Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding Central Environmental Services, LLC (CES) damages, holding that a court may not award damages based on both unjust enrichment and breach of contract where such theories of recovery arise from the same set of facts.Gulfport Energy corporation entered into a contract with CES whereby CES agreed to provide services at Gulfport's wells. Some of CES's invoices remained unpaid when the business relationship ended. CES sued Gulfport alleging that Gulfport breached the contract and was unjustly enriched by CES's performance. The circuit court awarded CES $144,038. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the circuit court awarded judgment based, at least in part, on unjust enrichment where the litigants were parties to an express contract, the circuit court's order must be reversed. View "Gulfport Energy Corp. v. Harbert Private Equity Partners, LP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Wal-Mart's posttrial motions and the court's judgment against each defendant in this personal injury case according to its apportioned fault, holding that the circuit court did not err.Plaintiff sued Wal-Mart after she sustained serious injuries in a collision with a fleeing shoplifter in a Parkersburg Wal-Mart. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded $16.9 million in damages, apportioning thirty percent of the fault to Wal-Mart and the remainder to the shoplifter. The circuit court denied Wal-Mart's posttrial motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wal-Mart owed a duty to Plaintiff to protect her from the shoplifter's criminal conduct, and a reasonable juror could have concluded that the shoplifter's flight was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries; (2) the circuit court did not commit reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury on intervening cause; (3) any error in the circuit court's exclusion of certain allegations in Plaintiff's complaint was harmless; (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Plaintiff prejudgment interest on her past medication expenses; and (5) the circuit court did not err in refusing to enter Plaintiff's proposed judgment order. View "Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. v. Ankrom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the circuit court in favor of Rosa Lee Butcher in the suit Butcher filed against Defendants, a police officer and the Clarksburg City Police Department, holding that in a claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 a plaintiff cannot obtain a finding of liability or receive a judgment for damages against a John Doe defendant.The circuit court upheld the jury's finding of liability against the John Doe defendants, as well as the judgment rendered against the John Doe defendants in favor of Butcher. The court then awarded costs and attorney's fees to Butcher. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a government official can be held liable only for his or her own misconduct, and Butcher failed to establish that any of the John Doe defendants were personally and directly responsible for the conduct giving rise to her section 1983 claim; and (2) because Butcher did not prevail in her section 1983 action she was not entitled to receive an award of her costs or attorney's fees. View "Vinson v. Butcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying the motion filed by Plaintiff, an oil and gas drilling company, for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff a favorable declaratory judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to imply into an existing oil and gas lease a covenant to pool and unitize the lease with nearby mineral estates.Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration that the oil and gas lease at issue contained an implied covenant to pool or unitize the lease with other mineral interests. The circuit court rejected Plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment, holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that there can be no implied covenant to pool or unitize in the absence of language in the lease showing the parties contemplated that a lessor has a right to pool and unitize the lease with other estates. View "Ascent Resources - Marcellus, LLC v. Huffman" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying Plaintiff a new trial on damages and imposing sanctions, holding that the verdict awarding no damages was inadequate.Plaintiff sued Defendant for the intentional tort of battery. The jury found Defendant liable for battery but awarded Plaintiff no damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because the uncontroverted evidence was not only that the battery caused Plaintiff's brain injury but also that Plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury for which he was not compensated, the verdict was inadequate; (2) the circuit court was within its discretion to require the parties to bear their own costs and to order Defendants to pay the costs of the jury trial; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions in the form of attorney fees where Defendants displayed a pattern of discovery misconduct. View "McKenzie v. Sevier" on Justia Law

In this tax appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the final order of the circuit court determining that certain purchases of tangible personal property and services made by Antero Resources Corporation did not qualify for the direct use exemption under W. Va. Code 9(b)(2) and 11-15A-3(a)(2) (the direct use exemption), holding that Antero was entitled to the direct use exemption for certain purchases and services.The office of tax appeals reimposed a sale and use tax assessment against Antero for purchases and rentals of certain personal property and services. The circuit court reversed, determining that because certain purchases of tangible personal property and services made by Antero were not directly used in its natural resource production, they did not qualify for the direct use exemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Antero (1) was entitled to the direct use exemption for crew quarters and related equipment, portable toils, sewage systems, related water systems, and septic cleaning charges; and (2) was not entitled to the exemption for the rentals of trash trailers and waste receptacles. View "Antero Resources Corp. v. Steager" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Public Employees Grievance Board (PEGB) determining that Petitioners, employees of the Lincoln County Board of Education, did not qualify as Executive Secretaries under W. Va. 18A-4-8(i)(45), holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioners filed grievances with the PEGB seeking reclassification from Secretary III to Executive Secretary. The PEGB found that Petitioners did not meet section 18A-4-8(i)(45)'s definition of Executive Secretary but that they were entitled to reclassification because they met the Board's definition of Executive Secretary. The circuit court affirmed the PEGB's determination that Petitioners did not qualify as Executive Secretaries under the Code but reversed the decision granting Petitioners' requested classification, concluding that the Board's definition of Executive Secretary contravened state law because it conflicted with section 18A-4-8(i)(45). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's definition of the Executive Secretary title was unquestionably contrary to the law. View "Owens v. Lincoln County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative a question certified to it by the Bankruptcy Court for the North District of West Virginia, concluding that a manufactured home with a title issued by the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) may be converted to real property by operation of common law even when the home still maintains a motor vehicle title.At issue was how, under state law, one can perfect a security interest upon a manufactured home that maintains both personal and real property characteristics. The Supreme Court determined that satisfying the requirements of Snuffer v. Spangler, 92 S.E. 106 ( W. Va. 1917) converts the legal character of a manufactured home from personal to real property such that a lien on that property may be perfected by deed of trust even if the home's owners have not cancelled the DMV title under the cancellation procedure of W. Va. Cod3 17A-3-12b(a). View "Sheehan v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Ruth Ann Pinson and dismissing Denise Johnson's claim that Ruth's husband, Mark Pinson, violated West Virginia's Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act's (UFTA), W. Va. Code 40-1A-1 to -15, prohibition against fraudulent transfers, holding that Plaintiff did not present evidence demonstrating the existence of a material fact regarding Mark's status as her debtor within the meaning of the UFTA.Johnson asserted that Mark conveyed real property to Ruth with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Johnson's attempt to collect on a judgment assigned to her by a third party. The circuit court found that Ruth was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not misinterpret the UFTA or err in denying Johnson's motion to amend the complaint to add Mark as a defendant. View "Johnson v. Pinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying AC&S, Inc.'s motion to dismiss this complaint claiming unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation, holding that the circuit court did not err.After his employment with AC&S was terminated, Plaintiff brought this case, asserting claims for unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation. AC&S filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration of Plaintiff's claims under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the relevant union and AC&S. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiff's individual employment discrimination claims fell outside the scope of the CBA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory and common law employment discrimination claims fell outside the substantive scope of the CBA. View "AC&S Inc., v. George" on Justia Law