Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the decision of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial, holding that the circuit court's jury instruction on the crime of kidnapping was incomplete.A jury found Petitioner guilty of kidnapping, malicious assault, commission of an assault during the commission of a felony, and domestic battery. Petitioner moved for a new trial, arguing that the circuit court incorrectly instructed the jury on kidnapping because the court erroneously omitted from its instruction that "transport" is an element of kidnapping under W. Va. Code 61-14a-2(a)(2). The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial on kidnapping and commission of an assault during the commission of a felony and remanded the case for entry of an order granting a new trial to Petitioner, holding that the circuit court's instruction on kidnapping was fundamental error. View "State v. Woodrum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' requested writ seeking to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing an order disqualifying Petitioners' joint counsel from representing Petitioners, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err when it applied Rule 44(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure to disqualify Christian Riddell from representing Petitioners, jointly, at this stage of the proceedings.Petitioners June Yurish, Kristin Douty, and Christina Lester, were each charged with failure to report. All three charges arose from the same set of facts. Christian Riddell appeared in court as counsel for each petitioner. The State moved to disqualify Riddell from appearing in Petitioners' cases, arguing that the joint representation created a current conflict among Petitioners' interests and threatened future conflicts that would jeopardize the integrity of the proceedings. The circuit court granted the State's motion. The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' requested writ, holding that the Petitioners did not show that the circuit court's order disqualifying Riddell from jointly representing them in their criminal cases was either a clear error of law or a flagrant abuse of the circuit court's discretion. View "State ex rel. Yurish v. Honorable Laura Faircloth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court granting the State's motion to dismiss the indictment against Defendant without prejudice and denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the indictment without prejudice.Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and two counts of conspiracy to commit said offense. One day before trial, the State filed a motion to dismiss the indictment without prejudice on the ground that the State was unable to prosecute Defendant without testimony from his codefendant, who would not be released from her incarceration in Ohio until the next year. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the State did not act with great dispatch in securing the codefendant's presence or her testimony at Defendant's trial, the State did not act in bad faith; and (2) the circuit court's decision granting the State's motion to dismiss without prejudice was based upon facts and circumstances known to the court and with due consideration for the rights of all parties. View "State v. Holden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in a conversion case granting motions to dismiss on the ground that all pleadings filed on behalf of the Estate of A. Rafael Gomez by a non-attorney executor and all arguments made by him in court proceedings constituted the unlawful practice of law, and (2) found that the appeal in a companion case, a will contest, was improvidently granted.The Estate sought reversal of a circuit court dismissing its lawsuit on the ground that Mark Gomez, as a non-attorney executor, was not authorized to file pleadings or otherwise represent the Estate in judicial proceedings. Mark, together with his brothers, also filed a will contest in which Mark filed pleadings and argued on both his own behalf and on behalf of the Estate. The Supreme Court held (1) as to the conversion case, Mark, a non-attorney executor, was engaged in the unlawful practice of law, and therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the case; and (2) as to the will contest, the court did not make any rulings that conclusively determined any issue in the case, and therefore, the appeal was improvidently granted. View "Gomez v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this original jurisdiction action in mandamus the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an indigent inmate who has entered a plea of guilty is entitled to one free copy of transcripts and other matters of record that are not protected from disclosure for purposes of preparing a post conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus and that discovery may not be used to obtain court records for purposes of preparing a post conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus.Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to certain crimes. As a self-represented litigant, Petitioner petitioned the circuit court for the "production of documents" to file his habeas corpus petition in which he intended to claim that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made. The presiding judge asserted that Petitioner was not entitled to discovery but may be entitled to certain documents. The Supreme Court granted, as moulded, a writ of mandamus requested by Petitioner, holding that, to the extent Petitioner was an indigent inmate who had never received a copy of a transcript of the proceedings against him or other matters of record, he was entitled to those records with the exception of any material that was subject to protection from disclosure. View "State ex rel. Tackett vs. Honorable Darl W. Poling" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the Supreme Court granted as moulded a requested writ of prohibition in Case Number 19-0754 and granted the requested writ of prohibition in Case Number 19-0755, holding that the circuit court erred by not complying with the statutory procedure prescribed for granting a stay of an administrative revocation of a driver's license to operate a motor vehicle.The circuit court stayed the administrative revocation of Respondents' driver's licenses while their appeals from the revocation rulings were pending in the circuit court. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles requested a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing the orders, arguing that the circuit court failed to comply with the requisite statutory procedure for the issuance of a stay set forth in W. Va. Code 17C-5A-2(s). Recognizing the different procedural postures of the two matters, the Supreme Court granted as moulded the requested writ of prohibition in one case and granted the requested writ as to the other case, holding that the circuit court erred by disregarding the plain and mandatory statutory language of section 17C-5A-2(s) in staying an administrative revocation of a driver's license. View "State ex rel., Frazier v. Honorable Thompson" on Justia Law

In this case involving an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate her dispute with an investment firm the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order to the extent that it included language that invaded the province of the arbitrator but otherwise affirmed the order dismissing Plaintiff's suit and compelling her to arbitrate.Plaintiff's deceased husband created two accounts with an investment firm, and the documents he signed required the arbitration of any account disputes. After the investment company paid the proceeds of both accounts to two other individuals, Plaintiff brought this suit, asserting her right to the proceeds of the accounts. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff was required to comply with the arbitration agreements even though she was a nonsignatory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly determined that Plaintiff was required to arbitrate her claims to the proceeds of both accounts; but (2) the circuit court erred in including improper language in its order that exceeded the court's authority. View "Bayles v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the sentencing order of the circuit court finding that Petitioner's offense of simple battery as a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the second degree was sexually motivated, holding that the circuit court neither abused its discretion nor erred when it found that Petitioner's offense was sexually motivated.The jury found Petitioner not guilty of sexual assault in the second degree, not guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree, and guilty of battery. At sentencing, the circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner's battery was sexually motivated and directed Petitioner to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit judge did not abuse her discretion finding that Petitioner's actions were sexually motivated. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the order of the Public Grievance Board denying as untimely the grievance brought by Melissa Wilfong challenging the alleged failure to the Board of Education of Randolph County to place her in a full-time administrative position, holding that Wilfong's grievance was untimely.Wilfong was employed as a half-time principal and half-time teacher at Valley Head Elementary School, which closed at the end of the 2016-2017 school year. In April 2017 the Board notified Wilfong that she had been approved for transfer to another position but informed her that she did not yet have an assignment for the following school year. In August 2017, Wilfong accepted a full-time teaching position. That same day, Wilfong filed her grievance complaining that the Board failed to place her in an administrative position. The Grievance Board denied the grievance as untimely. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Wilfong filed her grievance outside the fifteen-day window provided by W. Va. Code 6C-2-4(a)(1), the grievance was not timely filed. View "Wilfong v. Randolph County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded that Respondent, David E. Ferguson, Magistrate of Wayne County, violated several provisions of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and that a harsher sanction than that recommended by the West Virginia Judicial Hearing Board was appropriate.This case stemmed from Respondent's violation of a state fishing law and the coercive and belligerent behavior that Respondent exhibited when he was issued a citation. The Board concluded that Respondent violated several provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that Respondent be suspended for thirty days without pay. The Supreme Court adopted the Board's conclusions of law regarding Respondent's rule violations with the modification of concluding that Respondent committed an additional violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court further found that a harsher sanction than that recommended by the Board was warrant due to Respondent's flagrant attempt to intimidate law enforcement officers. The Court suspended Respondent for ninety days without pay, reprimanded him, and ordered him to pay a total fine of $2,000 and the costs of this disciplinary proceeding. View "In re Honorable David E. Ferguson" on Justia Law