Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court reversing the order of the Executive Director of the Governor's Committee on Crime, Delinquency, and Corrections (Petitioner) decertifying Respondent as a law enforcement officer in the State of West Virginia, holding that the circuit court applied the incorrect statutory provisions to this matter and the proceedings below.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the circuit court applied the incorrect statutes to define the scope of the Law Enforcement Professional Standards Subcommittee's authority and incorrectly applied the due process protections in employment disputes to a proceeding governing law enforcement professional certification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court applied the incorrect statutory provisions, and therefore, the court also erred in concluding that the civil service hearing proceedings must precede decertification proceedings. View "Thorton v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court denying two hospitals' motion to decertify the class after the court initially certified a class action against the hospitals, holding that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to conduct a sufficiently thorough analysis of whether the commonality required for class certification under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 23 was present.Respondent Phillip Gaujot, a judge of the circuit court, certified the class action against West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. and West Virginia United Health System, Inc. The hospitals moved to decertify the class, but the Judge Gaujot denied the motion. The hospitals then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to prohibit Judge Gaujot from conducting any further proceedings until he vacated his order denying their motion to decertify the class. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition as moulded, holding that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers by certifying the class while failing to conduct a sufficiently thorough analysis of the case to determine whether the commonality required for class certification under Rule 23 was present. View "State ex rel. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Honorable Phillip D. Gaujot" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals from the business court's orders reversing various Boards of Assessment Appeals and rejecting the West Virginia State Tax Department's valuation of Respondents' gas wells for ad valorem tax purposes the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the business court's judgment, holding that the business court erred in two respects.Specifically, the Court held that the business court (1) did not err in concluding that the Tax Department violated the applicable regulations by improperly imposing a cap on Respondents' operating expense deductions; (2) erred in rejecting the Tax Department's interpretation of the applicable regulations concerning the inclusion of post-production expenses in the calculation of the annual industry average operating expenses; and (3) erred in crafting relief permitting an unlimited percentage deduction for operating expenses in lieu of a monetary average. View "Steager v. Consol Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case involving the deaths of seventy-eight minors in 1968 the Supreme Court answered questions of law certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by concluding that the law in effect at the time of the tragedy did not recognize a cause of action for fraudulent concealment with respect to a statutory wrongful death claim.Petitioners were survivors of the seventy-eight miners who were killed in 1968 when methane gas exploded at a mine in Farmington, West Virginia. Petitioners sued Respondent, the parent company of the owner and operator of the mine, alleging that Respondent fraudulently concealed facts regarding the cause of the mine explosion such that Petitioners were prevented from timely pursuing a claim for the wrongful deaths of their decedents. The federal district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim was barred by the then-applicable two-year limitation period and was not tolled by the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The court of appeals certified two questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Court answered that a fraudulent concealment claim is not cognizable when the alleged injury was the plaintiffs' loss of a timely claim for wrongful death and that the second certified question was moot. View "Michael v. Consolidation Coal Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the declaratory judgment order entered by the circuit court interpreting a 1977 quitclaim deed whereby the grantor gave the grantee a parcel of land and entering judgment in favor of the grantee's successors, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's findings.In the deed, the grantor imprecisely defined the parcel's southern border, leaving the questions of whether the grantee received a 93.15-acre parcel or only a 33-acre parcel. The trial court found the 1977 deed was unambiguous and then, after a trial, concluded that the grantee's successors owned the entire 93.15-acre parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's decision was well supported by the record and was not clearly erroneous. View "Harrell v. Cain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting partial summary judgment, finding that Defendant trespassed on Plaintiffs' surface lands to the extent it was drilling for and removing minerals from neighboring properties and awarding Plaintiffs $190,000 in damages, holding that the partial summary judgment order and judgment order were supported by the record.The circuit court found that Defendant trespassed to the extent it used Plaintiffs' surface tracts to conduct operations under neighboring mineral estates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a mineral owner or lessee does not have the right to use the surface to benefit mining or drilling operations on other lands in the absence of an express agreement with the surface owner permitting those operations; and (2) the circuit court correctly found that Defendant trespassed on Plaintiffs' surface lands to the extent it used those lands to extract minerals from neighboring properties. View "EQT Production Co. v. Crowder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of a circuit court order dismissing two counts in Jane Doe's complaint that asserted the Logan County Board of Education and its employees were negligent but affirmed the dismissal of Jane Doe's fiduciary duty claim against the Board, holding that instead of wholly dismissing Doe's negligence claims with prejudice, the circuit court should have first allowed a different option.In dismissing Doe's negligence claims the circuit court concluded that Doe had failed to plead sufficient facts in her complaint to state a claim for relief. The Supreme Court held (1) the negligence claims contained some factual allegations to support aspects of the alleged negligence, and therefore, the circuit court's dismissal, with prejudice, of the negligence claims was in error; and (2) the circuit court properly dismissed Doe's fiduciary duty claim because Doe did not satisfy the requirements of the Tort Claims Act, W. Va. Code 29-12A-1 to -18. View "Doe v. Logan County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the request for extraordinary relief sought by Vanderra Resources, LLC asserting that the circuit court's denial of Vanderra's motion for summary judgment on Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC's claims against it was clearly erroneous and an abuse of the court's power, holding that because the denial of summary judgment was an interlocutory ruling, there was no error.Vanderra was a reclamation contractor hired by Chesapeake to implement a stabilization plan at one of Chesapeake's shale drill pads. While Verderra implemented the plan, earth movement and landslides occurred. Chesapeake filed suit against Vanderra to recover its costs incurred in repairing the collapsed drill pad. Vanderra filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court denied on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed. Vanderra then brought this action for a writ of prohibition, or alternatively mandamus, arguing that the circuit court lacked any factual or evidentiary findings. The Supreme Court denied Vanderra's request, holding that the circuit court did not exceed its legitimate powers when it denied summary judgment. View "State ex rel. Vanderra Resources, LLC v. Honorable David W. Hummel" on Justia Law

In this tort action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's order denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, holding that Respondent failed to demonstrate a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law of which a reasonable person would have known.Respondent brought this action against Petitioners, the West Virginia Division of Natural Resources (DNR) and some of its employees (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that Petitioners committed acts of defamation, false light, infringement of a liberty interest without due process, and reckless infliction of emotional distress. The circuit court denied Petitioners' motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Petitioners' acts or omissions were fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive and whether the individual DNR employees acted outside of their scope of employment; (2) did not err in its findings regarding the timing of the motion for summary judgment; but (3) erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Petitioners were in violation of Respondent's clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known. View "W. Va. Division of Natural Resources v. Dawson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court that terminated Mother's parental rights to her infant son, J.C., holding that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate Mother's parental rights.After an adjudication hearing, the circuit court found that J.C. was neglected and deemed abandoned as an aggravating factor. A dispositional hearing was held and then continued. The hearing reconvened and then was continued a number of times due to Mother's failure to appear. Eventually, the circuit court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the abuse and neglect petition because there was no evidence to show that any of the subject matter requirements of W. Va. Code 48-20-201(a) were satisfied. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law