Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case originated as a divorce action in the family court. During the pendency of child support enforcement proceedings initiated by the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (BCSE), the underlying abuse and neglect case was filed in the circuit court. In the abuse and neglect case, the circuit court terminated Father’s parental rights to the parties’ child and modified his support obligation. The circuit court subsequently held Father to be in contempt for nonpayment of child support and remanded the case to the family court for enforcement of the circuit court’s modified child support order. The BCSE appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court improperly remanded the case to the family court for enforcement of the child support order entered by the circuit court. View "In re Interest of J.L." on Justia Law

David Bunch, a real estate appraiser holding a license issued by the West Virginia Real Estate Licensing and Certification Board, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Cabell County seeking to halt an administrative disciplinary proceeding initiated against him. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was a state agency, and, pursuant to W. Va. Code 14-2-2(a)(1), venue for the action was proper only in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that it was unclear whether the Board was a “state agency” for purposes of the venue statute. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the Board is a state agency entitled to the special venue provisions of section 14-2-2(a)(1), and therefore, the circuit court erred when it allowed the action to proceed in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Real Estate Licensing & Cert. Bd. v. Hon. Christopher D. Chiles" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to two charges under an indictment - obtaining money by false pretenses and fraudulent scheme - and six counts in an information. Defendant later filed a motion to correct his sentence under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(a), contending that his two felony convictions under the indictment violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy principles do not preclude a conviction for a fraudulent scheme offense in addition to a conviction for any other offense arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. View "State v. Coles" on Justia Law

On August 5, 2014, the Mingo County Democratic Executive Committee nominated a candidate to fill a vacancy created by the former Family Court Judge for the Eighth Family Circuit. The Mingo County Commission was requested to place the candidate on the ballot for the general election scheduled for November 4, 2014. Seeking compliance with the state’s election laws, the Secretary of State ordered the Ballot Commissioners of Mingo County to remove from the 2014 general election ballot any and all references to an election to fill an unexpired term of judge for the Eighth Family Court Circuit. The Ballot Commissioners did not respond, and the Secretary of State sought extraordinary relief from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus, holding that the Ballot Commissioners lacked the authority to sua sponte place a candidate for a judicial office on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Tennant v. Ballot Comm’rs of Mingo County" on Justia Law

Petitioners entered into a written agreement with Bastian Homes and Lion Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “Bastian Homes”) for the construction of a new home. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. After a water leak allegedly substantially damaged major portions of the partially-constructed home, Petitioners sued Bastian Homes. Bastian Homes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the arbitration clause in the construction contract required the matter to be submitted to arbitration. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that the arbitration clause in this case was not bargained for and was therefore invalid. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) because the construction contract was properly formed and supported by sufficient consideration, there was no requirement that the arbitration clause be independently “bargained for”; and (2) because the circuit court decided the arbitration clause not unconscionable without the issue being fairly argued by the parties and without any factual development, this issue needed to be remanded for further development of the record.View "Kirby v. Lion Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Approximately one month after I.T. was born, Mother and I.T. moved into Grandmother’s residence. Mother moved out of Grandmother’s residence five months later, leaving I.T. in Grandmother’s care. Grandmother subsequently filed a petition requesting that she be appointed guardian of I.T. The circuit court denied the guardianship petition, finding (1) Grandmother failed to present evidence that Mother was an unfit mother; and (2) there was no finding of abuse or neglect by Mother upon I.T. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) issuing its ruling prior to receiving the report of I.T.’s guardian ad litem or the results of a paternity test; and (2) denying Grandmother’s guardianship petition.View "In re I.T." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a retention pond constructed in a subdivision for the purpose of catching water runoff. Patrick and Melinda Sterner, who owned property in the subdivision, contracted with WHR Group (WHR) to handle the sale of their home. Petitioners subsequently entered into a contract to purchase the property. Petitioners later filed an action against WHR, the Sterners, and Sahley Realty Company, the subdivision developer (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims for fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and breach of implied contract, alleging that a “slip” occurred on the retention bond prior to their purchase of the lot, which allowed the pond to cross the common boundary line onto their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this action, the circuit court acted properly in granting Respondents’ motions for summary judgment. View "Dickens v. Sahley Realty Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of wanton endangerment and sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his residence because, under the circumstances, the warrantless search of the residence was allowed under the emergency doctrine exception, and even in the absence of exigent circumstances, the police officers were entitled to conduct a protective search; and (2) the circuit court did not err in allowing the jury to hear testimony regarding the out-of-court identification of Petitioner made by the victim. View "State v. Kimble" on Justia Law

Mother filed two domestic violence petitions on behalf of B.C., her minor child. Mother’s second petition was granted, and an emergency protective order was entered in favor of B.C. and against Father. Mother subsequently filed an amended abuse and neglect petition asking the circuit court to terminate Father’s parental rights based upon his alleged abuse and neglect of B.C. The allegations were essentially the same allegations made in the domestic violence petition. The circuit court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if a civil domestic violence proceeding and a civil abuse and neglect proceeding involve the same underlying facts, the separate proceedings do not implicate the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.View "In re B.C." on Justia Law

After disagreements over Ripley Associates, LLC’s operation arose, the Domenick Marrara, Jr. Trust, which owned a twenty-five percent interest in Ripley, decided to dissociate from Ripley. The Trust and its Trustees filed this proceeding to enforce Ripley’s purchase of the Trust’s distributional interest. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court determined the fair market value of the Trust’s distributional interest in Ripley. The court subsequently ordered that Ripley should pay interest on this amount from the date the court determined the value of the Trust’s distributional interest at the hearing. The Trustees appealed, arguing that they were entitled to receive interest on the Trust’s distributional interest from the date of its dissociation from Ripley. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payment of interest upon a dissociated member’s distributional interest in an at-will limited liability company is calculated from the date of dissociation.View "Marrara v. Ripley Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law