Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the circuit court finding that the Workplace Freedom Act (the Act) infringes upon the rights to associate, as well as the liberty and property rights, of labor unions that are member organizations of the AFL-CIO (Labor Unions), holding that the Act does not violate constitutional rights at issue.In 2016, the Legislature enacted the Act, which prohibits collective bargaining agreements that require an employee to pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other similar charges as a condition of employment, or as a condition for the continuation of employment, when the employee has chosen not to join a union. On remand, the circuit court ruled that the Act unconstitutionally fringes on the rights of the Labor Unions, who represent both private and government workers in West Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act does not violate the West Virginia Constitution's protections of association, property, and liberty rights. View "Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court giving Petitioner credit for twelve days of time served toward the sentence he received for his felony conviction although Petitioner spent additional time in confinement for other charges that were dismissed in the universal plea agreement, holding that to grant Petitioner additional credit for time served would do little more than reward Petitioner for habitual criminal behavior.Petitioner was charged with several crimes and agreed to resolve the pending charges against him in a universal plea agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Petitioner agreed to plea guilty to the charge of felony carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person. In exchange, the State agreed to drop the remaining charges. After he was sentenced, Petitioner argued that, in addition to the twelve days of credit for time served he was granted, he was constitutionally entitled to credit for time served while he was incarcerated for charges that were resolved in the universal plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's circumstances implicated neither double jeopardy nor equal protection of the law such that additional credit for time served was constitutionally mandated. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion to compel arbitration of Respondents' claims against them, holding that a merger clause in the retail sales installment contract (RISC) between the parties served to supplant the arbitration agreement contained in the previously-executed credit application.Respondents purchased a new truck from Petitioners. Respondents first executed a credit application that contained an arbitration provision. Thereafter, the parties executed the RSIC, which did not contain an arbitration clause. After Respondents defaulted on their loan Petitioners began collection efforts. Respondents filed this complaint asserting that Petitioners harassed them by phone even after being advised they were represented by counsel. Petitioners moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision contained in the credit application. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration provisions in the credit application did not survive the merger clause of the RISC, thereby nullifying Respondents' obligation to arbitrate their claims against Petitioners. View "TD Auto Finance LLC v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court denying Father's request to terminate the guardianship of Respondents, holding that the circuit court erred by requiring Father to demonstrate a material change of circumstances in order to terminate the existing guardianship.As a result of Mother's incarceration, Guardians, who were Mother's parents, filed a petition to be appointed guardians of the child in this case. The circuit court granted the guardianship. Father subsequently filed a motion to terminate Guardians' guardianship, asserting that a change of circumstances had occurred because Father had shown that he was a fit parent and could provide the proper care and stability for the child. The circuit court denied Father's petition on grounds that Father had not demonstrated a material change of circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) because the circuit court's guardianship order did not sufficiently address the statutory factors required for the appointment of a guardian, the order must be treated as one establishing a temporary guardianship; and (2) the court applied the wrong burden of proof to Father's request to terminate the guardianship. View "Terrence E. v. Christopher R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief.Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder, death of a child by a guardian or custodian, and child abuse resulting in injury. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Petitioner then filed a self-represented petition for writ of habeas court, alleging, primarily, that his counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. The circuit court ultimately denied the habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendant failed to show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland/Miller; and (2) there were no errors in the trial court's proceedings that would warrant application of the cumulative doctrine to the facts of this case. View "Meadows v. Mutter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's private citizen application to present a complaint to the grand jury, holding that a circuit court may refuse a private citizen's application to present a complaint to the grand jury if it determines that such application constitutes an abuse of process, but the circuit court in this case failed to set forth any findings of fact or conclusions of law when it denied Petitioner's application.Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and burglary. After seeking both state and federal habeas relief Petitioner filed an application to present a complaint to the grand jury. In his application, Petitioner asserted that during the grand jury proceedings that resulted in his indictments, a police officer perjured himself and the prosecuting attorney suborned perjury. The circuit court denied the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, because the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's application did not include any findings of fact or conclusions of law, it was necessary to remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Dreyfuse, In re Application to Present Complaint to the Grand Jury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Cindy Langman on John Zsigray's claims for outrage and intentional infliction of emotional stress and reversed the order granting Langman's motion to dismiss the defamation claim regarding statements she made to a law enforcement officer, holding that Zsigray's complaint included sufficient allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss on this portion of the defamation claim.After a law enforcement officer's investigation into an incident at McDonald's Zsigray was charged with criminal harassment. Following a jury trial at which Langman testified Zsigray was found not guilty. Zsigray later filed a complaint against Langman, alleging, inter alia, defamation. The defamation claim was based on Langman's statements to the officer and her testimony. The circuit court granted Langman's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) properly ruled that Langman's testimony during the magistrate court trial judge was entitled to absolute immunity from Zsigray's defamation claim; (2) erred in ruling that Langman's statements to the officer were also absolutely privileged; and (3) did not err by granting Langman's motion for summary judgment on the outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. View "Zsigray v. Langman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial, and Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, as provided for by the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that the circuit court did not err.Respondent filed a complaint alleging that Petitioners, two correctional officers, used excessive force against him. The jury found that Petitioners used excessive force on Respondent and committed the civil tort of battery on Respondent. The jury award compensatory damages of $0 and punitive damages of $4,500. Petitioners filed a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and motions pursuant to Rules 59(a) and (e) for a new trial and/or to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that there was no reasonable relationship between the compensatory damages and punitive damages award. The circuit court denied the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) allowing punitive damages to be recovered by Respondent without an accompanying award of compensatory or nominal damages; and (2) failing to apply the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, to Petitioners. View "Lunsford v. Shy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final order of the circuit court affirming the family court's order denying Mother's motion to relocate to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina with her two children and designating Father as the children's primary residential parent, holding that not only did the family court erroneously rely upon a single factor in its analysis of the children's best interests, but its conclusion as to that factor was not supported by the record.The family court denied Mother's motion to relocate the children to Myrtle Beach, designated Father as the primary residential parent, and adjusted child support obligations accordingly. On appeal, Mother argued that the family court failed to conduct a proper analysis of the children's best interests for purposes of determining where they should reside following her relocation. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the family court's order contained insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its determination that it was in the best interests of the children to reside primarily with Father and that the family court should have undertaken an assessment of the custodial responsibility each parent was undertaking to determine which statutory principle to apply under W. Va. 48-9-403(d). View "Stacey J. v. Henry A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final order of the circuit court upholding the decision of the family court to deny Father's petition for modification of custodial responsibility, holding that the lower courts erred in failing to perform the required best interest analysis and in failing to provide specific findings with respect to the best interest of the parties' child.In his petition, which was based on the allocation of decision-making responsibilities under W. Va. Code 48-9-20, Father sought an order awarding him sole decision-making responsibility pertaining to medical and educational matters for the child. The family court denied the petition and ordered joint decision-making responsibility. The circuit court upheld the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the lower courts used the wrong standard when denying Father's petition for allocation of decision-making responsibility; and (2) the lower courts erroneously failed to perform the requisite analysis of the child's best interests and failed to provide specific findings with respect to the child's best interest. View "Benton B. v. Cassidy T." on Justia Law