Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied the writ sought by the State Treasurer prohibiting the State Auditor from processing payments to senior-status judges that exceed the per diem rate allowed in W. Va. Code 51-9-10, holding that because there was no actual controversy between the parties the Treasurer was seeking an advisory opinion from the Court.In 2018, the Supreme Court addressed W. Va. Code 51-9-10, which authorized per diem payment to senior-status judges and places an annual limit on a senior-status judge's combined per diem compensation and retirement income. In 2019, the legislature amended the statute to specify a rate of per diem payment to senior-status judges on assignment and to create an exception to the annual limit on compensation in extraordinary circumstances. In the instant action, the Treasurer argued that he was entitled to the requested writ of prohibition because the Auditor will violate section 51-9-10 when he issues a warrant for per diem payment to a senior-status judge that is greater than the daily rate of per diem compensation set forth in the statute. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the petition was not one of the rare proceedings in which this Court must undertake something in the nature of an advisory opinion. View "State ex rel. Perdue v. McCuskey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (PSC) finding that Trulargo, LLC had been unlawfully operating as a common carrier by motor vehicle and requiring it to cease such activities until it obtains a permit therefore, holding that the PSC did not err by determining Trulargo to be a common carrier and that Trulargo was required to obtain the PSC's approval before engaging in, or continuing, such activities.On appeal, Trulargo argued that the PSC erred by ruling that it was operating as a common carrier and by improperly regulating Trulargo's roll-off container rental business and the costs it charged for such service. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Trulargo's operations constituted those of a common carrier by motor vehicle such that it was required to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity to continue its activities; and (2) Trulargo's roll-off container rental and retrieval activities were squarely within the definition of a common carrier by motor vehicle, and therefore, the PSC had the authority to regulate Trulargo's business. View "Trulargo, LLC v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court denying Mother's appeal of an order of the family court rejecting Mother's request for Father's custodial time to be supervised and allocating income tax exemptions for the parties' children solely to Father, holding that the family court abused its discretion by refusing to permit Mother to present evidence relating to alleged abuse by Father.After Mother and Father separated, Mother petitioned the family court for allocation of custodial responsibility. During two ensuing hearings, the family court rejected Mother's attempts to present evidence of Father's alleged abuse. The court awarded Mother primary custodial responsibility, granted unsupervised visitation to Father, and awarded the income tax dependency exemptions for the children to Father. The circuit court denied Mother's appeal. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the family court's order and remanded the case with instructions to hear evidence relating to alleged abuse by Father; and (2) reversed the order regarding the income tax exemption and remanded with instructions to award the exemption for both children to Mother unless any of the exceptions in W. Va. Code 48-13-801 are satisfied. View "Heather M. v. Richard R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the West Virginia Department of Education and the Arts (WVDEA) on Petitioner's claims brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (Act), W. Va. Code 5-11-1 through -21, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Petitioner's failure-to-accommodate and constructive discharge claims.Prior to resigning from her position of employment for the WVDEA Petitioner asked the WVDEA to permit her to work weekends from home rather than requiring her to take paid leave for her required weekly absences due to medical treatments. WVDEA did not accommodate that request. Petitioner ultimately sued alleging that she was unlawfully denied a reasonable accommodation and that she was constructively discharged as a result of the denial of her requested accommodation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the WVDEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner did not require a work-from-home accommodation; and (2) Petitioner's constructive discharge claim, premised on the denial of her request for accommodation, failed as a matter of law. View "Burns v. West Virginia Department of Education and the Arts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court appointing Great-Grandparents as guardians of Child and the circuit court's order affirming the family court, holding that the family court had no jurisdiction to act on Great-Grandparents' minor guardianship petition.Great-Grandparents filed a minor guardianship petition in the family court regarding Child, alleging that Child was abused and neglected. Instead of removing the case to circuit court as required by Rule 13 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Minor Guardianship Proceedings the family court appointed Great-Grandparents as temporary guardians of Child. After an evidentiary hearing, the family court appointed Great-Grandparents as guardians of Child. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court erred by failing immediately to remove Great-Grandparents' minor guardianship petition to the circuit court and that the family court was without subject matter jurisdiction to take any other action on the petition. View "M.H. v. C.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by a federal district court regarding W. Va. Code 31E-3-304(b)(2), holding that beyond the derivative suit mentioned in the statute, a member of a nonprofit corporation's board of directors may not file a derivative suit against another director to recover damages or other relief on behalf of the nonprofit corporation.Section 31E-3-304(b)(2) permits a member of a nonprofit corporation's board of directors to file an "ultra vires" derivative suit against another member of the board of directors to challenge the validity of an action taken by the corporation. At issue in this case was whether the Legislature intended to preclude such derivative suits brought by a member of the board of directors against another director to recover damages or other relief on behalf of nonprofit corporations. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that, other than as expressly authorized by section 31E-3-304(b)(2), the West Virginia Nonprofit Corporation Act does not confer the right upon a director to bring a derivative action on behalf of the nonprofit corporation. View "John A. Sheppard Memorial Ecological Reservation, Inc. v. Fanning" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the circuit court's decision affirming the order of the family court in this divorce proceeding, holding that under the provisions of W. Va. Code § 43- 1-2(a)–(e), where a spouse conveys a security interest in her separate real property by a deed of trust and fails to give notice of the conveyance to the non-title holding spouse within thirty days of the transaction, then in the event of a divorce within five years of the conveyance, the real property shall be deemed a part of the conveyancer’s marital property for purposes of determining equitable distribution or support awards and assigned a value equal to its fair market value at the time of the conveyance.The family court here initially concluded that the fair market value of the wife's separate property was attributable as a marital asset. The circuit court reversed in part, concluding that the value of the real estate conveyed by a deed of trust was not the total market value of the property but the value of the security interest. On remand, the family court recalculated equitable distribution pursuant to the circuit court's directive. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a recalculation of equitable support. View "Raymond H. v. Cammie H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the order of the family court granting Grandparents' petition for visitation over the objection of Mother, holding that Mother's arguments could not properly be assessed because the family court failed to set forth sufficient findings of fact or conclusions of law explaining its ruling.The family court granted Grandparents' petition for visitation, and the circuit court affirmed. The record in this matter, however, only consisted of a report from the guardian ad litem. On appeal, Mother argued (1) the grandparent visitation factors set forth in W. Va. Code 48-10-502 weighed against visitation under the circumstances, and (2) the family court erred in failing to give special weight to her wishes concerning the care of the child. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the family court for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred in affirming the order of the family court because the family court failed to make specific findings of fact regarding the statutory grandparent visitation factors and failed to explain why Mother's interest in making decisions regarding the care of the child was outweighed by the child's interest in having a continuing relationship with Grandparents. View "Meagan S. v. Terry S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the circuit court determining that Plaintiff's complaint filed against Defendants alleging wrongful discharge in contravention of substantial public policy failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that Plaintiff failed adequately to plead the self-defense exception to the at will employment doctrine.Plaintiff, who was employed by Defendants as an at will employee, was fired after he engaged in a physical altercation with a co-worker in the workplace. Plaintiff later brought a complaint alleging that he was wrongfully discharged because he used "only absolutely necessary force to defend himself." The circuit court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that where Plaintiff was engaged in an altercation that did not involve a threat of lethal immune danger he was not fired in violation of substantial public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's complaint failed to contain any facts indicating that he faced lethal imminent danger, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to adequately plead the self-defense exception to the at will employment doctrine set forth in Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001). View "Newton v. Morgantown Machine & Hydraulics of West Virginia, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's final order finding that Kenneth and Aimee Bragg had met every element of their adverse possession claim as a matter of law, despite questions of fact pertaining to permissive use of the 9.21 acres of disputed property, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate in this case.Teubert Family Farms, LLC filed a complaint against the Braggs seeking to quiet title, requesting injunctive relief, and alleging slander of title. The Braggs filed a counterclaim alleging adverse possession as to the disputed property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Braggs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by finding no material question of fact was in dispute as to whether the Braggs satisfied every element required of an adverse possession claim. View "Teubert Family Farms, LLC v. Bragg" on Justia Law