Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment ruling that Lawrence Pifer and Michael Pifer were entitled to damages related to condemnation blight and the jury's award of damages for condemnation blight but reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to recalculate interest on the award in accordance with W. Va. Code 54-2-14a, holding that the trial court erred when calculating interest on the jury award.The Pifers were operators of a family business operated on a 2.45 acre parcel. The Division of Highways filed a petition to condemn the Pifers' land for a public use. The parties disagreed on the matter of just compensation, and the matter went to trial. In addition to seeking compensation the Pifers claimed that they suffered damages for rental loss due to condemnation blight. The jury found that the Pifers suffered damages related to condemnation blight. The trial court calculated pre-petition interest at ten percent and ten percent interest to the total award from the date of the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the jury's award of damages for condemnation blight was proper but that the trial court erred in calculating interest on the jury award. View "West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways v. Pifer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement, holding that individuals may agree to arbitrate a dispute regarding a cloud on the title to real estate.Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract whereby Plaintiff would convey almost 1,000 acres of mineral interests to Defendant. The contract contained an arbitration clause requiring the parties to refer any dispute about the parties' performance of the contract to arbitration. Later, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment to determine whether a cloud on the title to the mineral interests existed. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and to compel the parties to arbitrate. The circuit court refused the motion, finding that Plaintiff's claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause because, as a matter of public policy, property rights are not subject to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) parties may agree to submit to arbitration questions concerning clouds on the title to any estate, right, or interest in real property despite W. Va. Code 51-2-2(d) vesting circuit courts with jurisdiction to resolve those questions; and (2) there was an, enforceable agreement to arbitrate here, and the parties' controversy fell within the scope of that arbitration agreement. View "Golden Eagle Resources,II, LLC v. Willow Run Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court insofar as it denied summary judgment to Beth Thompson on Joseph Whitt's intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment claims, holding that Thompson was immune from liability on those claims.Whitt was terminated from his employment as IT Director for Cabell County. Whitt sued Thompson, the Cabell County Administrator who informed Whitt of his termination, and the Cabell County Commission, which made the decision to terminate. The circuit court denied Thompson's motion for summary judgment on grounds of immunity and both Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the merits of the substantive claims in the complaint. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's order insofar as it denied statutory immunity to Thompson on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment, holding that Thompson was entitled to immunity; and (2) declined to review the court's ruling denying summary judgment on Whitt's whistleblower claims. View "Cabell County Commission v. Whitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final order of the circuit court granting scheduled visitation with C.B., who was adopted by Petitioners when he was five years old, to Respondents, with whom C.B. lived before the adoption but to whom C.B. was not related, holding that Respondents did not have standing to petition the circuit court to modify their alleged post-adoption agreement and that such an agreement did not exist in this case.When Petitioner became C.B. guardian, the family court granted Respondents visitation with C.B. The visitation continued after the adoption, but after the parties quarreled, Petitioners reduced the visitation. Respondents subsequently petitioned for visitation. The circuit court granted the petition, relying on Respondents' pre-adoption relationship with the child and the child's best interests. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioners' adoption of C.B. severed Respondents' visitation with the child; and (2) because the adoption order did not provide for visitation between Respondents and C.B., an agreement among the parties regarding post-adoption visitation did not exist. View "Murrell B. v. Clarence R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of prohibition sought by Defendants challenging the circuit court's denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, holding that the circuit court erred when it refused to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress but did not err when it refused to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for general negligence.Plaintiff brought his complaint alleging that he suffered emotional injuries after witnessing a co-worker sustain fatal injuries due to Defendants' negligence. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiff and his co-worker did not meet the "closely related" requirement. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendants then filed this petition requesting a writ of prohibition challenging the denial of the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part and denied it in part, holding (1) an employee cannot recover damages for emotional distress after witnessing an injury to an unrelated co-worker under a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's claim for general negligence because the claim was not duplicative of Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. View "State ex rel. Maxxim Shared Services, LLC v. Honorable Warren R. McGraw" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition sought by PrimeCare Medical of West Virginia, Inc. (PrimeCare) to dismiss the Estate of Cody Lawrence Grove's (the Estate) claims against PrimeCare for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to dismiss the claims against PrimeCare brought under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA).The Estate sued a correctional officer, a regional jail authority, and Prime Care, which provided monitoring of inmates, arguing that Cody Grove was able to commit suicide while he was an inmate because the correctional officer failed to conduct one or more safety checks on Grove. PrimeCare filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Estate failed to serve the notice of claim and the screening certificate of merit required by the MPLA. See W. Va. Code 55-7B-6. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order, holding that to the extent the MPLA's pre-suit notice requirements were not complied with, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed. View "State ex rel., Primecare Medical of West Virginia, Inc. v. Honorable Laura V. Faircloth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's claims against a sheriff's deputy, a county, and its sheriff's department alleging that his earlier arrest violated his constitutional rights and was intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery, holding that Plaintiff's claims were time barred and that Plaintiff's motions for disqualification were properly denied.The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's claims because he did not file within the two-year statute of limitations. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the circuit judge should have been disqualified from the case and that the tolling provision of W. Va. Code 55-17-3(a) should have applied once he gave notice of his claim to the sheriff's department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tolling provision of section 55-17-3(a) did not apply because the sheriff's department is not part of the executive branch of state government; and (2) Plaintiff's allegations that the circuit judge should have been disqualified were properly adjudicated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and were without merit. View "Patton v. County of Berkeley, West Virginia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's claims, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.Plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old high school student, filed a civil action against Defendants, the county board of education and the county's sheriff's office and deputy, based on injuries he received while wrestling on a public school soccer field after leaving the high school building without authorization after the seventh period of class. The circuit court ruled that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that, because Plaintiff was an adult when he left the school, Defendants did not owe him a duty at the time of the injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county board was a state actor for purposes of determining whether it was entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) Defendants did not violate any statutory duty to Plaintiff, and therefore, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Goodwin v. Board of Education of Fayette County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming a decision by the West Virginia Board of Medicine that imposed professional discipline upon Dr. Omar Hasan, including a one-year suspension of his medical license with the requirement that he petition for reinstatement, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's order affirming the final order of the Board.On appeal, Hasan argued that the Board erred by failing to adopt recommended findings of fact by its hearing examiner, by misstating various facts in its final order, and by improperly considering the content of certain text messages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board has the authority to amend findings of fact recommended by its hearing examiner so long as it provides a reasoned, articulate decision that explains the rationale for its changes, and the Board provided such a rationale in this case; (2) the Board did not err in considering the challenged text messages; and (3) the Board did not commit reversible error by misstating certain evidence. View "Hasan v. West Virginia Board of Medicine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's renewed motion for summary judgment and granting declaratory relief, holding that judicial estoppel applied to this appeal.Robert May brought an injunction proceeding against Mark-Banbury, LLC, the owner of property that it developed as The Lakes, after Mark-Banbury, LLC began draining water across May's land without May's permission. The circuit court awarded damages and an injunction prohibiting Mark-Banbury, LLC from future development of The Lakes until flooding and damages were stopped. The judgment order was recorded. Banbury Holdings, LLC subsequently purchased The Lakes and filed this collateral proceeding for declaratory judgment requesting that the circuit court declare that the judgment order in the injunction proceeding as void as to Banbury Holdings and its successors in title. The circuit court denied relief, finding that the prior litigation, in which Banbury Holdings was a party, ran with the land and was binding upon Banbury Holdings and all its successors in title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Banbury Holdings was judicially estopped from asserting conflicting positions in this collateral proceeding. View "Banbury Holdings, LLC v. May" on Justia Law