Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While owning a one-fifth interest in two tracts of land in Wyoming County, George P. Cook appointed his son, Gene, as his power of attorney. Subsequently, Gene, acting under the power of attorney, conveyed to himself George’s undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts of land. George subsequently died. Approximately one decade later, Gene, as the ostensible owner of the undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts, along with the owners of the other four-fifths interest, leased the property to Toney’s Fork Land, LLC for mining activities. Thereafter, Gene field a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment quieting his title to the undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts. George’s daughters, Elizabeth and Katherine, counterclaimed, alleging that their father’s estate was the owner of the two tracts and that Gene had no authority to enter into the lease with Toney’s Fork. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gene, concluding that the power of attorney was authentic and that the deeds executed by Gene were valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the authenticity of the power of attorney, which brought into dispute the validity of the deeds. View "Chichester v. Cook" on Justia Law

Respondent obtained a home mortgage loan from Lender. Lender obtained a mortgage lender bond from Petitioner and later filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Code. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint naming Petitioner as defendant solely as surety for Lender. At the time this suit was filed, Lender was bankrupt and judgment proof. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the bond conditions had not been satisfied because Respondent had not obtained a judgment against the bond principal, Lender. The circuit court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that the bond at issue was a judgment bond and that the unambiguous bond language requires an aggrieved party to obtain a judgment against the principal before maintaining an action against the surety of the bond. View "Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. James" on Justia Law

The City of Bluefield charged Estella Robinson with having a dangerous animal. Robinson pled guilty to the charge. The municipal court subsequently ordered the dog to be killed. Robinson appealed. The circuit court concluded that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of Robinson’s dog and affirmed the municipal court’s order. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the municipal court for entry of an order vacating its order to kill Robinson’s dog, holding (1) before the destruction of a dog may be ordered under the authority of W. Va. Code 19-20-20, satisfactory proof that the dog is “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons or other dogs or animals” must be presented before a circuit court or magistrate; and (2) because the City of Bluefield did not offer such proof before a circuit court or a magistrate, the circuit court erred by affirming the municipal court’s order. View "Robinson v. City of Bluefield" on Justia Law

In 1982, Hospital and Doctor entered into a “Memorandum Agreement” in which Hospital agreed to deed certain real property to Doctor. The Memorandum Agreement contained a provision entitled “Option to Repurchase.” In 2012, Hospital filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Doctor asking the circuit court to declare that the Option to Repurchase was an option contract rather than a right of first refusal. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that the Option to Repurchase agreement was a “valid” option contract. Doctor appealed, arguing that the validity of the option contract was not an issue before the circuit court, and therefore, the summary judgment order should be reversed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the ruling contained in the circuit court’s summary judgment order that the option contract was a “valid” option contract, as Hospital’s complaint for declaratory judgment did not seek a determination of the validity of the option contract; and (2) affirmed the order’s ruling that the Option to Repurchase agreement was an option contract. View "Black v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Buckhannon, Inc." on Justia Law

After Patricia Kelch, a resident of the Town of Shepherdstown, constructed a fence around the perimeter of her property, Kelch filed an application for a building permit with the Shepherdstown Planning Commission, seeking to make the fence a permanent fixture. The Planning Commission denied the application. On appeal, the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Shepherdstown (“BZA”) granted a variance with regard to the fencing material and ordered Kelch to lower the fence height, finding that Kelch met all the requirements for the granting of a variance. Borys Tkacz, an adjoining property owner of Kelch, appealed the BZA’s decision. The circuit court vacated the decision of the BZA and awarded Tkacz attorney’s fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in concluding that the BZA had no jurisdiction over the matter; (2) erred in finding that the BZA applied an erroneous principle of law; and (3) improperly substituted its judgment for that of the BZA. View "Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Shepherdstown v. Tkacz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting a system of precedent intended to clarify the weight of opinions issued by the Court, holding that the trial court (1) did not improperly admit prior bad act evidence at trial; (2) abused its discretion in admitting certain lay opinion testimony, but the error was harmless; (3) did not abuse its discretion in precluding testimony by a psychiatrist; (4) did not err in rejecting a plea agreement; and (5) did not err in admitting opinion testimony by a fact witness. In addition, Petitioner waived his allegation that the trial court erred in its ruling concerning Facebook evidence. View "State v. McKinley" on Justia Law

This case originated as a divorce action in the family court. During the pendency of child support enforcement proceedings initiated by the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (BCSE), the underlying abuse and neglect case was filed in the circuit court. In the abuse and neglect case, the circuit court terminated Father’s parental rights to the parties’ child and modified his support obligation. The circuit court subsequently held Father to be in contempt for nonpayment of child support and remanded the case to the family court for enforcement of the circuit court’s modified child support order. The BCSE appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court improperly remanded the case to the family court for enforcement of the child support order entered by the circuit court. View "In re Interest of J.L." on Justia Law

David Bunch, a real estate appraiser holding a license issued by the West Virginia Real Estate Licensing and Certification Board, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Circuit Court of Cabell County seeking to halt an administrative disciplinary proceeding initiated against him. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was a state agency, and, pursuant to W. Va. Code 14-2-2(a)(1), venue for the action was proper only in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that it was unclear whether the Board was a “state agency” for purposes of the venue statute. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that the Board is a state agency entitled to the special venue provisions of section 14-2-2(a)(1), and therefore, the circuit court erred when it allowed the action to proceed in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Real Estate Licensing & Cert. Bd. v. Hon. Christopher D. Chiles" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to two charges under an indictment - obtaining money by false pretenses and fraudulent scheme - and six counts in an information. Defendant later filed a motion to correct his sentence under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(a), contending that his two felony convictions under the indictment violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy principles do not preclude a conviction for a fraudulent scheme offense in addition to a conviction for any other offense arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. View "State v. Coles" on Justia Law

On August 5, 2014, the Mingo County Democratic Executive Committee nominated a candidate to fill a vacancy created by the former Family Court Judge for the Eighth Family Circuit. The Mingo County Commission was requested to place the candidate on the ballot for the general election scheduled for November 4, 2014. Seeking compliance with the state’s election laws, the Secretary of State ordered the Ballot Commissioners of Mingo County to remove from the 2014 general election ballot any and all references to an election to fill an unexpired term of judge for the Eighth Family Court Circuit. The Ballot Commissioners did not respond, and the Secretary of State sought extraordinary relief from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus, holding that the Ballot Commissioners lacked the authority to sua sponte place a candidate for a judicial office on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Tennant v. Ballot Comm’rs of Mingo County" on Justia Law