Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with first degree murder and found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner subsequently requested a bench trial to give him the opportunity to establish defenses to the charged offense. At the conclusion of a hearing held pursuant to W. Va. Code 27-6A-6, the trial court ruled that the evidence adduced, were it to go to trial, could result in a verdict of second degree murder. The court determined that it retained jurisdiction over Petitioner for forty years based on the maximum sentence specified for a conviction of second degree murder and remanded him to the custody of William R. Sharpe Hospital for the duration of that period of time. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding (1) Petitioner was not unconstitutionally denied his right to a jury trial because the right to a jury trial does not attach to a hearing requested pursuant to section 27-6A-6; and (2) the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient for the trial court to rule that the State had demonstrated Petitioner committed second degree murder for commitment purposes. View "State v. Gum" on Justia Law

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board (collectively, the ODC) issued an informal advisory opinion that determined (1) the Attorney General did not have authority to prosecute criminal cases outside of the limited prosecutorial authority granted by W. Va. Code 5-3-2, and (2) the Rules of Professional Conduct would be violated if the Attorney General prosecuted assisted county prosecutors in certain criminal prosecutions. The Attorney General subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent ODC from enforcing the informal advisory opinion, contending that county prosecutors have authority to request the Attorney General to assist with criminal prosecutions and that the office of the Attorney General has independent common law authority to prosecute criminal cases. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) county prosecutors do not have statutory authority to appoint the Attorney General as a special prosecutor; and (2) under the state Constitution and statutory law, the common law criminal prosecutorial authority of the Attorney General was abolished. View "State ex rel. Morrisey v. W. Va. Office of Disciplinary Counsel" on Justia Law

Petitioner, West Virginia Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. (WVMIC), was a professional medical liability insurer that insured physicians, medical practices and others in West Virginia. The medical malpractice claims underlying the current dispute were asserted by Respondents against their surgeon’s former employer, United Health Professional, Inc. (UHP), a medical corporation insured under a medical malpractice policy issued by WVMIC for the year 2010. Under the terms of a global settlement agreement, WVMIC tendered $3 million to Respondents under an extended reporting endorsement insuring the surgeon. The settlement further provided that Respondents and WVMIC would abide by a judicial determination as to whether additional insurance limits were available for Respondents’ vicarious liability claims against UHP. The circuit court concluded that there was an additional $6 million in policy limits available for Respondents’ claims against UHP. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that UHP has a total of $3 million in separate policy limits under the 2010 policy for Respondents’ claims asserted against it, which amount was in addition to the $3 million that WVMIC previously tendered under the global settlement agreement for the claims asserted against the surgeon. Remanded. View "W. Va. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Dawn Hanna worked for the Board of Education of Webster County as a teacher from 1989 until 2012. After fundraiser proceeds went missing, Hanna was informed that she would be charged with felony embezzlement but that she could avoid prosecution by resigning from her position and paying back the missing funds. Pursuant to this discussion, Hanna resigned from her position. Hanna subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review of WorkForce West Virginia concluded that Hanna was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because she voluntarily quit her job. The circuit court reversed, finding that Hanna acted under duress and that her decision to resign was not voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WorkForce was not clearly wrong when it found that Hanna resigned voluntarily, and therefore, the circuit court erred in reversing WorkForce’s findings. View "Bd. of Educ. of Webster County v. Hanna" on Justia Law

While owning a one-fifth interest in two tracts of land in Wyoming County, George P. Cook appointed his son, Gene, as his power of attorney. Subsequently, Gene, acting under the power of attorney, conveyed to himself George’s undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts of land. George subsequently died. Approximately one decade later, Gene, as the ostensible owner of the undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts, along with the owners of the other four-fifths interest, leased the property to Toney’s Fork Land, LLC for mining activities. Thereafter, Gene field a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment quieting his title to the undivided one-fifth interest in the two tracts. George’s daughters, Elizabeth and Katherine, counterclaimed, alleging that their father’s estate was the owner of the two tracts and that Gene had no authority to enter into the lease with Toney’s Fork. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Gene, concluding that the power of attorney was authentic and that the deeds executed by Gene were valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the authenticity of the power of attorney, which brought into dispute the validity of the deeds. View "Chichester v. Cook" on Justia Law

Respondent obtained a home mortgage loan from Lender. Lender obtained a mortgage lender bond from Petitioner and later filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Code. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint naming Petitioner as defendant solely as surety for Lender. At the time this suit was filed, Lender was bankrupt and judgment proof. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the bond conditions had not been satisfied because Respondent had not obtained a judgment against the bond principal, Lender. The circuit court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that the bond at issue was a judgment bond and that the unambiguous bond language requires an aggrieved party to obtain a judgment against the principal before maintaining an action against the surety of the bond. View "Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. James" on Justia Law

The City of Bluefield charged Estella Robinson with having a dangerous animal. Robinson pled guilty to the charge. The municipal court subsequently ordered the dog to be killed. Robinson appealed. The circuit court concluded that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of Robinson’s dog and affirmed the municipal court’s order. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the municipal court for entry of an order vacating its order to kill Robinson’s dog, holding (1) before the destruction of a dog may be ordered under the authority of W. Va. Code 19-20-20, satisfactory proof that the dog is “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons or other dogs or animals” must be presented before a circuit court or magistrate; and (2) because the City of Bluefield did not offer such proof before a circuit court or a magistrate, the circuit court erred by affirming the municipal court’s order. View "Robinson v. City of Bluefield" on Justia Law

In 1982, Hospital and Doctor entered into a “Memorandum Agreement” in which Hospital agreed to deed certain real property to Doctor. The Memorandum Agreement contained a provision entitled “Option to Repurchase.” In 2012, Hospital filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Doctor asking the circuit court to declare that the Option to Repurchase was an option contract rather than a right of first refusal. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Hospital, finding that the Option to Repurchase agreement was a “valid” option contract. Doctor appealed, arguing that the validity of the option contract was not an issue before the circuit court, and therefore, the summary judgment order should be reversed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the ruling contained in the circuit court’s summary judgment order that the option contract was a “valid” option contract, as Hospital’s complaint for declaratory judgment did not seek a determination of the validity of the option contract; and (2) affirmed the order’s ruling that the Option to Repurchase agreement was an option contract. View "Black v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Buckhannon, Inc." on Justia Law

After Patricia Kelch, a resident of the Town of Shepherdstown, constructed a fence around the perimeter of her property, Kelch filed an application for a building permit with the Shepherdstown Planning Commission, seeking to make the fence a permanent fixture. The Planning Commission denied the application. On appeal, the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Shepherdstown (“BZA”) granted a variance with regard to the fencing material and ordered Kelch to lower the fence height, finding that Kelch met all the requirements for the granting of a variance. Borys Tkacz, an adjoining property owner of Kelch, appealed the BZA’s decision. The circuit court vacated the decision of the BZA and awarded Tkacz attorney’s fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in concluding that the BZA had no jurisdiction over the matter; (2) erred in finding that the BZA applied an erroneous principle of law; and (3) improperly substituted its judgment for that of the BZA. View "Bd. of Zoning Appeals of the Town of Shepherdstown v. Tkacz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed after adopting a system of precedent intended to clarify the weight of opinions issued by the Court, holding that the trial court (1) did not improperly admit prior bad act evidence at trial; (2) abused its discretion in admitting certain lay opinion testimony, but the error was harmless; (3) did not abuse its discretion in precluding testimony by a psychiatrist; (4) did not err in rejecting a plea agreement; and (5) did not err in admitting opinion testimony by a fact witness. In addition, Petitioner waived his allegation that the trial court erred in its ruling concerning Facebook evidence. View "State v. McKinley" on Justia Law