Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Ruth Ann Pinson and dismissing Denise Johnson's claim that Ruth's husband, Mark Pinson, violated West Virginia's Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act's (UFTA), W. Va. Code 40-1A-1 to -15, prohibition against fraudulent transfers, holding that Plaintiff did not present evidence demonstrating the existence of a material fact regarding Mark's status as her debtor within the meaning of the UFTA.Johnson asserted that Mark conveyed real property to Ruth with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Johnson's attempt to collect on a judgment assigned to her by a third party. The circuit court found that Ruth was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not misinterpret the UFTA or err in denying Johnson's motion to amend the complaint to add Mark as a defendant. View "Johnson v. Pinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying AC&S, Inc.'s motion to dismiss this complaint claiming unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation, holding that the circuit court did not err.After his employment with AC&S was terminated, Plaintiff brought this case, asserting claims for unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation. AC&S filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration of Plaintiff's claims under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the relevant union and AC&S. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiff's individual employment discrimination claims fell outside the scope of the CBA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory and common law employment discrimination claims fell outside the substantive scope of the CBA. View "AC&S Inc., v. George" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that defendants are not entitled to credit for time served on home incarceration where the home incarceration is a condition of probation.Defendant was convicted of one count of grand larceny by false pretenses. Defendant was sentenced to a term of one to ten years in prison, suspended in favor of three years' probation. After Defendant's probation was revoked, he was sentenced to the underlying term of incarceration. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, asserting that he should be credited for time served on home incarceration as part of his probation. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to credit for time served while on home incarceration where that home incarceration was imposed as a condition of probation rather than as an alternative sentence to another form of incarceration. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion for a new trial and renewed motion for a new trial after a bench trial, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that Petitioners had neither an express easement nor a prescriptive easement across Respondents' property.At issue was an internal private road on Respondents' property that stretched to Petitioners' property. Respondents eventually revoked permission to use the internal road and blocked Petitioners' access across the private road. The circuit court determined that Petitioners had neither an express easement nor a prescriptive easement across Respondents' property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding (1) no express easement existed that granted Petitioners the right to use the private road crossing Respondents' property; and (2) no easement across Respondents' land was established by prescription. View "Carr v. Veach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered a question certified by the circuit court and answered that the deceptive trade practices provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (the Act), W. Va. Code 46A-6-101 to -106, do not apply to educational and recreational services offered by a religious institution.The Attorney General sued the Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston and Michael Bransfield, in his capacity as former bishop of the Diocese, alleging (1) the Diocese knowingly employed persons who admitted to sexually abusing others or who were credibly accused of sexual abuse at its camps and schools, and (2) by misrepresenting or hiding that danger, the Diocese violated the deceptive practices provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The circuit court dismissed the Attorney General's claims but stayed its order and certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the deceptive practices provisions of the Act do not apply to educational and recreational services offered by a religious institution. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversing the administrative order revoking Gary Bragg's driving privileges for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances and/or drugs (DUI), holding that the OAH erred in reversing the order of revocation.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the OAH erred in reversing the order of revocation based solely upon the fact that a blood sample withdrawn from Bragg was not tested or made available to Bragg for independent testing; and (2) because the OAH failed otherwise to evaluate the record evidence, the case must be remanded for a determination of whether sufficient evidence supported the administrative revocation of Bragg's driver's license. View "Frazier v. Bragg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment finding that Gary Dobbs retained his right to purchase pasture land under a 1976 option agreement and that Terry and Catherine Dobbs triggered that right to purchase when they signed a 2007 option agreement, holding that the circuit court did not err.After Lyle Hobbs died, the land he owned passed to his wife and two sons, Terry and Gary. The trio conveyed a small parcel to the sons for a slaughterhouse. The remaining land, including a pasture, was conveyed to Terry and his wife, Catherine. Gary reserved the right to buy back the pasture land if Terry died or if Terry and Catherine decided to sell or assign the pasture land. Gary subsequently purchased the slaughterhouse property at auction. Decades later, Terry and Catherine entered into an option agreement with McElroy Coal Company to either sell the pasture land or provide McElroy Coal a waiver of liability for the company's mining operations. McElroy Coal chose a waiver and paid Terry and Catherine. Thereafter, Gary sued McElroy Coal and Terry and Catherine, alleging that they breached the 1976 option agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "McElroy Coal Co. v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment for Respondents on their declaratory judgment action against Petitioner, their insurer, to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the insurance policy, holding that an exclusion in the policy was applicable so that the policy did not cover Respondents' loss.The building housing Respondents' business was inundated with sewage, causing damage. Respondents were insured by Petitioner under a general commercial liability policy. Petitioner denied coverage for the loss as falling under an exclusion for "water that backs up or overflows from a sewer, drain or sump." Respondents brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights of the parties under the insurance contract. The trial court found that the policy exclusion was inapplicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it found the exclusion to be inapplicable. View "Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Zukoff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court removing the child B.A. from the custody of Petitioners, foster parents, holding that the circuit court properly considered Petitioners' finances but that remand was required for a full analysis of the facts within the framework of the sibling preference contained in W. Va. Code 49-4-111(e) and the holding in In re Carol B., 550 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 2001).Petitioners had already adopted B.A.'s older sibling when B.A. was placed in their foster care. The guardian ad litem appointed to represent B.A. later discovered a number of liens and judgments against Petitioners, as well as more than $46,000 in unpaid child support. The guardian recommended that B.A. be removed from Petitioners' custody due to those issues. The circuit court directed that B.A. be removed from Petitioners' custody, finding that Petitioners would not meet the prerequisites to adopt the child under W. Va. Code 48-22-701(d). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its apparent failure to place any weight on Petitioners' adoption of B.A.'s sibling and that Petitioners' home was the only home B.A. had ever known. The Court remanded the case for the circuit court to perform a best interests analysis making detailed consideration of the sibling preference. View "In re B.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court that ordered the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to grant the application for a motor vehicle salesperson license submitted by Timothy McCabe, holding that W. Va. Code 17A-6E-4(c)(5) is rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in preventing fraudulent activity in the motor vehicle industry and is not arbitrary or discriminatory.McCabe was denied a permanent motor vehicle salesperson license pursuant to section 17A-6E-4(c)(5), which prohibits the issuance of a motor vehicle salesperson license to an applicant previously convicted of a felony involving financial matters or the motor vehicle industry. The circuit court ordered that McCabe's application for a motor vehicle salesperson license be granted, concluding that the statute cannot lawfully be applied to applicants who were convicted of felonies prior to the enactment of the statute, that Defendant was denied due process, and that the statute is both constitutionally overbroad and overly narrow. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 17A-6E-4(c)(5) is a regulatory statute that does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws; (2) Defendant was afforded his procedural due process rights; and (3) the statute is neither overly broad nor overly narrow. View "Frazier v. McCabe" on Justia Law