Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition requested by Petitioners, West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) and guardian ad litem of six minor children, seeking to prohibit the circuit court from granting a post-adjudicatory improvement period to Respondents, the children's parents, holding that the circuit court committed a clear legal error.DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition requesting emergency custody due to the threat of imminent danger to Respondents' five adopted children and one foster child. The circuit court entered an order adjudicating Respondents as abusive. The DHHR subsequently sought termination and the guardian ad litem recommended termination and that post-dispositional improvement periods be denied. The circuit court, however, granted Respondents a six-month post-adjudicatory improvement period. This writ of prohibition followed. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the circuit court misapprehended the evidence, failed to consider probative evidence, and failed to consider the best interests of the children. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order terminating Respondents' custodial and parental rights. View "State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Services v. Honorable Lora A. Dyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court in this case considered two certified questions regarding West Virginia's kidnapping statute, W. Va. Code 61-2-14a.Defendant was indicted for kidnapping. During pretrial proceedings, the parties discussed (1) whether, under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the judge or the jury would need to make additional determinations when considering a kidnapping charge and (2) the propriety of special interrogatories to the jury in a kidnapping case. Defendant's trial was continued so that these issues could be brought to the Supreme Court for consideration. The Court answered, for a person convicted of kidnapping, (1) the trial judge, rather than the jury, is vested with the authority under the kidnapping statute to determine those facts that reduce the minimum and maximum penalty of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole; and (2) in the absence of a statutory or constitutional requirement that special interrogatories be submitted to a jury in a kidnapping case, a trial court exceeds its authority and abuses its discretion in submitting special interrogatories to determine those facts that reduce the minimum and maximum penalty of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. View "State v. Scruggs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner relief on his second petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on his three arguments on appeal.Petitioner was convicted of burglary by entering without breaking and other offenses. In his second habeas corpus petition Petitioner raised four grounds for relief. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the errors Petitioner raised in this appeal were either not raised below and therefore waived or were previously and finally adjudicated on the merits and not clearly wrong. View "Lewis v. Ames" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ sought by the State Treasurer prohibiting the State Auditor from processing payments to senior-status judges that exceed the per diem rate allowed in W. Va. Code 51-9-10, holding that because there was no actual controversy between the parties the Treasurer was seeking an advisory opinion from the Court.In 2018, the Supreme Court addressed W. Va. Code 51-9-10, which authorized per diem payment to senior-status judges and places an annual limit on a senior-status judge's combined per diem compensation and retirement income. In 2019, the legislature amended the statute to specify a rate of per diem payment to senior-status judges on assignment and to create an exception to the annual limit on compensation in extraordinary circumstances. In the instant action, the Treasurer argued that he was entitled to the requested writ of prohibition because the Auditor will violate section 51-9-10 when he issues a warrant for per diem payment to a senior-status judge that is greater than the daily rate of per diem compensation set forth in the statute. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the petition was not one of the rare proceedings in which this Court must undertake something in the nature of an advisory opinion. View "State ex rel. Perdue v. McCuskey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (PSC) finding that Trulargo, LLC had been unlawfully operating as a common carrier by motor vehicle and requiring it to cease such activities until it obtains a permit therefore, holding that the PSC did not err by determining Trulargo to be a common carrier and that Trulargo was required to obtain the PSC's approval before engaging in, or continuing, such activities.On appeal, Trulargo argued that the PSC erred by ruling that it was operating as a common carrier and by improperly regulating Trulargo's roll-off container rental business and the costs it charged for such service. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Trulargo's operations constituted those of a common carrier by motor vehicle such that it was required to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity to continue its activities; and (2) Trulargo's roll-off container rental and retrieval activities were squarely within the definition of a common carrier by motor vehicle, and therefore, the PSC had the authority to regulate Trulargo's business. View "Trulargo, LLC v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court denying Mother's appeal of an order of the family court rejecting Mother's request for Father's custodial time to be supervised and allocating income tax exemptions for the parties' children solely to Father, holding that the family court abused its discretion by refusing to permit Mother to present evidence relating to alleged abuse by Father.After Mother and Father separated, Mother petitioned the family court for allocation of custodial responsibility. During two ensuing hearings, the family court rejected Mother's attempts to present evidence of Father's alleged abuse. The court awarded Mother primary custodial responsibility, granted unsupervised visitation to Father, and awarded the income tax dependency exemptions for the children to Father. The circuit court denied Mother's appeal. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the family court's order and remanded the case with instructions to hear evidence relating to alleged abuse by Father; and (2) reversed the order regarding the income tax exemption and remanded with instructions to award the exemption for both children to Mother unless any of the exceptions in W. Va. Code 48-13-801 are satisfied. View "Heather M. v. Richard R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the West Virginia Department of Education and the Arts (WVDEA) on Petitioner's claims brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act (Act), W. Va. Code 5-11-1 through -21, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Petitioner's failure-to-accommodate and constructive discharge claims.Prior to resigning from her position of employment for the WVDEA Petitioner asked the WVDEA to permit her to work weekends from home rather than requiring her to take paid leave for her required weekly absences due to medical treatments. WVDEA did not accommodate that request. Petitioner ultimately sued alleging that she was unlawfully denied a reasonable accommodation and that she was constructively discharged as a result of the denial of her requested accommodation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the WVDEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner did not require a work-from-home accommodation; and (2) Petitioner's constructive discharge claim, premised on the denial of her request for accommodation, failed as a matter of law. View "Burns v. West Virginia Department of Education and the Arts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court appointing Great-Grandparents as guardians of Child and the circuit court's order affirming the family court, holding that the family court had no jurisdiction to act on Great-Grandparents' minor guardianship petition.Great-Grandparents filed a minor guardianship petition in the family court regarding Child, alleging that Child was abused and neglected. Instead of removing the case to circuit court as required by Rule 13 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Minor Guardianship Proceedings the family court appointed Great-Grandparents as temporary guardians of Child. After an evidentiary hearing, the family court appointed Great-Grandparents as guardians of Child. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court erred by failing immediately to remove Great-Grandparents' minor guardianship petition to the circuit court and that the family court was without subject matter jurisdiction to take any other action on the petition. View "M.H. v. C.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by a federal district court regarding W. Va. Code 31E-3-304(b)(2), holding that beyond the derivative suit mentioned in the statute, a member of a nonprofit corporation's board of directors may not file a derivative suit against another director to recover damages or other relief on behalf of the nonprofit corporation.Section 31E-3-304(b)(2) permits a member of a nonprofit corporation's board of directors to file an "ultra vires" derivative suit against another member of the board of directors to challenge the validity of an action taken by the corporation. At issue in this case was whether the Legislature intended to preclude such derivative suits brought by a member of the board of directors against another director to recover damages or other relief on behalf of nonprofit corporations. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that, other than as expressly authorized by section 31E-3-304(b)(2), the West Virginia Nonprofit Corporation Act does not confer the right upon a director to bring a derivative action on behalf of the nonprofit corporation. View "John A. Sheppard Memorial Ecological Reservation, Inc. v. Fanning" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the circuit court's decision affirming the order of the family court in this divorce proceeding, holding that under the provisions of W. Va. Code § 43- 1-2(a)–(e), where a spouse conveys a security interest in her separate real property by a deed of trust and fails to give notice of the conveyance to the non-title holding spouse within thirty days of the transaction, then in the event of a divorce within five years of the conveyance, the real property shall be deemed a part of the conveyancer’s marital property for purposes of determining equitable distribution or support awards and assigned a value equal to its fair market value at the time of the conveyance.The family court here initially concluded that the fair market value of the wife's separate property was attributable as a marital asset. The circuit court reversed in part, concluding that the value of the real estate conveyed by a deed of trust was not the total market value of the property but the value of the security interest. On remand, the family court recalculated equitable distribution pursuant to the circuit court's directive. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a recalculation of equitable support. View "Raymond H. v. Cammie H." on Justia Law