Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Fairmont owned and operated Fairmont General Hospital (FGH) until 1985. In 1984, the City Council adopted section 4.06 of the Fairmont City Charter, which provided that the board of directors of the hospital would be appointed by the Council. FGH then became a private, not-for-profit corporation. In 2010, FGH amended its bylaws to provide for appointment of its board members by the board itself, rather than the Council. FGH also amended its articles of incorporation to comport with the amended bylaws. After the Council challenged FGH's authority to make appointments to the hospital board, FGH filed an action seeking a declaration that section 4.06 of the city charter was no longer applicable to the hospital. The City and Council counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that FGH's amended bylaws were void. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the City nor the Council had standing to challenge, either as ultra vires or as a violation of the city charter, the actions of the hospital's board in amending its bylaws, appointing new members to the board, and amending the articles of incorporation. View "The City of Fairmont v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder without a recommendation of mercy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court committed error by failing to grant Defendant's motion to strike a prospective juror for cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion. In so holding, the Court took the opportunity to overrule State v. Phillips, which permitted a new trial whenever a criminal defendant used a peremptory strike to remove a prospective juror that should have been struck for cause, holding (1) a trial court's failure to remove a biased juror from a jury panel does not violate a criminal defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury if the defendant removes the juror with a peremptory strike; and (2) to obtain a new trial for having used a peremptory strike to remove a biased juror from a jury panel, a criminal defendant must show prejudice. View "State v. Sutherland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder without a recommendation of mercy and sentenced to life in prison without mercy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in determining that Defendant's statement to law enforcement should not be suppressed because the prompt presentment statute had not been violated; (2) did not deny Defendant's due process rights when it denied counsel's motion to withdraw based on an asserted conflict of interest, as there was no actual conflict, and Defendant waived the alleged conflict of interest claim; and (3) did not deny Defendant's right to a fair trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct due to the prosecutor's comments during closing argument, as the prosecutor's remarks neither clearly prejudiced Defendant nor resulted in manifest injustice. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Tobby Small and James Ramsey were involved in a traffic accident. Small filed an action against Ramsey and others in federal court, and Ramsey filed an action against Small and others in circuit court. Small filed a motion to dismiss the federal case on the grounds that Ramsey failed to file a compulsory counterclaim. The circuit court ordered Ramsey to file a counterclaim in Small's federal case, and ordered Small not to object to Ramsey's motion to amend his answer so he could file a counterclaim. Ramsey eventually settled with Small, but the other defendants did not. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Small, Small unsuccessfully filed a motion for summary judgment in Ramsey's circuit court case. The circuit court ruled that Small waived the asserted issues because he had disobeyed the court's order not to contest Ramsey's motion to amend his answer. Small then filed for this writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the circuit court exceeded its authority in prohibiting Small from raising a defense to Ramsey's counterclaim in the federal litigation and in sanctioning him for exercising his right to assert a defense; and (2) the doctrine of res judicata barred Ramsey's action against Small. View "State ex rel. Small v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

After Stepfather was arrested and admitted to sexual abuse of one of Mother's children, the Department removed Mother's two children from the home and filed an abuse and neglect petition against Mother. After an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children were abused. The court also denied Mother's motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Later, the circuit court entered a dispositional order terminating Mother's parental rights to the two children. Mother appealed, asserting that her due process rights were violated, that no imminent danger existed at the time her children were taken into custody, that she should have been granted an improvement period, and that the lower court failed to impose the least restrictive alternative disposition so as to protect the best interests of her children. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment; but (2) remanded for a determination of whether the permanent placement of the children with their biological father was appropriate. View "In re Timber M." on Justia Law

The circuit court adjudicated Mother and Father abusive and neglectful and terminated their parental rights to three children. Mother and Father appealed, contending, among other things, that the circuit court erred in finding that an altercation involving Father and their grandfather, which was witnessed by the children, constituted abuse and/or neglect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Department of Health and Human Resources failed to properly amend the abuse and neglect petition prior to adjudication, and the circuit court failed to permit proper amendment post-adjudication, such to encompass all of the allegations made evident during the course of the proceeding; and (2) the circuit court's analysis and findings in support of the disposition were deficient. Remanded. View "In re Lilith H." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) filed an abuse and neglect petition against Mother and Father, the biological parents of two girls. After an adjudicatory hearing establishing the children were abused and neglected, Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. Mother was granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period. The circuit court later granted Mother a one-year rehabilitation period, finding that Mother benefitted from the services provided. DHHR subsequently filed a motion to terminate Mother's parental rights. After a dispositional hearing, the circuit court terminated Mother's parental rights, finding, among other things, that Mother participated in rehabilitative services but failed to benefit from them in ways that would protect the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neglect and parental unfitness were not established by clear, cogent, and convincing grounds. Remanded for development of a reunification plan. View "In re Jessica M." on Justia Law

These two consolidated cases involved a bond for which Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) was the surety. Each bond principal was sued, and both cases resulted in the entry of default judgments. Hartford was not given notice of either lawsuit against its principals or notice that default judgments were being sought. Hartford learned of the default judgments only after the plaintiffs in those cases sought payment on the bonds. In each case, Hartford ultimately was found liable on the bond. Hartford appealed, asserting that the circuit courts erred in finding the bonds to be judgment bonds and in holding Hartford liable on the bonds under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two bonds at issue were judgment bonds, and therefore, the circuit courts correctly found that default judgments entered against the bond principals were conclusive and binding against Hartford. View "Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were six custodial parents of children who were owed child support from the noncustodial parent suing on behalf of their respective children. Defendants included the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR), the Support Enforcement Commission (SEC), and the Bureau for Child Support Enforcement (BCSE). In each case, child support orders were entered requiring the noncustodial parents to pay a certain amount of child support each month, but the orders were not preserved, and significant portions of the child support payments in arrears were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to reduce their respective support arrearages to judgment and/or to renew such judgments, thus causing their claims to become time-barred. The circuit court concluded that further factual development was necessary to determine whether Plaintiffs had a private cause of action under the statutes governing child support enforcement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a private cause of action under the statutes governing collection of child support by the BCSE. View "Fucillo v. Kerner" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father divorced in Colorado, Mother was awarded primary custody of the parties' two minor children subject to visitation by Father, who subsequently moved to Virginia. Mother later moved with the children to West Virginia so the children could be closer to Father. Father then filed a motion for modification. The lower courts modified the parties' prior custodial arrangement and awarded primary custody to Father. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the lower courts erred in finding Mother's move to West Virginia was a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the lower courts erred in modifying custody based, in large part, on the fact that Father's new wife was a stay-at-home mom who could provide childcare; and (3) the best interests of the children were served by maintaining primary custodial responsibility with Mother. View "Andrea H. v. Jason R.C." on Justia Law