Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Activate Healthcare, LLC under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff's factual allegations against Activate were insufficient to establish a claim of aiding and abetting under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.Plaintiff was working at Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC when she requested a change in her duties to accommodate her medical condition. Plaintiff was directed to Activate, Constellium's on-site medical provider, for a physical activity report, but Activate issued more than one report. Constellium terminated Plaintiff based on one of the reports and later returned to work. After Plaintiff unsuccessfully filed a grievance seeking lost wages during her break in employment she sued Constellium, Activate, and other defendants, alleging retaliation and discrimination. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's aiding and abetting claim against Activate for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that nothing in the complaint could be construed to establish the elements of an aiding and abetting claim. View "Boone vs. Activate Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the final order of the circuit court terminating Mother's rights to her infant son in an abuse and neglect proceeding, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that the child was abused and/or neglected. The petition stated that Mother and the child were residents of Tazewell County, Virginia but that the circuit court had jurisdiction because West Virginia was the home state of the child at the commencement of this proceeding. When DHHR was granted emergency legal custody of the child, Mother returned home to Virginia. The circuit court adjudicated Mother as an abusing parent and subsequently terminated her rights. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding. View "In re Z.H." on Justia Law

In this petition challenging two circuit court rulings the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling dismissing Petitioner's writ of prohibition and reversed the monetary sanction the circuit court imposed on Petitioner's attorney, Gregory Schillace, holding that Schillace was entitled to a jury trial on this sanction.Petitioner filed a complaint for declaratory relief, writ of prohibition and other relief seeking to enforce the terms of a divorce settlement entered into by Petitioner and his former wife and seeking to prevent the family court from proceeding with a contempt hearing against Petitioner and Schillace. At issue was a monetary sanction the circuit court imposed on Schillace and the circuit court's ruling dismissing Petitioner's writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly dismissed Petitioner's writ of prohibition; and (2) Schillace was entitled to a jury trial on the monetary sanction. View "Rector v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the order of the family court, which crafted a reunification plan with the goal of allowing grandparent of visitation to Respondents, the paternal grandparents of the six children in this case, holding that Petitioner did not meet her burden to demonstrate error.Upon her divorce from the children's father, Petitioner was granted full custody of the children. In the presence of all the children, the maternal grandfather shot and killed the father and then shot and killed himself. Respondents subsequently filed a petition for grandparent visitation. After a hearing, the family court ordered grandparent visitation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of showing that the judgment below was erroneous. View "In re Grandparent Visitation of L.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court concluding that the right of first refusal in a deed conveying land from the grantor to the grantee but containing a clause granting the grantee to give a "stranger" the right of first refusal to any future conveyance of the land was not void under the "stranger to the deed" rule.The "stranger to the deed" rule identifies someone who is neither a grantor nor a grantee to a conveyance as a "stranger" and posits that any property interest in favor of that stranger, and which is contained in a reservation or an exception, is void. The circuit court applied the "stranger to the deed" rule and ruled that the right of first refusal clause in the deed was void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a right of first refusal clause in a deed is neither an exception nor a reservation; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred when it applied the "stranger to the deed" rule and dismissed the complaint. View "Klein v. McCullough" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner requesting the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the Honorable Paul Farrell, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cabell County, from enforcing the court's order in which the circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the writ.Petitioner was indicted on three felony offenses in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. In his request for prohibitory relief from the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the State violated his speedy trial right by not trying him within three regular terms of court after the return of his indictment, as required by W. Va. Code 62-3-21. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that there was no violation of the three-term rule in this case because, as of the date of Petitioner's motion to dismiss and the circuit court's ruling on the motion, three regular terms of court had not yet passed since Petitioner had been indicted. View "State ex rel. Porter v. Honorable Paul Farrell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Petitioner, Chair of the Wayne County Republican Executive Committee, compelling James C. Justice, II, Governor of West Virginia, to select Derrick Evans' replacement replacement from a list of three candidates, holding that Petitioner failed to show a clear legal right to the relief sought.This request for extraordinary relief stemmed from the resignation of Evans, a Republican, from his elected position as a member of the House of Delegates from the Nineteenth Delegate District. Petitioner sought to writ of mandamus compelling Governor Justice to select Evans' replacement from a list of candidates submitted by the executive committee members of Wayne County residing in the Nineteenth delegate district. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the county letter was the result of a process that did not comply with the provisions of W. Va. Code 3-10-5. View "State ex rel. Maynard v. Justice" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court refusing to compel arbitration in this case alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-1 to -20, holding that the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) could not enforce the arbitration agreement.Plaintiff, a nurse who formerly worked for Sunbelt Staffing, LLC, signed an employment agreement containing an arbitration provision. Plaintiff was assigned to work at a hospital under DHHR's direction but later was informed she was not eligible to return to work for DHHR. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against DHHR and others, alleging violations of the Act. DHHR moved to dismiss the amended complaint and to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DHHR had no right to invoke arbitration contained in the employment agreement; and (2) the theory of estoppel did not require arbitration. View "W. Va. Department of Health & Human Resources v. Denise" on Justia Law

In this legal malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court effectively granting summary judgment to Defendants, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the continuous representation doctrine was not applicable to the facts presented in this case.The circuit court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable two-year statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claim had expired before the filing of his legal malpractice lawsuit. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the continuous representation doctrine to find that his complaint was timely filed. The Supreme Court converted the dismissal to summary judgment because the lower court considered matters outside the pleadings and affirmed, holding that because there was no continuing representation of Plaintiff by Defendants, the circuit court properly ruled that Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. View "Hupp v. Monahan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's termination of Mother's parental rights to her infant child, who died during the pendency of these abuse and neglect proceedings, holding that W. Va. Code 49-4-604(c)(6) does not permit termination of parental rights following the death of the child who is the subject of the underlying abuse and neglect petition.Mother entered a voluntary stipulation of adjudication admitting that she neglected the infant by subjecting it to drug abuse and/or a drug-endangered environment and by using and abusing alcohol and drugs. The infant subsequently died. Mother moved to dismiss the petition against her. The circuit court denied the motion and later terminated Mother's parental rights to the child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the death of the only child named in an abuse and neglect petition requires its post-adjudicatory dismissal. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law