Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court concluding that the right of first refusal in a deed conveying land from the grantor to the grantee but containing a clause granting the grantee to give a "stranger" the right of first refusal to any future conveyance of the land was not void under the "stranger to the deed" rule.The "stranger to the deed" rule identifies someone who is neither a grantor nor a grantee to a conveyance as a "stranger" and posits that any property interest in favor of that stranger, and which is contained in a reservation or an exception, is void. The circuit court applied the "stranger to the deed" rule and ruled that the right of first refusal clause in the deed was void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a right of first refusal clause in a deed is neither an exception nor a reservation; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred when it applied the "stranger to the deed" rule and dismissed the complaint. View "Klein v. McCullough" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner requesting the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the Honorable Paul Farrell, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cabell County, from enforcing the court's order in which the circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the writ.Petitioner was indicted on three felony offenses in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. In his request for prohibitory relief from the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the State violated his speedy trial right by not trying him within three regular terms of court after the return of his indictment, as required by W. Va. Code 62-3-21. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that there was no violation of the three-term rule in this case because, as of the date of Petitioner's motion to dismiss and the circuit court's ruling on the motion, three regular terms of court had not yet passed since Petitioner had been indicted. View "State ex rel. Porter v. Honorable Paul Farrell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Petitioner, Chair of the Wayne County Republican Executive Committee, compelling James C. Justice, II, Governor of West Virginia, to select Derrick Evans' replacement replacement from a list of three candidates, holding that Petitioner failed to show a clear legal right to the relief sought.This request for extraordinary relief stemmed from the resignation of Evans, a Republican, from his elected position as a member of the House of Delegates from the Nineteenth Delegate District. Petitioner sought to writ of mandamus compelling Governor Justice to select Evans' replacement from a list of candidates submitted by the executive committee members of Wayne County residing in the Nineteenth delegate district. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the county letter was the result of a process that did not comply with the provisions of W. Va. Code 3-10-5. View "State ex rel. Maynard v. Justice" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court refusing to compel arbitration in this case alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-1 to -20, holding that the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) could not enforce the arbitration agreement.Plaintiff, a nurse who formerly worked for Sunbelt Staffing, LLC, signed an employment agreement containing an arbitration provision. Plaintiff was assigned to work at a hospital under DHHR's direction but later was informed she was not eligible to return to work for DHHR. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against DHHR and others, alleging violations of the Act. DHHR moved to dismiss the amended complaint and to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DHHR had no right to invoke arbitration contained in the employment agreement; and (2) the theory of estoppel did not require arbitration. View "W. Va. Department of Health & Human Resources v. Denise" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court effectively granting summary judgment to Defendants, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the continuous representation doctrine was not applicable to the facts presented in this case.The circuit court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable two-year statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claim had expired before the filing of his legal malpractice lawsuit. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the continuous representation doctrine to find that his complaint was timely filed. The Supreme Court converted the dismissal to summary judgment because the lower court considered matters outside the pleadings and affirmed, holding that because there was no continuing representation of Plaintiff by Defendants, the circuit court properly ruled that Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. View "Hupp v. Monahan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's termination of Mother's parental rights to her infant child, who died during the pendency of these abuse and neglect proceedings, holding that W. Va. Code 49-4-604(c)(6) does not permit termination of parental rights following the death of the child who is the subject of the underlying abuse and neglect petition.Mother entered a voluntary stipulation of adjudication admitting that she neglected the infant by subjecting it to drug abuse and/or a drug-endangered environment and by using and abusing alcohol and drugs. The infant subsequently died. Mother moved to dismiss the petition against her. The circuit court denied the motion and later terminated Mother's parental rights to the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the death of the only child named in an abuse and neglect petition requires its post-adjudicatory dismissal. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the circuit court affirming the family court's determination that Respondent was the legal father of Child, holding that the circuit court erred in upholding the family court's paternity determination.The family court concluded that Respondent was the legal parent of Child and conducted both a de facto adoption and de facto termination of parental rights. In affirming the determination of the family court, the circuit court upheld the family court's refusal to admit DNA test results demonstrating that Petitioner was Child's biological father. The Supreme Court vacated the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case, holding (1) the lower courts erred in their decision to disregard the paternity test results; and (2) to the extent that both a de facto adoption and termination of parental rights occurred in family court, the court acted beyond its jurisdiction. View "Corey D. v. Michelle H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting and sentencing Defendant for first-degree robbery, holding that Defendant's assignments of error did not merit relief.Defendant and his girlfriend were indicted for robbing a gambling parlor. Before trial, the girlfriend agreed to testify against Defendant. After Defendant made a series of jailhouse phone calls to his girlfriend, she withdrew her plea agreement and declared she would not testify against Defendant. The circuit court granted the State's motion to admit the girlfriend's recorded statement into evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting the State's motion to admit the girlfriend's out-of-court statement under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine; (2) the circuit court properly found that Defendant had engaged in wrongdoing that would support the admission of the girlfriend's out-of-court statement; (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (4) the court's answer to a jury question was not in error. View "State v. Jako" on Justia Law

In this premises liability case, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, holding that the circuit court plainly erred in making factual determinations based upon assertions in Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff asserted that, during a visit to Defendant's house, an object on Defendant's front porch stairs caused him to slip, fall, and be injured. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because the complaint did not allege facts demonstrating that Plaintiff was not a trespasser on Defendant's porch, then Plaintiff was a trespasser who was owed no duty of care. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court plainly erred in making factual determinations based upon assertions in Defendant's motion to dismiss; and (2) the complaint stated a claim, and dismissal was improper. View "Gable v. Gable" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition seeking to vacate the circuit court's order denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss the underlying suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the claims.Respondents sued Petitioners - various medical providers, pharmacists, and pharmacies - under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) asserting claims of medical negligence, pharmacist negligence, and loss of consortium. Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Respondents did not serve a notice of claim upon Petitioners before filing their complaint. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed due to Respondents' failure to comply with the MPLA's pre-suit requirements. View "State ex rel. Hope Clinic, PLLC v. Judge McGraw" on Justia Law