Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court finding a delegation clause in an arbitration agreement unconscionable and refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement, holding that the delegation clause was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable.Respondent, who was terminated from her employment, filed workers' compensation discrimination claims against Petitioners. Petitioner moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement that Respondent signed at the time she was hired. The circuit court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on the grounds that the agreement's delegation clause was ambiguous, unconscionable and in violation of W. Va. Code 23-2-7. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the delegation clause clearly and unmistakably showed the parties' intent to send gateway questions of arbitration to an arbitrator; (2) the delegation clause was valid; and (3) the circuit court should have referred the parties' arguments about the enforceability of the arbitration agreement to the arbitrator. View "Rent-A-Center Inc. v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the determination of the Board of Equalization and Review that Petitioners Murray Energy Corporation and Consolidation Coal Company's coal interests were properly valued and assessed by Defendants, holding that the circuit court properly concluded that the method of valuing coal properties violated neither the statutory requirement of assessment at "true and actual value" nor the constitutional equality requirements of the West Virginia Constitution and the equal protection provisions of the United States and West Virginia Constitutions.Specifically, the Court held (1) the methodology of valuing Petitioners' coal properties for ad valorem tax valuation purposes, as set forth in West Virginia Code of State Rules 110-1I-1 et seq., does not violate the requirement set forth in W. Va. Code 11-6K-1(a) that natural resources property be assessed based upon its "true and actual value"; and (2) the valuation methodology contained in the Code of State Rules does not violate the equality provision of W. Va. Const. art. X, 1 or the equal protection provisions of the United States and West Virginia Constitutions. View "Murray Energy Corp. v. Steager" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's second amended motion for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner pled guilty by information to first-degree murder. Petitioner later filed his second amended habeas petition asserting (1) his guilty plea by information was illegal under the West Virginia Constitution and Rule 7 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure because he faced a life sentence; (2) his guilty plea was involuntary; and (3) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the guilty plea by information did not comport with Rule 7, Petitioner waived his argument as to that irregularity when he waived his constitutional right to an indictment; (2) Petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary; and (3) Petitioner failed to establish deficient performance by trial counsel. View "Montgomery v. Ballard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed two orders of the Public Service Commission (PSC) interpreting and applying regulations it adopted to give effect to the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., holding that there was no error in the PSC's decision.In the orders at issue, the PSC interpreted its PURPA-based regulations as applying to ad agreement between a small power plant and a traditional electric utility and applied the regulations to find that the agreement, with modification, was "just and reasonable" to the electric utility's consumers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PSC's decision was not contrary to the evidence, without evidence to support it, or arbitrary and that the PSC's approach was within the bounds of PURPA's requirement. View "Sierra Club v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

In this matter arising from a condemnation proceeding initiated by the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, the Supreme Court accepted questions certified by the circuit court and answered, among other things, that when the DOT initiates a condemnation proceeding that involves a partial taking of land in connection with a highway construction project and when, as a result of the project, a residue tract not needed by the State for public road purposes has been rendered landlocked, a court cannot require the Division of Highways to acquire the landlocked residue by condemnation.The federally-funded highway construction project in this case resulted in residue property being rendered landlocked. The Supreme Court answered questions certified to it by the circuit court and answered, under the circumstances of this case, that (1) the question of whether the residue has become an "uneconomic remnant" is not a question of fact to be determined by a jury; (2) the Division of Highways, over the objection of the landowner, may mitigate the damage to the residue by restoring reasonable public road access thereto; and (3) the trial court cannot require the Division to acquire the landlocked residue by condemnation. View "West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. Echols" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court that affirmed an order of the Randolph County Commission affirming the findings of its special fiduciary commissioner as to Joann Fussell's claims against the Estate of Roger G. Fussell and her objections to the estate appraisement, holding that the circuit court did not err.Specifically, the Court held that the circuit court correctly found (1) two bank notes obtained by Joann were just debts of the Estate; (2) Joann was not a creditor beneficiary of a life insurance policy on the life of Roger; and (3) Joann's fair market value written appraisals in West Virginia and Georgia were properly considered by the special fiduciary commissioner to establish fair market value. View "Estate of Fussell v. Fussell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court determining disposition of Petitioner's child without first allowing him a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the dispositional hearing, which resulted in the child being placed in the legal and physical custody of guardians, holding that Petitioner must be afforded a full and complete opportunity to present witnesses and to testify on his own behalf.Petitioner was the father of one child and the stepfather of the other child. The dispositional order at issue on appeal granted Petitioner a disposition in which parental rights were not terminated but the children were placed in the care, custody, and control of the guardians. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the circuit court erred when it divested him of his rights to parent his child without first allowing him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for the limited purpose of affording Petitioner an opportunity to be heard at the dispositional hearing, which the circuit court had previously denied Petitioner, holding that the circuit court erred when it determined disposition regarding his child without first allowing him a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the dispositional hearing. View "In re T.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction for attempted first-degree murder under a felony-murder theory ("attempted felony-murder"), holding that there is no cognizable crime of attempted felony-murder in West Virginia.Petitioner was indicted on eight counts, including attempting first-degree murder. The day before the trial, the State indicated that it would pursue the theory of attempted felony-murder against Petitioner. The circuit court allowed the State to proceed with attempted first-degree-felony-murder. After hearing all of the evidence presented at trial, the jury convicted Petitioner on the charge of attempted felony-murder. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the crime of attempted felony-murder does not exist in the state. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed Petitioner's conviction, holding that attempted felony-murder is not a cognizable crime under West Virginia law because the crime of attempt requires as one of its elements the specific intent to commit the underlying substantive crime and the only way that the transferred intent of felony-murder is achieved is if an actual homicide occurs. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the "order of permanent placement" entered by the circuit court awarding custody of two children to Uncle and Aunt, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, there exists, in the abuse and neglect context, a relative preference other than the preference afforded to grandparents and siblings.In selecting Children's Uncle and Aunt to be the children's permanent custodians, the circuit court determined that a "blood relative" preference exists in addition to the statutory preferences afforded to siblings and grandparents in abuse and neglect proceedings. Foster Parents appealed, arguing that there does not exist a preference for relatives in addition to the grandparent and sibling preferences established by the legislature. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded this case for entry of an order permanently placing the children with Foster Parents, holding (1) the circuit court erred by finding there exists a blood relative preference and relying on that preference as a basis for placing the children with Aunt and Uncle; and (2) the best interests of the children would best be promoted by allowing them to remain in Foster Parents' home. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's felony conviction for two counts of delivery of a controlled substance but reversed the circuit court's order sentencing him to life in prison with mercy in accordance with the recidivist statute, W. Va. Code 61-11-18, holding that the sentence violated the proportionality clause of the state Constitution.The circuit court imposed a recidivist life sentence based upon Petitioner's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance and two prior felony convictions for unlawful wounding and conspiracy to commit the felony of transferring stolen property. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance; but (2) the imposition of a life sentence with mercy was unwarranted and an abuse of discretion. View "State v. Lane" on Justia Law