Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This matter involved two consolidated writs of prohibition filed under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of circuit court orders that denied their motions to disqualify private attorneys from representing the State as special assistant attorneys general, contending that the fee arrangements of the special assistant attorneys general violated the West Virginia Governmental Ethics Act and the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and that the attorney general lacked the authority to appoint special assistant attorneys general. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding (1) Petitioners failed to establish that the special assistant attorneys general actually engaged in any improper conduct that caused an injury; (2) the Court improperly held in Manchin v. Browning, which was heretofore overruled, that the office of attorney general did not retain inherent common law powers; and (3) while the circuit courts relied on the wrong reasons for rejecting the motions to disqualify the special assistant attorneys general, those courts nevertheless were correct in denying the motions. View "State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

In 2008, Donte Newsome, a university student, was the innocent victim of murder. In 2009, Newsome's mother, Angela Smith, submitted an application to the court of claims seeking reimbursement from the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund for medical expenses, funeral and burial costs, and student loans owed by Newsome at the time of his death. Smith was granted an award for medical expenses and funeral and burial costs but was denied compensation for the student loans. After a hearing, the court of claims denied Smith's request for reimbursement of her son's unpaid student loans pursuant to the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Act, concluding that student loans are contractual obligations that cannot be reimbursed under the Act. The Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for writ of certiorari, holding that Newsome's student loans were not subject to reimbursement under the Act because they were not loans that Newsome was unable to receive or use, in whole or in part, prior to his death. View "State ex rel. Smith v. W. Va. Crime Victims Comp. Fund" on Justia Law

Mother had two infant twin boys, Joseph and Walter. Joseph died after ingesting a lethal dose of Suboxone. Neither the investigations by law enforcement nor Mother's inquiries into Joseph's death were able to determine how Joseph ingested the drug or where it originated. The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) later filed an imminent danger petition alleging that Walter was a neglected and/or abused child based on the death of Joseph. After a hearing, the circuit court found (1) Mother neglected Walter and Joseph by failing to provide them with appropriate supervision the night of Joseph's death; and (2) Walter was a neglected child, and it was contrary to his welfare to reside with Mother in her home. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred in concluding that Walter was a neglected child. View "In re Walter G." on Justia Law

William Piper was killed in a motor vehicle accident in which he was driving. His passenger, Kyle Hoffman, was also killed. The Estate of Hoffman subsequently filed suit against the Estate of Piper. The case was bifurcated into two parts for trial. Relevant to this appeal was the declaratory judgment action of insurance coverage involving State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. The declaratory judgment coverage action involved the question of whether Piper was a resident of the home of his grandparents at the time of his death. If he was, there would be coverage under a State Farm personal liability umbrella policy issued to Piper's grandfather. The jury returned a verdict finding Piper lived with his grandparents, thus finding in favor of Hoffman's Estate on the coverage issue. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erroneously applied the Dead Man's Statute in prohibiting the testimony of Piper's family members and the introduction of documentary evidence regarding where Piper was residing on the date of his death. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the Dead Man's Statute is invalid, as it conflicts with the paramount authority of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Prinz" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted on two counts of first degree murder and one count of first degree arson. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murders and a sentence of twenty years for the arson, to run consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that the trial court did not err in (1) permitting the trial to be held in the circuit court of Mercer County; (2) admitting into evidence a statement Defendant made regarding his observation of the two dead victims; (3) admitting into evidence certain of Defendant's telephone conversations from jail; (4) finding the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for first degree murder; and (5) permitting a photographic array in the identification of Defendant. In addition, any error in the admission of certain testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Defendant's sentence was proportionate to the offenses committed. View "State v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Mother sought to change the name of Daughter. Mother filed a name change petition to request a hyphenated surname for Daughter. Father opposed the name change request, arguing that he was likely to be injured by the change of Daughter's name and that the alteration of Daughter's name would not significantly advance her best interests. The trial court allowed the requested hyphenated name change. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court failed properly to apply the standard governing a name change request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that clear and convincing evidence did not support the finding that the name change would significantly advance the best interests of Daughter. View "In re Name Change of Jenna A.J." on Justia Law

After Petitioner's daughter, A.P., was born, Petitioner and A.P. lived with Petitioner's mother, Respondent. Two and one-half months later, Petitioner and A.P. moved out of Respondent's home. The relationship between Petitioner and Respondent subsequently deteriorated, and Petitioner prohibited further visitation between A.P. and Respondent. Respondent subsequently filed a petition for grandparent visitation. The family court awarded grandparent visitation to Respondent, and the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower tribunals erred in finding that Respondent rebutted the statutory presumption against grandparent visitation by clear and convincing evidence that an award of grandparent visitation was in the best interest of A.P. View "In re Grandparent Visitation of A.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to entering without breaking. The circuit court ordered Petitioner to be placed at the Anthony Center for Youthful Offenders. The warden later determined Petitioner was unfit to continue his placement at that facility, and Petitioner was transferred to jail. After a hearing to determine if the warden abused his discretion in removing Petitioner from the Anthony Center, the circuit court reinstated Petitioner's original one to ten year prison sentence and ordered that Petitioner not be given any credit towards the sentence for the time served at the Anthony Center. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in upholding the warden's decision to expel Petitioner from the Anthony Center; but (2) erroneously denied Petitioner's request for credit for time served. Remanded. View "State v. Fitzsimmons" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles revoked the driving privileges of Respondents for driving under the influence of alcohol. After Respondents filed petitions for review of the administrative orders, the circuit courts granted Respondents' motions for stay of the revocation. The Commissioner sought to prohibit the circuit courts from entering orders staying the license revocations of Respondents, alleging that the circuit courts exceeded their jurisdiction and violated the requirements of W. Va. 17C-5A-2(s) and applicable case law by failing to (1) require Respondents to present evidence that there was a substantial probability that Respondents would prevail on the merits and the Respondents would suffer irreparable harm if the orders were not stayed, (2) provide findings of fact and conclusions of law in the orders, and (3) limit the stays to 150 days. The Supreme Court granted the Commission relief in prohibition, holding that the stay orders violated the requirements of section 17C-5A-2(s) and applicable case law, and therefore, the circuit courts exceeded their jurisdiction in granting Respondents' respective motions. View "State ex rel. Miller v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner was employed as a custodian by Respondent, the Board of Education of the County of Raleigh under a 210-day regular contract and thirty-day summer contract that did not include paid vacation days. Petitioner filed a grievance against Respondent in 2007, asserting that Respondent violated the uniformity provisions in W. Va. Code 18A-4-5b and the discrimination prohibition of W. Va. Code 6C-2-2(d) by employing a similarly situated custodian with a 261-day contract that included paid vacation days. The West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board found Petitioner established that Respondent violated sections 18A-4-5b and 6C-2-2(d) but denied both back pay and prospective relief to Petitioner. The circuit court affirmed the denial of relief. Petitioner appealed, seeking lost wages for the school year after which Petitioner initiated his grievance. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of relief to Petitioner, holding that an employee who holds a 210-day regular contract and a thirty-day contract to perform related duties during a summer school term does not perform like assignments and duties with a school service employee who holds a 261-day regular contract for the purpose of the uniformity provisions found in section 18A-4-5b. View "Patterson v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Raleigh" on Justia Law