Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In these two consolidated cases, the Supreme Court granted as moulded a requested writ of prohibition in Case Number 19-0754 and granted the requested writ of prohibition in Case Number 19-0755, holding that the circuit court erred by not complying with the statutory procedure prescribed for granting a stay of an administrative revocation of a driver's license to operate a motor vehicle.The circuit court stayed the administrative revocation of Respondents' driver's licenses while their appeals from the revocation rulings were pending in the circuit court. The Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles requested a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing the orders, arguing that the circuit court failed to comply with the requisite statutory procedure for the issuance of a stay set forth in W. Va. Code 17C-5A-2(s). Recognizing the different procedural postures of the two matters, the Supreme Court granted as moulded the requested writ of prohibition in one case and granted the requested writ as to the other case, holding that the circuit court erred by disregarding the plain and mandatory statutory language of section 17C-5A-2(s) in staying an administrative revocation of a driver's license. View "State ex rel., Frazier v. Honorable Thompson" on Justia Law

In this case involving an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate her dispute with an investment firm the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order to the extent that it included language that invaded the province of the arbitrator but otherwise affirmed the order dismissing Plaintiff's suit and compelling her to arbitrate.Plaintiff's deceased husband created two accounts with an investment firm, and the documents he signed required the arbitration of any account disputes. After the investment company paid the proceeds of both accounts to two other individuals, Plaintiff brought this suit, asserting her right to the proceeds of the accounts. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff was required to comply with the arbitration agreements even though she was a nonsignatory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly determined that Plaintiff was required to arbitrate her claims to the proceeds of both accounts; but (2) the circuit court erred in including improper language in its order that exceeded the court's authority. View "Bayles v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the sentencing order of the circuit court finding that Petitioner's offense of simple battery as a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the second degree was sexually motivated, holding that the circuit court neither abused its discretion nor erred when it found that Petitioner's offense was sexually motivated.The jury found Petitioner not guilty of sexual assault in the second degree, not guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree, and guilty of battery. At sentencing, the circuit court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner's battery was sexually motivated and directed Petitioner to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit judge did not abuse her discretion finding that Petitioner's actions were sexually motivated. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the order of the Public Grievance Board denying as untimely the grievance brought by Melissa Wilfong challenging the alleged failure to the Board of Education of Randolph County to place her in a full-time administrative position, holding that Wilfong's grievance was untimely.Wilfong was employed as a half-time principal and half-time teacher at Valley Head Elementary School, which closed at the end of the 2016-2017 school year. In April 2017 the Board notified Wilfong that she had been approved for transfer to another position but informed her that she did not yet have an assignment for the following school year. In August 2017, Wilfong accepted a full-time teaching position. That same day, Wilfong filed her grievance complaining that the Board failed to place her in an administrative position. The Grievance Board denied the grievance as untimely. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Wilfong filed her grievance outside the fifteen-day window provided by W. Va. Code 6C-2-4(a)(1), the grievance was not timely filed. View "Wilfong v. Randolph County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded that Respondent, David E. Ferguson, Magistrate of Wayne County, violated several provisions of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and that a harsher sanction than that recommended by the West Virginia Judicial Hearing Board was appropriate.This case stemmed from Respondent's violation of a state fishing law and the coercive and belligerent behavior that Respondent exhibited when he was issued a citation. The Board concluded that Respondent violated several provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that Respondent be suspended for thirty days without pay. The Supreme Court adopted the Board's conclusions of law regarding Respondent's rule violations with the modification of concluding that Respondent committed an additional violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court further found that a harsher sanction than that recommended by the Board was warrant due to Respondent's flagrant attempt to intimidate law enforcement officers. The Court suspended Respondent for ninety days without pay, reprimanded him, and ordered him to pay a total fine of $2,000 and the costs of this disciplinary proceeding. View "In re Honorable David E. Ferguson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the circuit court finding that the Workplace Freedom Act (the Act) infringes upon the rights to associate, as well as the liberty and property rights, of labor unions that are member organizations of the AFL-CIO (Labor Unions), holding that the Act does not violate constitutional rights at issue.In 2016, the Legislature enacted the Act, which prohibits collective bargaining agreements that require an employee to pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other similar charges as a condition of employment, or as a condition for the continuation of employment, when the employee has chosen not to join a union. On remand, the circuit court ruled that the Act unconstitutionally fringes on the rights of the Labor Unions, who represent both private and government workers in West Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act does not violate the West Virginia Constitution's protections of association, property, and liberty rights. View "Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court giving Petitioner credit for twelve days of time served toward the sentence he received for his felony conviction although Petitioner spent additional time in confinement for other charges that were dismissed in the universal plea agreement, holding that to grant Petitioner additional credit for time served would do little more than reward Petitioner for habitual criminal behavior.Petitioner was charged with several crimes and agreed to resolve the pending charges against him in a universal plea agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Petitioner agreed to plea guilty to the charge of felony carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person. In exchange, the State agreed to drop the remaining charges. After he was sentenced, Petitioner argued that, in addition to the twelve days of credit for time served he was granted, he was constitutionally entitled to credit for time served while he was incarcerated for charges that were resolved in the universal plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's circumstances implicated neither double jeopardy nor equal protection of the law such that additional credit for time served was constitutionally mandated. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion to compel arbitration of Respondents' claims against them, holding that a merger clause in the retail sales installment contract (RISC) between the parties served to supplant the arbitration agreement contained in the previously-executed credit application.Respondents purchased a new truck from Petitioners. Respondents first executed a credit application that contained an arbitration provision. Thereafter, the parties executed the RSIC, which did not contain an arbitration clause. After Respondents defaulted on their loan Petitioners began collection efforts. Respondents filed this complaint asserting that Petitioners harassed them by phone even after being advised they were represented by counsel. Petitioners moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision contained in the credit application. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration provisions in the credit application did not survive the merger clause of the RISC, thereby nullifying Respondents' obligation to arbitrate their claims against Petitioners. View "TD Auto Finance LLC v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court denying Father's request to terminate the guardianship of Respondents, holding that the circuit court erred by requiring Father to demonstrate a material change of circumstances in order to terminate the existing guardianship.As a result of Mother's incarceration, Guardians, who were Mother's parents, filed a petition to be appointed guardians of the child in this case. The circuit court granted the guardianship. Father subsequently filed a motion to terminate Guardians' guardianship, asserting that a change of circumstances had occurred because Father had shown that he was a fit parent and could provide the proper care and stability for the child. The circuit court denied Father's petition on grounds that Father had not demonstrated a material change of circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) because the circuit court's guardianship order did not sufficiently address the statutory factors required for the appointment of a guardian, the order must be treated as one establishing a temporary guardianship; and (2) the court applied the wrong burden of proof to Father's request to terminate the guardianship. View "Terrence E. v. Christopher R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief.Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder, death of a child by a guardian or custodian, and child abuse resulting in injury. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Petitioner then filed a self-represented petition for writ of habeas court, alleging, primarily, that his counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. The circuit court ultimately denied the habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendant failed to show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland/Miller; and (2) there were no errors in the trial court's proceedings that would warrant application of the cumulative doctrine to the facts of this case. View "Meadows v. Mutter" on Justia Law