Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the West Virginia Public Service Commission (PSC) finding that it did not have statutory jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s complaint challenging the Greater Harrison County Public Service District’s (the District) rate increase, holding that the District was not subject to the PSC’s jurisdiction with regard to ratemaking authority.In 2015, the Legislature adopted deregulation measures to limit the PSC’s jurisdiction and to exempt larger public service districts from the requirement that the district obtain approval from he PSC before changing the rates it charged for water or sewer service. After 2015, larger public service districts, statutory defined as having at least 4,500 customers, were only required to obtain approval of a rate change from a local elected body. After the Harrison County Commission approved a rate increase sought by the District, Petitioner, a District customer, brought suit arguing that the PSC had jurisdiction because the District did not have at least 4,500 customers. The PSC found that the District provided service to at least 4,500 customers, and thus, it did not have jurisdiction to examine the District’s rate increase. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pool v. Greater Harrison County Public Service District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Board of Review in these consolidated workers’ compensation cases, holding that the four claimants’ applications for occupational pneumoconiosis (OP) benefits were properly rejected pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-15(b).Section 23-4-15(b) provides that a claimant may either file an OP claim within three years of the claimant’s date of last exposure to the hazards of OP or within three years of the date a diagnosed impairment due to OP was made known to the claimant by a physician. None of the claimants here filed an application within three years of their date of last exposure. Relying on the second time limitation, however, the claimants asserted that because they were not informed by a physician that they had a diagnosed impairment due to OP, they were not barred from filing new claims with the same date of last exposure as in their prior claims. The Supreme Court ruled that the claims were properly rejected, holding that the claimants’ interpretation of the statute was unconvincing. View "Pennington v. W.Va. Office of Insurance Commissioner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Service Commission finding that the Jefferson County Public Service District may “indefinitely delay” a project to upgrade its sewer service, holding that the Commission did not exceed its authority or make factual findings that were not supported by adequate evidence and that the substantive result of the Commission’s order was not improper.The Supreme Court may reserve an order of the Commission when it exceeded its authority, it made factual findings that were not supported by adequate evidence, and the substantive result of the order was not proper. In affirming the Commission’s order, the Court held that, under the facts of this case, none of these three situations applied. View "Jefferson County Citizens for Economic Preservation v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the municipal court's prosecution of him, holding that the prosecution of Petitioner pursuant to this complaint was in violation of W. Va. art. VIII, 11 and W Va. Code 8-11-1(a).Petitioner was charged with a criminal complaint issued from the Masontown Municipal Court with ten violations of the West Virginia Code. In his petition, Petitioner argued that he was not prosecuted within the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the prosecution was outside the statute of limitations and raising two issues of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions that the circuit court grant the writ of prohibition, holding (1) the record was devoid of any evidence that Masontown adopted, as municipal ordinances, any provisions of the West Virginia Code upon which the complaint against Petitioner was based; and (2) therefore, the Municipal Court of Masontown was proceeding in excess of its jurisdiction. View "Lewis v. Municipality of Masontown, W. Va." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner, the Honorable Margaret L. Workman, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, and halted the impeachment proceedings against her, holding that the prosecution of Petitioner for the allegations set forth in Article IV, Article VI, and Article XIV of the Articles of Impeachment was prohibited.Petitioner was impeached on three of the eleven Articles of Impeachment approved by the House of Delegates. Articles IV and VI alleged that Petitioner improperly authorized the overpayment of senior-status judges, and Article XIV included charges that Petitioner and three other justices failed to implement various administrative policies and procedures. Petitioner filed this proceeding to have the Articles of Impeachment against her dismissed, naming as Respondents the president and president pro tempore of the Senate, the clerk of the Senate, and the West Virginia Senate. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding (1) the prosecution of Petitioner for the allegations at issue violated the separation of powers doctrine; (2) Respondents lacked jurisdiction over the alleged violations in Articles IV and VI and lacked jurisdiction over the alleged violation in Article XIV as drafted; and (3) the failure to set forth findings of fact and to pass a resolution adopting the Articles of Impeachment violated due process principles. View "State ex rel. Workman v. Carmichael" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ sought by Petitioners requesting the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing Respondent, the West Virginia Secretary of State, to list Donald Blankenship as a candidate for the United States Senate on the general election ballot as the nominee of the Constitution Party of West Virginia, holding that there was no legal right in Petitioners to the relief sought and no legal duty on the part of Respondent to do the thing which Petitioners sought to compel.Specifically, the Court held (1) W. Va. Code 3-5-23(a) prohibits unsuccessful primary candidates from running as nomination-certificate candidates in the general election; (2) the ballot access restriction in section 3-5-23(a) is constitutional; and (3) because Blankenship unsuccessfully ran in the 2018 Republican primary election, he was now prohibited from gaining access to the 2018 general election ballot for the same office by means of a nomination-certificate candidacy. View "State ex rel. Blankenship v. Warner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition sought by Foster Parents and remanded this case with directions to the circuit court to vacate its order granting Biological Parents post-dispositional improvement periods in excess of statutory time limitations, to grant Foster Parents’ motion to intervene, and to schedule this matter for disposition.After eight weeks in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, J.L. was placed into foster care with Foster Parents. Biological Parents admitted to abuse and neglect, and a post-adjudicatory improvement period was ordered for each. Foster Parents moved to intervene, but the circuit court denied the motion. Upon the request of the guardian ad litem to revoke Biological Parents’ improvement periods, the circuit court awarded a six-month post-dispositional improvement period to Biological Parents. The Supreme Court granted Foster Parents’ requested writ of prohibition, holding (1) Foster Parents were absolutely entitled to participate in all court proceedings by virtue of W. Va. 49-4-601(h); (2) foster parents are entitled to intervention as a matter of right when the time limitations contained in W. Va. Code 49-4-605(b) and/or 49-4-610(b) are implicated; and (3) upon issuance of the writ, the circuit court is directed to schedule this matter for disposition at its earliest opportunity. View "State ex rel. C.H. v. Honorable Laura V. Faircloth" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court setting aside the jury’s verdict in favor of Defendants for insufficient evidence and granting Plaintiff a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in this case.Plaintiff proved at trial that she had a written easement to cross Defendants’ land. Defendants, however, introduced evidence that Plaintiff had abandoned the written easement through decades of nonuse. During trial, Plaintiff never objected or filed a motion that challenged the sufficiency of Defendants’ evidence. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants and on appeal, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a new trial, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support Defendants’ abandonment theory. The circuit court granted the motion and set aside the jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiff did not file a motion challenging the sufficiency of evidence at trial, before the jury returned a verdict, and because the jury’s verdict had support in the record, the circuit court abused its discretion in setting aside the jury’s verdict and in granting a new trial. View "McInarnay v. Hall" on Justia Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court setting aside the jury’s verdict in favor of Defendants for insufficient evidence and granting Plaintiff a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in this case.Plaintiff proved at trial that she had a written easement to cross Defendants’ land. Defendants, however, introduced evidence that Plaintiff had abandoned the written easement through decades of nonuse. During trial, Plaintiff never objected or filed a motion that challenged the sufficiency of Defendants’ evidence. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants and on appeal, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a new trial, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support Defendants’ abandonment theory. The circuit court granted the motion and set aside the jury’s verdict for insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiff did not file a motion challenging the sufficiency of evidence at trial, before the jury returned a verdict, and because the jury’s verdict had support in the record, the circuit court abused its discretion in setting aside the jury’s verdict and in granting a new trial. View "McInarnay v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review concluding that Employer could reclaim temporary total disability benefits it paid to a claimant for an extra 156 days beyond the date Employer was statutorily required to pay, holding that the overpayment decision violated W.Va. Code 23-4-1c(h).Employer paid benefits to a claimant for almost two-and-a-half years while the claimant was undergoing medical and physical rehabilitation. When Employer discovered it had paid the claimant benefits for 156 days beyond what it was required to pay, Employer declared those days an overpayment and sought to recover the benefits from the claimant. A claims examiner concluded that Employer could reclaim those benefits under this state’s workers’ compensation laws. The Board of Review upheld the decisions regarding overpayment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employer wholly failed to follow the process set forth in section 23-4-1c(h). View "Reed v. Exel Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law