Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, holding that the DEP was entitled to qualified immunity.Plaintiffs suffered damages to personal and real property as a result of severe flooding of Bull Creek in McDowell County. Plaintiffs filed suit against Twin Star Mining, Inc. and the DEP, claiming negligence. The DEP moved for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity and the public duty doctrine. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the DEP's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. View "W. Va. Department of Environmental Protection v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered certified questions of law by holding that W. Va. Code 60A-4-416(b), which criminalizes the failure of any person who, while engaged in the illegal use of a controlled substance with another, knowingly fails to seek medical assistance for such other person and an overdose or adverse physical reaction proximately causes the death of the other person, is constitutional.Petitioner was indicted on the charge of failing to render aid to another, in violation of section 60A-4-416(b). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The circuit court held the motion in abeyance and determined that certain aspects of section 60A-4-416(b) warranted the certification of two questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the phrase in section 60A-4-416(b) "any person who, while engaged in the illegal use of a controlled substance with another" is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the undefined phrase "seek medical assistance" in the context of the statute provides an adequate standard for adjudication. View "State v. Conner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to prohibit Respondents from enforcing any policy restricting the use of devices to make a recording of public documents, holding that the circuit court erred.Respondents in this case were Grant County Circuit Clerk Angela Van Meter, the Grant County Circuit Clerk's Office, and the Grant County Commission. Petitioner planned to photograph several documents in the public file at the Grant County Circuit Clerk's Office, but he was instructed that he would be required to pay a one dollar fee per page for each photograph. Petitioner then brought this action. The circuit court ruled that W. Va. Code 59-1-11(b)(2) permitted the circuit clerk's office to impose the fee for photographs taken of public documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clear language of the statute limits limits the imposition of the statutory per-page fee to papers made by the clerk and does not apply to photographs taken by an individual member of the public. View "Smith v. Van Meter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing the underlying eminent domain action, holding that the sua sponte dismissal of this action without notice and an opportunity to be heard required reversal of the circuit court's order.In 1990, Respondent, the Wheeling Creek Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Commission, filed a condemnation proceeding against Petitioners' property. In 1991, Respondent received right of entry and Petitioners received Respondent's statement of just compensation. The matter lay dormant until 2018 when Petitioners filed a motion for further proceedings to determine just compensation. The circuit court (1) concluded that estoppel, laches, and applicable statutes of limitation or repose prevented Petitioners from resurrecting the matter; and (2) sua sponte found that Petitioners' withdrawal of Respondent's estimate of just compensation without further proceedings until now was sufficient proof of accord and satisfaction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred by failing to notify the parties of its intent to dispose of the matter and provide them a meaningful opportunity to respond and be heard; and (2) none of the doctrines espoused by the circuit court to preclude further prosecution prevented Petitioners from resurrecting this matter. View "Scherich v. Wheeling Creek Watershed Protection & Flood Prevention Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying the motions filed by both sides for reasonable attorney fees and expenses after a settlement left each side convicted that the other side had behaved in bad faith, holding that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying Michael Harlow's motion for attorney fees and expenses.Harlow was one of three members of Eastern Electric, LLC when Eastern lost almost $400,000 in a prevailing wage case. Thereafter, Harlow dissociated from Eastern. Eastern made an offer to purchase Harlow's interest, but Harlow rejected the offer. Harlow then sued to enforce his statutory right to receive fair value for his interest. The parties eventually settled. Both sides then sought to recover their attorney fees and expenses. The circuit court rejected both parties' motions, and Harlow appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing an award of fees. View "Harlow vs. Eastern Electric, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Aaron W.'s requested writ of prohibition seeking to prevent Robert M. Montgomery, Judge of the Family Court of Kanawha County, from holding a hearing or otherwise deciding Evelyn W.'s motion to disqualify Aaron's counsel, holding that the family courts of this State have the authority to disqualify attorneys appearing before them.In this case that originated as a divorce proceeding, Evelyn filed a motion to disqualify Aaron's attorney from representing him in the divorce proceedings. Aaron filed a petition for writ prohibition in the circuit court seeking to prevent the family court from hearing or ruling on the motion, claiming that family courts lack jurisdictional authority to decide matters pertaining to the disqualification of attorneys. The circuit court denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court had the jurisdictional authority to hear and rule upon Evelyn's disqualification motion. View "Aaron W. v. Honorable Robert M. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court that denied Petitioner's appeal of an order of the family court modifying an infant guardianship order to prohibit Petitioner from having any contact with his child, J.B., holding that Petitioner's due process rights were violated.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the family court erred by failing to give him adequate notice or the opportunity to be heard at the final hearing in this matter. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's final order, holding that Petitioner was not afforded his due process rights as the father of J.B. when he was not afforded the opportunity to refute the family court's assumption that he was unfit to have contact with his child. The Court remanded this case for a full evidentiary hearing before the family court. View "David C. v. Tammy S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint claiming failure to accommodate, gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, holding that the circuit court did not err.In dismissing the complaint, the circuit court found that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they could have been raised in an earlier lawsuit between the same parties. Plaintiff appealed, arguing (1) she was foreclosed from raising her claims during the earlier proceeding because the deadline for amendments to the pleadings had passed, and (2) the claims were different from those raised in the earlier lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly found that res judicata was a bar to the litigation of Plaintiff's claims. View "Baker v. Chemours Co. FC, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment, holding that Petitioners were immune from Respondent's lawsuit pursuant to the litigation privilege and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.Petitioners executed an oil and gas lease to a company that assigned 2,300 acres of Petitioners' tract to Respondent for a storage project. Respondent then applied to FERC for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct and operate a storage field. Petitioners intervened in the FERC proceeding. FERC eventually granted Respondent's request. When Respondent did not complete construction of the storage facility within the required amount of time it sought a three-year extension. Petitioners opposed the extension, and FERC denied Respondent's request to extend the timeframe. Thereafter, Petitioners filed suit against Respondent alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment. Respondent filed a counterclaim alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were immune from suit pursuant to the litigation privilege and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the litigation privilege and Noerr-Pennington doctrine provided Petitioners with immunity from all of Respondent's counterclaims. View "Smith v. Chestnut Ridge Storage, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court modifying the disposition of this case to terminate Petitioners' parental rights under W. Va. Code Ann. 49-4-604(c)(6), holding that the circuit court erred in modifying the disposition absent a motion under section 49-4-606 and that the parties were deprived of due process when they were not notified that the circuit court intended to take up a motion to modify disposition.In 2017, the circuit court ordered a "section 5" disposition, concluding that Petitioners were unwilling or unable to provide for B.W.'s needs and that there were no parenting services available specifically tailed to Petitioners' need for reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213. The court did not terminate Petitioners' parental rights at that time but dismissed the case from its docket. In 2019, the circuit court held a status hearing and sua sponte modified the case's disposition to terminate Petitioners' parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that termination of Petitioners' parental rights violated the procedure required by section 49-4-606 to modify disposition and denied Petitioners due process. View "In re B.W." on Justia Law