical examination on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging.Claimant, who applied for workers’ compensation benefits, was ordered by his claims administrator to attend a medical examination 100 miles away from from his home. Claimant ate one meal while attending the medical examination. The claims administrator denied Claimant’s request for reimbursement for the meal expense he incurred on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review affirmed the denial of Claimant’s request for meal reimbursement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims administrator violated the clear mandate in section 23-4-8 that Claimant be reimbursed for his reasonable travel expenses. View "Silveti v. Ohio Valley Nursing Home, Inc." on Justia Law

Under the plain language of W. Va. Code 23-4-8, the claims administrator did not have discretion to deny Claimant reimbursement for his meal expense he incurred while attending a required medical examination on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging.Claimant, who applied for workers’ compensation benefits, was ordered by his claims administrator to attend a medical examination 100 miles away from from his home. Claimant ate one meal while attending the medical examination. The claims administrator denied Claimant’s request for reimbursement for the meal expense he incurred on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review affirmed the denial of Claimant’s request for meal reimbursement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims administrator violated the clear mandate in section 23-4-8 that Claimant be reimbursed for his reasonable travel expenses. View "Silveti v. Ohio Valley Nursing Home, Inc." on Justia Law