Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The petitioner, J.F., appealed the Circuit Court of Kanawha County's order terminating his parental rights to his children, C.F. and T.F. The case began when the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against J.F. after he was arrested for various charges, including child neglect. The petition alleged that J.F. had committed acts of domestic violence and verbal abuse in the presence of C.F. T.F. was living with his paternal grandparents under a legal guardianship at the time. The petition included historical allegations of domestic violence involving T.F.'s mother, M.H., and J.F., but no recent allegations involving T.F.The Circuit Court adjudicated J.F. as an abusive and neglectful parent and found both children to be abused and neglected. At the disposition hearing, the court terminated J.F.'s parental rights, citing his incarceration and denial of the abuse, which prevented DHS from providing remedial services. The court also denied J.F. post-termination visitation with his children.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court found that the Circuit Court failed to make specific findings regarding T.F. being an abused or neglected child, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-601. The court noted that T.F. was living with non-abusive guardians and that the allegations of domestic violence involving T.F. were outdated. Consequently, the court vacated the Circuit Court's adjudicatory and dispositional orders concerning T.F. and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if T.F. met the statutory definition of an abused or neglected child.The court affirmed the termination of J.F.'s parental rights to C.F., agreeing with the lower court's findings that the conditions of abuse and neglect were unlikely to improve due to J.F.'s denial of the circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of post-termination visitation, finding no evidence of a close emotional bond between J.F. and his children or that continued contact would not be detrimental to their well-being. View "In re C.F. and T.F." on Justia Law

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In May 2019, a fire in Davisville resulted in the deaths of Robert and Charlotte Taylor and injuries to a child. Sixteen-year-old M.W., the Taylors' daughter, was interviewed by Deputy Fire Marshal Jason Baltic at the scene. During the interview, M.W. confessed to starting the fire using gasoline. M.W. was subsequently indicted for first-degree murder, attempted murder, and arson. She moved to suppress her confession, arguing that she had not voluntarily waived her Miranda rights and that her confession was coerced. The circuit court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial, where the jury found M.W. guilty on all counts.The Circuit Court of Wood County denied M.W.'s motion to suppress her confession, finding that she had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. The court also found that her confession was not coerced. M.W. later filed an emergency motion to reconsider the suppression ruling, citing a Brady violation due to the late disclosure of Deputy Sheriff Tasha Hewitt's past untruthfulness. The circuit court denied this motion, stating that Baltic's testimony was credible and sufficient to establish that M.W. had been read her Miranda rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that M.W. had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights, considering her age, intelligence, and the circumstances of the interview. The court also found that her confession was not coerced, as Baltic's interview techniques did not overbear her will. Additionally, the court ruled that the late disclosure of Hewitt's past untruthfulness did not constitute a Brady violation that would have changed the outcome of the suppression hearing. Finally, the court upheld the jury's verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support M.W.'s convictions. View "State v. M.W." on Justia Law

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The State of West Virginia sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Monongalia County from enforcing its order dismissing a two-count indictment against William J. McGough. McGough was charged with failing to register as a sex offender, second or subsequent offense, under West Virginia Code § 15-12-8. The circuit court dismissed the indictment, concluding that McGough was not required to register as a sex offender in West Virginia because he was no longer required to register in Ohio, where his original conviction occurred.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County granted McGough’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. The court reasoned that under West Virginia Code § 15-12-9(c), McGough was not required to register in West Virginia since he was no longer required to register in Ohio. The court interpreted this statute as the only relevant law applicable to McGough’s case, thereby dismissing the indictment on the grounds that the facts did not support the charges.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers by dismissing the indictment based on the sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that a circuit court may not grant a defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on such grounds, as this invades the province of the grand jury. The court emphasized that the grand jury’s role is to determine whether there is sufficient probable cause to require the defendant to stand trial, not to determine the truth of the charges. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the circuit court from enforcing its dismissal order. View "State of West Virginia ex rel., State of West Virginia v. Gwaltney" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC, doing business as Burger King, and its employees Lesley McLaughlin, Sheila Spaulding, and Teresa Stephens (collectively, the Petitioners) against Kenna Bishop (the Respondent). The dispute arose from allegations of sexual harassment and other violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act during Bishop's employment at a Burger King franchise. As part of her hiring process, Bishop signed an arbitration agreement with Ampler Burgers LLC, an affiliated company of her actual employer, Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC. The agreement required all disputes related to her employment to be arbitrated.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied the Petitioners' motion to compel arbitration, citing five reasons: Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC was not a party to the arbitration agreement; the agreement lacked mutual consideration; the dispute was not subject to the agreement; the agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable; and the Petitioners had waived their right to arbitration.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the arbitration agreement could be enforced by Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC as it was an affiliated entity of the signatory, Ampler Burgers LLC. The court also determined that the agreement was supported by mutual consideration and covered the disputes raised in the complaint. The court disagreed with the lower court's finding of unconscionability, stating that the agreement's requirements applied equally to all parties. Finally, the court concluded that the Petitioners did not waive their right to arbitration by engaging in limited litigation activities prior to filing the motion to compel arbitration. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC v. Bishop" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between Christopher P. (Father) and Amanda C. (Mother) over the custody of their two children. The Family Court of Upshur County was set to hold a final hearing on the matter, but a scheduling conflict arose for Mother's counsel, who was also due to appear in the Circuit Court of Webster County at the same time. Despite Mother's counsel notifying the courts of the conflict, the family court proceeded with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel. The family court then ruled that the children should primarily reside with Father.Mother appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the family court had wrongly failed to yield its hearing time to the circuit court. The ICA granted Mother a new custody hearing, but based its decision on the conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of West Virginia Code § 48-9-206. Father then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the ICA's decision in part, agreeing with the ICA that Mother is due a new hearing in family court, but disagreeing with the ICA's conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of the law. The Supreme Court found that the family court had abused its discretion by proceeding with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel, and remanded the case back to the family court for a new hearing. View "Christopher P. v. Amanda C." on Justia Law

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The case involves a mother, N.C.-F., who appealed a decision by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, regarding the placement of her children, M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3. The children's father had admitted to killing M.F.-3's mother, leading to an abuse and neglect case. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) placed M.F.-3 with his maternal aunt, S.M., while M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 remained in N.C.-F.'s physical custody, but their legal custody was with the DHS. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County adjudicated M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3 as abused and neglected children based on the father's actions. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings, determining that maintaining M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. served his best interests.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the circuit court did not err in its rulings, including the decision to maintain M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. The court also found that the circuit court did not violate N.C.-F.'s constitutional due process rights by placing custody of her children with the DHS during the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court concluded that the circuit court's decision to place M.F.-3 with S.M. was in the child's best interest and that the court had properly facilitated regular visitation between M.F.-3 and his half-siblings. View "In Re M.F.-1" on Justia Law

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The case involves the paternal grandparents of a child, M.F. III, who sought to intervene in an abuse and neglect proceeding following the fatal stabbing of the child's mother by his father. The grandparents, who lived in Baltimore, Maryland, but had a second home in Charleston, West Virginia, filed three motions to intervene in the proceedings, seeking placement of the child and/or visitation rights. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied all three motions. The grandparents appealed, arguing that the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to conduct a home study to determine their suitability as adoptive parents, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3).The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had previously reviewed the case. The court denied the grandparents' motions to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court also did not order the DHS to conduct a home study to assess the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents, despite the termination of the father's parental rights and the child's placement in the DHS's permanent custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the grandparents' motions to intervene, as they did not fall within the class of individuals who may seek permissive intervention under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h). However, the court found that the DHS had failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) to consider the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents. The court remanded the case with directions for the DHS to comply with the statute and for the circuit court to determine the child's best interests for permanent placement following the DHS's compliance. View "In Re M.F. III" on Justia Law

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The case involves Brian Frye, a homeowner who claimed that his property had suffered damage due to underground mine subsidence. He submitted a claim to his home insurer, Erie Insurance Company, and notified the Board of Risk Insurance and Management (BRIM) of the damages. Both Erie and BRIM investigated the claim, but both denied it, stating that the damage was not due to mine subsidence. Frye then sued Erie for breach of contract and other claims. The Circuit Court of Ohio County granted summary judgment to Erie, concluding that Erie functioned as BRIM’s agent in the adjustment of Frye’s claim. Frye moved the court to alter or amend that judgment, arguing that it threatened the constitutionality of certain West Virginia statutes.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the lower court erred by failing to notify the Attorney General of the constitutional questions raised in Frye’s motion to alter or amend the summary judgment order. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the lower court’s order denying Frye’s motion and to remand the matter to permit the lower court to notify the Attorney General of these proceedings in accordance with Rule 24(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Frye v. Erie Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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The case involves a lawsuit filed by Rosemary Lambert and Carolyn Hinzman, individually and as co-executors of the estate of Delmar P. Fields, against Eldercare of Jackson County, LLC, Community Health Association, and Dr. Irvin John Snyder. The plaintiffs allege that Mr. Fields contracted COVID-19 while a resident at Eldercare and died while under the care of Jackson General and Dr. Snyder. The defendants sought dismissal of the lawsuit, arguing that they were immune from liability under the COVID-19 Jobs Protection Act.The Circuit Court of Jackson County denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court interpreted the term "actual malice" in the COVID-19 Jobs Protection Act to mean that the defendant acted with the intent to injure or harm the plaintiff or decedent. The court found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court held that the term "actual malice" in the COVID-19 Jobs Protection Act means that the defendant acted with the deliberate intent to commit an injury, as evidenced by external circumstances. The court found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to show that Eldercare engaged in intentional conduct with actual malice. However, the court found that the allegations against Jackson General Hospital and Dr. Snyder were insufficient to establish that they engaged in intentional conduct with actual malice. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Eldercare of Jackson County, LLC v. Lambert" on Justia Law

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The case involves Michael D. Ruble and Brenda K. Ruble, who filed a lawsuit against Rust-Oleum Corporation and other defendants. Michael Ruble alleged that he was injured due to exposure to defective, toxic chemicals at his workplace, which were manufactured by third parties. He filed a product-defect lawsuit against these manufacturers and a workers' compensation claim with his employer. The workers' compensation administrative process concluded that Ruble failed to prove he developed an injury as a result of his employment. The third-party manufacturers then moved to dismiss the product-defect lawsuit, arguing that Ruble was barred from litigating causation in court due to the workers' compensation decision. The Circuit Court of Cabell County granted the motion to dismiss.The Circuit Court of Cabell County ruled in favor of the third-party manufacturers, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court held that the workers' compensation decision precluded Ruble from litigating the causation issue in court. The court found that the workers' compensation process involved legal standards and procedural rules that were substantially different from those in a courtroom, and that process did not afford Ruble a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the third-party manufacturers' chemicals were a cause of his injury.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision. The court found that the workers' compensation administrative procedures were not an adequate substitute for juridical procedures in the circuit court. The court held that Ruble did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of causation in the prior workers' compensation administrative proceedings. The court concluded that it was error for the circuit court to have applied collateral estoppel to Ruble's claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ruble v. Rust-Oleum Corporation" on Justia Law