Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in this original jurisdiction case prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing its order denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss the amended complaint brought by Respondents, Angela and Denny Seth Lester, holding that the complaint failed to follow the pre-suit notice requirements set forth in the Medical Professional Liability Act, W. Va. Code 55-7B-1, et seq.Respondents sued Petitioner-hospital and other entities asserting that each negligently mishandled fetal remains following Angela's treatment at the hospital for a stillbirth. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that a stillborn fetus cannot be a "patient" under the MPLA, and therefore, Respondents were not required to comply with the MPLA's pre-suit notice requirements. View "State ex rel. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Honorable Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Employer in this action brought by Employee for wrongful discharge under the West Virginia Business Liability Protection Act and wrongful discharge under Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978), holding that questions of material fact remained precluding summary judgment.In granting summary judgment for Employer the circuit court concluded that Employer did not violate the Act and that Employee's Harless claim lacked any basis. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that W. Va. Code 61-7-14(d)(1) and 61-7-14(d)(3) conflict with one another and that material issues of fact remained on this issue, requiring remand for further proceedings. View "Ransom v. Guardian Rehabilitation Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding the ownership of real property located in Martinsburg, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint.Petitioner brought this complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to ownership of the disputed real property and alleging claims of breach of fiduciary duty, tort of outrage, conversion, and tort damages. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Petitioner was not entitled to ownership of the real property or any of its household belongings. View "Gabbert v. Richard T. Coyne Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition precluding the circuit court from enforcing its September 30, 2022 order denying the Delaware Tribe of Indians' motion to transfer the underlying abuse and neglect proceedings to the District Court of the Delaware Tribe pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 to -1963, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to transfer this action to the tribal court.The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed a second amended abuse and neglect petition alleging that Father abandoned I.R. Father, who claimed to be a member of the Tribe, later indicated his desire to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. The Tribe successfully moved to intervene in the proceedings, after which the court concluded that the ICWA was not applicable to these proceedings. The court thus denied the Tribe's motion to transfer this action to the tribal court. This petition seeking a writ of prohibition followed. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in determining that the ICWA was inapplicable to this case; and (2) clearly erred in determining that good cause existed to deny transfer of this matter to the tribal court. View "State ex rel. Del. Tribe of Indians v. Honorable Nowicki-Eldridge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question that a jury's failure unanimously to decide the recommendation of mercy does not allow the circuit court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment required for a conviction of first-degree murder pursuant to W. Va. Code 61-2-2.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and conspiracy to commit murder. After the mercy phase of the bifurcated trial the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to mercy. The court ultimately discharged the jury and certified the question at issue to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) in a first-degree murder trial, the jury deciding whether the defendant receives mercy must reach a unanimous verdict; and (2) if the jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict then the trial court must declare a mistrial and impanel a new jury to determine whether Defendant should receive mercy. View "State v. Reeder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the business court disposing of WW Consultants, Inc.'s (WWC) claims for contractual indemnity in favor of third-party defendants but affirmed in part as to the denial of WWC's claims for implied indemnity and contribution in favor of third-party defendants, holding that the business court erred by granting summary judgment for third-party defendants on this claim.In this case arising from a dispute involving the construction of a wastewater treatment facility in Pocahontas County, WWC, the project's design engineer, appealed the business court's rulings dismissing or granting summary judgment to three third-party defendant contractors who supplied materials for or worked on the project. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) there were material questions of fact that precluded summary judgment as to WWC's contractual indemnity claim; (2) WWC failed to plead or present facts alleging the requisite special relationships to support its implied indemnity claims; and (3) WWC failed to plead contribution claims that are recognized under the modified comparative fault statutory scheme codified at W. Va. Code 55-7-13a to -13d. View "WW Consultants, Inc. v. Pocahontas County Public Service District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying motions to dismiss this tort action brought against correction officers Bryon Whetzel and Isaiah Blancarte and West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOC), holding that the circuit court erred in denying DOC's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's negligent training and supervision claim.Plaintiff asserted three claims against the officers, including failure to protect and deliberate indifference, and two claims against the DOC - failure to train and adequately supervise and vicarious liability for the violation of his clearly established rights under the Eighth Amendment. In denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff alleged sufficient particularized facts to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying the officers' motions to dismiss; (2) did not err in denying DOC's motion to dismiss the vicarious liability count; but (3) erred in denying DOC's motion to dismiss the negligent training and supervision count because the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to deprive DOC of the immunity from suit that otherwise attaches to its discretionary functions of training and supervising employees. View "W. Va. Division of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Robbins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's conviction of attempted murder in the second degree and other crimes, holding that the principles of double jeopardy were violated by Defendant's convictions for brandishing a deadly weapon and wanton endangerment involving Deputy Coty Pierson.Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, two counts of wanton endangerment, one involving Deputy Pierson and the other involving Jeffrey Barnhouse, and brandishing a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) the jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer should not be set aside; (2) it was plain error for Defendant to have been convicted and sentenced for brandishing and wanton endangerment of Deputy Pierson because those crimes were lesser included offenses of the offense of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer; and (3) the trial court did not favor the State during Defendant's trial. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's four felony convictions stemming from an incident resulting in a shooting death, holding that the admission of certain evidence prejudiced Defendant, requiring remand for a new trial.At the time of the underlying shooting Defendant was on parole from a previous felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, the charges against him included the status offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by refusing to accept his stipulation to his prior felony conviction on the grounds that Defendant offered it during the trial because, in fact, Defendant offered the evidence after the court refused the prosecutor's earlier attempts to obtain the stipulation. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that because the court's refusal permitted the State to admit evidence of the name and nature of Defendant's prior, similar offense, and the admission of this evidence prejudiced Defendant, the circuit court abused its discretion and unfairly prejudiced Defendant by refusing his offered stipulation. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the sentencing Petitioner consecutively to a definite term of forty years' imprisonment for first-degree robbery, one to ten years' imprisonment for grand larceny, one to fifteen years' imprisonment for burglary, and one to five years in prison for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit grand larceny, and conspiracy to commit burglary, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Petitioner argued, among other things, that the circuit court committed reversible error during sentencing by admitting testimonial evidence of her prior criminal charge over her objection because the State presented no evidence establishing how the charge related to her current case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Petitioner's prior criminal charge under W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b), and Petitioner did not open the door to the evidence; but (2) the prior-act evidence, while inadmissible, had no prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case and did not warrant a new trial. View "State v. Kessler" on Justia Law