Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a child, C.E.-1, who was found in a dangerous situation due to his parents' substance abuse. The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition against the parents, L.F. and C.E.-2, after L.F. was found unconscious with heroin nearby, and C.E.-1 was left in her care. Both parents admitted to drug use and were granted improvement periods to address their issues. However, they failed to comply with the terms, leading the guardian ad litem to move for termination of the improvement periods.The Circuit Court of Hancock County extended the improvement periods despite the parents' noncompliance, effectively prolonging the case. The guardian ad litem objected, but the court continued the improvement periods until July 2023. The court then scheduled a dispositional hearing but instead held an ex parte meeting with all parties except the guardian ad litem. Following this meeting, the court approved a Disposition Five agreement, placing C.E.-1 in the custody of the DHS and planning for a legal guardianship with the maternal grandmother.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred by not conducting a proper dispositional hearing and by excluding the guardian ad litem from the ex parte meeting. The court also noted that the dispositional order lacked necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's dispositional order and remanded the case for a proper dispositional hearing and entry of a new order consistent with its opinion. View "In re C.E.-1" on Justia Law

The case involves Corbett Maurice Carter, who was placed on home incarceration with electronic monitoring as a condition of pretrial bond after being charged with first-degree robbery. Carter left his home, cut his electronic monitoring bracelet, and disposed of it in a dumpster. He was later apprehended and charged with felony escape. At trial, the State presented evidence including the bond order and testimony from Corporal Patrick Vance, who supervised Carter's home incarceration. The jury found Carter guilty of felony escape.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County sentenced Carter to a three-year determinate sentence. Carter appealed, arguing that home incarceration as a condition of pretrial bond does not constitute "custody" under the escape statute, West Virginia Code § 61-5-10 (2000). He contended that the statute's language and legislative intent did not encompass pretrial home incarceration and that previous court decisions differentiated between pretrial and postconviction home incarceration.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Carter was in "custody" for purposes of the escape statute, as the Raleigh County Sheriff exercised significant control over his movements and daily life. The court found no legislative intent to exclude pretrial home incarceration from the statute's reach and emphasized that the statute aims to deter escape from lawful custody, whether pretrial or postconviction. The court affirmed Carter's conviction for felony escape, concluding that he breached the confinement imposed as a condition of his bond. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

In this case, Anthony M. was convicted of wanton endangerment, malicious assault, and other charges related to a 2021 shooting involving Brittany S., the mother of his children. Brittany S. testified that Anthony M. shot her while their infant child, K.M., was nearby. The State presented evidence including text messages, cell phone location data, and a firearm linked to the shooting found in Anthony M.'s residence. Anthony M. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, certain evidentiary rulings, and argued that his convictions for both wanton endangerment and malicious assault violated double jeopardy protections.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had previously denied Anthony M.'s post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial. The jury had acquitted him of charges related to a 2020 shooting but found him guilty of all charges related to the 2021 incident. He was sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for each conviction.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the conviction and sentence for both wanton endangerment and malicious assault violated double jeopardy protections because both charges stemmed from a single act involving one gunshot at Brittany S. The court affirmed the convictions on all other charges but vacated the conviction for wanton endangerment (Count Eleven) and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion.The court also addressed Anthony M.'s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his convictions. Additionally, the court found that the improper admission of lay opinion testimony by Brittany S.'s mother was harmless error and did not warrant a new trial. The court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anthony M.'s motion for a mistrial based on the State's improper comment on his right to remain silent. View "State v. Anthony M." on Justia Law

Petitioner C.S. and Respondent A.F.-1 are the non-offending parents of D.S., a child involved in an abuse and neglect proceeding. The Circuit Court of Grant County held several evidentiary hearings to determine custody of D.S. and awarded equal custodial responsibility to both parents. The father argued that he was the primary caregiver and that the mother had serious mental health issues affecting her ability to parent. The mother, the child’s guardian ad litem, and the Department of Human Services contended that the mother was receiving proper treatment and could share caretaking responsibilities.The Circuit Court of Grant County found that both parents had stable employment and homes, and although the mother had mental health issues, she was seeking proper treatment and could safely parent. The court noted that the mother had expansive visitation with D.S., which was appropriate and beneficial for the child. The court also emphasized the importance of D.S. maintaining contact with his half-sibling, A.F.-2. Despite concerns about the parents' strained relationship, the court concluded that both parents had the child’s best interests at heart and ordered a transition plan for equal custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and applied a two-prong deferential standard of review. The court found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding equal custodial allocation. The court noted that the circuit court had considered all relevant factors, including the mother’s mental health treatment and the father’s allegations. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, emphasizing the importance of meaningful contact between the child and both parents, as well as the child’s half-sibling. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Mary C. Sutphin, filed a complaint alleging statutory violations of the Uniform Trust Code and breaches of fiduciary duties against several defendants, including A. David Abrams and others. The complaint was amended twice, with the second amended complaint containing sixteen counts related to the management of Lewis Chevrolet and interference with the plaintiff’s inheritance. During discovery, the plaintiff received over ten thousand documents, which led to the filing of the second amended complaint. The defendants sought detailed information about the factual basis of the plaintiff’s allegations through interrogatories, but the plaintiff’s responses were deemed insufficient, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders for the plaintiff to supplement her responses.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County referred the discovery disputes to a discovery commissioner, who recommended that the plaintiff supplement her responses with specific references to the complaint and discovery materials. The plaintiff complied, but the defendants were still unsatisfied and sought to depose the plaintiff’s counsel, arguing that the plaintiff had relied on her counsel for the factual basis of her claims. The discovery commissioner denied the motion to compel the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel, applying the Shelton test, which requires showing that no other means exist to obtain the information, the information is relevant and non-privileged, and the information is crucial to the case. The circuit court partially rejected the discovery commissioner’s decision and ordered the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court committed a clear error of law by not properly applying the Shelton test. The court held that the information sought could be obtained from other sources and that the deposition would invade the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel. View "State ex rel. Sutphin v. Poling" on Justia Law

Danny Webb and Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. (Webb petitioners) appealed a Fayette County Circuit Court order that set aside a jury verdict in their favor and awarded North Hills Group, Inc. (North Hills) a new trial. North Hills had claimed that Webb petitioners contaminated their property by injecting fracking waste into a well on North Hills' land. Webb petitioners argued that the circuit court erred because sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict and because the parties' lease agreement precluded North Hills' claim for unjust enrichment.The Circuit Court of Fayette County had previously found that Webb petitioners breached their lease agreement with North Hills by injecting unauthorized substances into the well. The court set aside the jury's verdict, finding it contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and granting North Hills a new trial. Webb petitioners appealed, arguing that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and that the lease agreement barred the unjust enrichment claim.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court abused its discretion. The court held that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, including testimony that the substances found on North Hills' property did not exceed health-based standards. The court also held that the lease agreement precluded North Hills' unjust enrichment claim because it governed Webb Construction's injection activities. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict in favor of Webb petitioners and to enter judgment in accordance with the verdict. View "Danny Webb Construction Company, Inc. v. North Hills Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several car dealers (Thornhill Auto Group, Moses Ford, and Astorg Ford of Parkersburg) and Ford Motor Company. The dealers had renovated their facilities to meet Ford's Trustmark standards under a voluntary Facility Assistance Program, which provided matching funds up to $750,000. These renovations included specific franchisor image elements required and approved by Ford. Later, Ford introduced the Lincoln Commitment Program (LCP), which offered additional incentives for dealers who constructed exclusive Lincoln facilities, known as Vitrine facilities. The dealers did not meet the new LCP standards and thus did not receive the full incentives.The dealers filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, arguing that Ford's actions violated West Virginia Code section 17A-6A-10(1)(i). This statute prohibits manufacturers from requiring dealers to replace or substantially alter franchisor image elements installed within the preceding ten years if those elements were required and approved by the manufacturer. The district court found that the issue was a question of first impression and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the ten-year grandfather clause in West Virginia Code section 17A-6A-10(1)(i) applies to the dealers. The Court found that the dealers' renovations under the Facility Assistance Program, which included franchisor image elements required and approved by Ford, fell within the statute's protection. Therefore, Ford could not require the dealers to replace or substantially alter those elements within ten years of their installation. The Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "West Virginia Automobile and Truck Dealers' Association v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2015, the parental rights of H.M. and B.M.'s biological parents were terminated, and the children were adopted by their aunt, C.M. In 2019, the children were removed from C.M.'s home due to her substance abuse but were later returned after she completed an improvement period. In April 2022, new referrals indicated C.M. had relapsed, and the family was homeless. C.M. placed H.M. and B.M. in guardianships and entered a rehabilitation facility. DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition in May 2022. C.M. stipulated to substance abuse, and the court found the children to be abused and neglected. C.M. was granted an improvement period but failed to secure stable housing and employment and tested positive for drugs.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County held dispositional hearings and determined that C.M. did not substantially comply with her improvement period. The court placed H.M. in a legal guardianship with her foster mother, A.H., under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5), and dismissed C.M. from the case, allowing only the GAL or DHS to seek modification of the disposition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that C.M. failed to make sufficient improvement to be reunified with H.M. However, the court found errors in the dispositional order, specifically the dismissal of C.M. from the case and the provision for post-termination visitation at A.H.'s discretion. The court affirmed the decision to place H.M. in a legal guardianship but vacated the order in part and remanded the case for further proceedings to correct these deficiencies. View "In re H.M." on Justia Law

The case involves Francis Kaess, who owns mineral interests in land in Pleasants County, West Virginia, subject to an oil and gas lease with BB Land, LLC. The lease, dated January 6, 1979, provides for in-kind royalties, meaning Kaess is entitled to a portion of the physical oil and gas produced. BB Land began production in 2018, but Kaess did not take his share in-kind. Instead, BB Land sold Kaess' share and paid him royalties after deducting postproduction costs.Kaess filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, alleging improper deductions of postproduction costs from his royalties, among other claims. The district court denied BB Land's motion for summary judgment on the improper deductions claim, finding that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs set forth in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC apply to in-kind leases. BB Land then moved to certify a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and answered two certified questions. First, the court held that there is an implied duty to market the minerals in oil and gas leases containing an in-kind royalty provision. If the lessor does not take physical possession of their share, the lessee must either deliver the lessor's share to a third-party purchaser near the wellhead, buy the lessor's share, or market and sell the lessor's share along with their own.Second, the court held that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs from royalties, as established in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, apply to leases with in-kind royalty provisions. Therefore, if the lessee markets and sells the lessor's share, the lessee must tender the lessor's percentage share of the gross proceeds, free from any deductions for postproduction expenses, received at the first point of sale to an unaffiliated third-party purchaser in an arm's length transaction. View "Francis Kaess v. BB Land, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller against Antero Resources Corporation. The plaintiffs, who own oil and gas interests in Harrison County, West Virginia, allege that Antero breached the terms of their leases by failing to pay the full one-eighth royalty specified in the leases. They argue that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs from the gross sale proceeds of the gas, contrary to West Virginia Supreme Court precedents in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which is handling the case, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first question asked whether the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend only to the "first available market" as opposed to the "point of sale" when the duty to market is implicated. The second question asked whether the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on natural gas liquids (NGLs) and, if so, whether the lessors share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting the NGLs to sale.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia answered the first question in the negative, holding that the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend to the point of sale, not just to the first available market. The court reaffirmed that the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale unless the lease provides otherwise.For the second question, the court held that the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on NGLs. However, the court also held that absent express language in the lease to the contrary, the lessors do not share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting residue gas and NGLs to the point of sale. View "Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law